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Politics has been an integral part of Korean football since the Japanese colonial era 
when the game became a vehicle for the Korean independence movement. The split 
between North and South Korea following the Korean War further accentuated the 
intrusion of politics into the domain of Korean football. As Koreans residing on either 
side of the border followed the game with intense interest and often regarded 
performance in international competition as a signifier of national prestige, the 
governments of both North and South Korea attached more importance to football 
than to any other sport and became its foremost patrons. In these circumstances it is 
not surprising to find that the relative performance of the national teams of North and 
South Korea mirrored changing economic and political conditions. Thus the rapid rise of 
North Korean football in the 1960s was a reflection of the state‘s systematic and 
successful postwar reconstruction. Since the 1980s, however, South Korea, with its 
booming economy, has clearly surpassed its increasingly impoverished northern 
counterparts in the football field.  
 
Undoubtedly, the most two important events pertaining to the development of Korean 
football were the 1966 and 2002 World Cups. They provided occasions when nationalist 
sentiment could be expressed through football in both North and South Korea. They 
also provided opportunities for Korean footballers, through their achievements on the 
field, to show that the gap between the traditional periphery and core of world football 
was narrowing. At the same time, participation in competition at this level, whether by 
teams from North or South Korea, suggested that there was a recognizable and 
distinctive Korean football style nurtured in training camps where the emphasis was on 
producing players with sufficient stamina to run at their opponents for ninety minutes. 
Tireless running football has been the characteristic of successful teams from both 
North and South Korea. Thus, while recognizing the profound ideological differences 
that separate North and South Korea, this thesis also emphasizes the football tradition 
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(1) An overview: a national game for the two Koreas   
 
Over the course of the twentieth century the Korean people suffered a series of unusual 
and agonizing experiences: Japanese colonization, the Korean War, and then the division 
into two nation states, North and South Korea. The Japanese annexation of Korea in 
1910 gave rise to a movement for independence, and the ensuing struggle meant that 
anti-Japanese sentiments became deeply entrenched in the Korean psyche. However, it 
is unfortunate that the liberation from Japanese imperialism in 1945 was followed by 
the tragic Korean War (1950-53). After the split, North and South Korea rapidly fell into 
Cold War politics in which both camps attempted to defeat their neighbours in any field. 
These socio-political circumstances have contributed to the strong sense of national 
identity that exists in both North and South Korea and sport had played a major part in 
this process. All the modern sports introduced into Korea helped to foster the spirit of 
the independence under the Japanese and sports later turned into a high-profile battle 
ground during the Cold War. As Ha and Mangan have argued, modern sport in Korea 
was essentially ‗the consequence of its political priorities‘.1 
 
Changes in Korean society over the years are clearly reflected in the history of Korean 
football. For the Koreans there has been no sport to surpass football in terms of its 
                                           
 1 Nam-gil Ha and J. Mangan, ‗Ideology, Politics, Power: Korean Sport-Transformation, 1945-92‘, in Fan 
Hong and J. Mangan, (eds.), Sport in Asian Society: Past and Present, London, 2002, 213.     
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popularity and national importance. During the Japanese colonization era, football 
emerged as a national game since it provided more victories over Japanese than did 
any other sport. This established a patriotic tradition that meant that the two Koreas 
attached great importance to football at the outset of the Cold War. The World Cup 
successes enjoyed by North Korea in 1966 and South Korea in 2002 exemplify the 
Korean effort to put their nations on the international map through football. As far as 
the totalitarian North Korean government was concerned their team‘s football‘s 
memorable feat in reaching the World Cup quarter-finals in 1966 provided evidence of 
how their post-war reconstruction and state-making programmes were on track. The 
miracle in England quickly became a source of North Korean national pride and for 36 
years could be claimed as a unique achievement because no other Asian national team 
reached the quarter-finals until 2002.2 In another sense, however, 1966 has evoked 
nostalgic feelings for North Koreans especially as it came to represent the summit of 
the nation‘s football achievement. In 36 years North Korean football never achieved the 
same level of success and disappointing performances on the field seem to have 
reflected the experience of an increasingly impoverished and internationally isolated 
society. In addition, periods of absence from international competition caused either by 
the ruling party‘s intervention or because of punishments prompted by the violent 
behaviour of its players, have not helped the development of North Korean football.  
 
Ironically, North Korea‘s success in 1966 may have had a greater impact on South Korea 
where football development was significantly stimulated by the success of their 
northern neighbour. In a nation with a political culture characterized by pervasive anti-
                                           
2 Dong-gyu Lee et al., Football: Past and Present, Pyongyang, 2001, 140. 
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communism it was seen as important to match or even surpass North Korea‘s 
achievements and this prompted the government to inaugurate a new international 
football tournament, a significant watershed that established football as a component of 
South Korean national consciousness. Developments in South Korea were also 
influenced by the sudden emergence of Japan as a football power when its team 
captured the bronze medal at the 1968 Mexico Olympics. The traditional rivalry 
between Korea and Japan dating from the colonial era provided a further incentive for 
the South Korean military regime to encourage the game‘s development. Indeed, as one 
social critic has noted, ‗Japan and North Korea supplied the two most important 
impetuses for [the government] to cultivate South Korean football‘.3 Thus, though it 
took a different form, state intervention was as important a characteristic of football 
development in the South as it was in the North. For both North and South Korea 
victories in football internationals, including the ‗Korean Derby‘ were increasingly 
regarded as a matter of national prestige. 
 
The success of South Korea in the 2002 World Cup, like the success of North Korea in 
1966, had important ramifications. It was not just what happened on the field that was 
significant. South Korea‘s role at co-host in staging this global event sent out reassuring 
signals about the nation‘s ascent to the status of an advanced society. The real 
sensation, however, was brought about by South Koreans coming out to the streets. 
Crowds of passionate red-shirted people rooting for South Korean team at the City Hall 
plaza in Seoul, where a host of ordinary people had called for political reform from the 
authoritarian government in 1987, symbolized South Korea‘s internal shift to a more 
                                           
3 Jun-man Kang, Football is Korea: A 124-year History of Korean football (1882-2006), Seoul, 2006, 12.  
13 
 
democratically mature entity. ‗This fervour over the World Cup‘, a Korean sociologist has 
observed, was ‗about national pride, identity, and confidence‘. 4  Against this social 
backdrop, the South Korean team manager, the Dutchman Guus Hiddink, emerged as a 
national hero. Every corner of South Korean society was awash with high praise on his 
leadership. South Koreans were particularly impressed by his impartial and pragmatic 
team selections. This seemed to defy the cronyism and favouritism which had become 
deeply ingrained in South Korea during the period of rapid economic development.  
 
The wave of red in the streets, it has been argued, indicated that South Korea had 
begun to free itself from the endemic ‗red complex‘ of pervasive anti-communism. The 
‗good old days‘ of North Korean football became a matter of common interest to 
Koreans on both sides of the border, especially when South Korea upset Italy at the 
stadium festooned with plastic cards reading ‗Again 1966‘. Significantly an edited hour-
long version of this match was aired by the Korean broadcasting company, Chosun 
Joongang TV.5 This was a very exceptional decision for North Korea. It might have been 
the intention to refresh fading memories of 1966 by broadcasting this match. In the 
context of the policy of appeasement towards the North being pursued at the time by 
the incumbent South Korean president, Kim Dae Jung, the 2002 World Cup helped to 
remind all Koreans of the proverb: ‗blood is thicker than water‘.   
 
For all its positive effects, the 2002 World Cup generated some concerns about South 
Korean football. The fanatical World Cup fever surrounding the national team 
represented a marked contrast with the public indifference to local professional fixtures. 
                                           
4 Gi-wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, And Legacy, Stanford, 2006, 1.  
5 North Korea, July 2006, 128. 
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This characteristic was rooted in early twentieth century Korean history when Korean 
football became inextricably bound up with nationalism and resentment of Japanese 
rule. Kang Jun Man has pointed out, that Koreans, are fond of obtaining ‗values and 
meanings through football rather than football itself ‘. 6 It is undeniable that the Korean 
professional football league has been dwarfed by the immense popularity of ‗FC Korea‘. 
This phenomenon could also be attributable to a weak connection between the football 
clubs and regionalism. It is through baseball that regional identity in the South has 
been most strongly expressed. Thus there is a clear sporting demarcation. For South 
Korean sports enthusiasts, it is the performance of the national team in international 
competition that matters, while domestic baseball is their staple diet.  
 
(2) The historiography of Korean football  
 
The existing literature on the history of football in Korea is not extensive. The Korea 
Football Association (KFA) sponsored two official histories published in 1986 and 2003. 
However, although these books provide an outline for understanding how the game in 
Korea has been transformed, they concentrate, to a considerable degree, on 
international matches which are looked at with an uncritical eye.7  Later, in 2005, the 
KFA published a collection of biographies of six Korean football celebrities, including 
Cha Bum Kun, the all-time leading scorer for the South Korean national team, and Guus 
Hiddink, to mark their induction into the Korean Football Hall of Fame. This book came 
up with a few new facts but lacked any analytical perspective.8  
                                           
6 Kang, Football is Korea, 9.  
7 Korea Football Association (KFA), A 100-year History of Korean Football, Seoul, 1986 and 2003.  
8 KFA, Korea Football Hall of Fame, Seoul, 2005. 
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Former journalists have made a major contribution to the historiography of Korean 
football. A National Pastime: Football and its Bright Morning (1997) and A National 
Pastime: Football and its Brilliant Traces (1999) are both worthy of notice.9 The former, 
in dealing with the Korean football during the colonial years, illustrates the story of 
Korean football‘s early development and diffusion through a myriad of colorful 
anecdotes. The latter indicates how Korean football has challenged to the World Cup 
following the years of the liberation onwards. Along with these books, A History of 
Korean Footballers has recently been published by another former journalist, using oral 
history gathered from interviews with old Korean international players. However, though 
these books have their uses and are cited here where relevant, they make little attempt 
to relate Korean football to its changing social context.  
 
Kang Jun Man has added to our understanding of the characteristics of Korean football 
and the changes it has experienced by setting them in a wider context. He has made 
use of Korean primary sources to demonstrate the relationship between Korean politics 
and football, focusing mainly on Korea-Japan and South-North football contests. His 
work makes the point that Korean football history is an essential part of modern Korean 
history that should not be overlooked by serious Korean historians. Korea-Japan football 
rivalry has also been researched by a Japanese author, Ohshima Hiroshi, who has drawn 
on a range of Korean and Japanese sources and weaves some important football 
matches between the two nations into his account of diplomatic relations between the 
two countries. The main strength of his study, The Legend of the Kick-off between Korea 
                                           
9 Gyung-heon Yun and Chang-shin Choi, A National Pastime: Football and its Bright Morning : A Story 
of Korean Sports History, vol. 3, Seoul, 1997; Duk-sang Shin and Duk-gi Kim, A National Pastime: 
Football and its Brilliant Traces: A Story of Korean Sports History, vol. 10, Seoul, 1999. 
16 
 
and Japan (1996) is that demonstrates how Korean football has been viewed in Japan 
and how it has been influenced by Japan and vice versa.10  In relation to this theme, a 
former Japanese football journalist, Goto Takeo, also provides us with compelling 
narrative on the subtle relations surrounding football issues between Korea and Japan. 
His two books, The Future Centuries of Japanese Soccer (1997) and A History of 
Japanese Soccer (2007), for instance, have elucidated some critical points on the 1986 
World Cup preliminaries and 2002 World Cup bidding race. 11 
 
There have been few attempts to explain the history of Korean football to an 
international readership. Most of studies on Korean football in English have been 
written either as part of the history of world football or as a theme pertaining to the 
2002 World Cup. William Murray has very briefly outlined the development of Korean 
football along with football in other Asian and African nations in his Football: A History 
of the World Game (1994).12 He later modified this brief account for a chapter on Asian 
football in Stephen Wagg‘s edited collection Giving the Game Away (1995). However, it 
was still insufficient to grasp Korean football clearly, though including a more detailed 
account of North and South Korean World Cup challenges. 13  David Goldblatt has 
described Korean football along the same lines of Murray while clearly suggesting that 
the rapid rise of South Korean football, especially after 1970, could be attributed to ‗the 
authoritarian, militaristic and nationalist foundations‘, established under the Park 
                                           
10 H. Ohshima, The legend of Kick-off between Japan and Korea, Tokyo, 1996, 10-384.  
11 T. Goto, The Future Centuries of Japanese Soccer, Tokyo, 1997, 61-78; A History of Japanese Soccer: 
the Ninety years of Japanese national team (1917-2006), Tokyo, 2007, 297-299. 
12 B. Murray, Football: A History of the World Game, Basingstoke, 1994, 200-227.  
13 B. Murray, Cultural Revolution? Football in the Societies of Asia and the Pacific, in S. Wagg (ed.), 
Giving the Game Away: Football, Politics and Culture on Five Continents, London, 1995, 138-161.  
17 
 
dictatorship (1961-79). 14  
 
It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that this analysis has been widely accepted 
by Korean academics.15 The South Korean government‘s interventionist strategy has 
been studied by Chung Hong Ik, a Korean sports sociologist, whose chapter in 
Manzenreiter and Horne‘s edited collection Football Goes East (2004) has argued that 
the government began to channel its energies and resources into the development of 
Korean football for two main reasons, firstly, because of its deep ‗colonial roots‘ as a 
form of social resistance to Japanese rule made it an effective way of forging national 
identity and, secondly, because it offered the opportunity of ‗early dominance on the 
Asian circuit‘. 16  Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup (2002), also edited by 
Manzenreiter and Horne, contains some valuable studies on Korean football, notably a 
chapter by Sugden and Tomlinson concerned with the 2002 World Cup bidding race 
between Japan and Korea and the way in which it was enmeshed into the politics of 
world football. The co-authors focused on the strategic alliance between the president 
of the KFA, Chung Mong Joon, and Lennart Johansson, the president of UEFA (Union of 
European Football Associations), which thwarted Japanese ambitions to be the sole host 
and led to the 2002 World Cup being a co-hosted event. 17  Finally of all foreign 
literature relating to South Korean football, Podoler ‘s recent study (2008) has offered the 
                                           
14 D, Goldblatt, The Ball Is Round: A Global History of Football, London, 2006, 835.  
15 Ha and Mangan, ‗Ideology, Politics, Power: Korean Sport‘, 213-242; Hak-rae Lee, A Contemporary 
History of Korean Sports, Yongin, 2008, 166-187.  
16 Hong-ik Chung, ‗Government Involvement in Football in Korea‘, in W. Manzenreiter and J. Horne 
(eds.), Football Goes East: Business, Culture and The People‘s Game in China, Japan and South Korea, 
Abingdon, 2004, 123.  
17 J. Sugden and A. Tomlinson, ‗International Power Struggles in the governance of World Football: the 
2002 and 2006 World Cup Bidding Wars‘, in J. Horne and W. Manzenreiter (eds.), Japan, Korea and the 
2002 World Cup, London and New York, 2002, 58-61.   
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most comprehensive narrative. It is important because he has assessed South Korean 
football in comparison with the football of its sister-adversary, formulating a hypothesis 
in which Korean football is seen as demonstrating both the ethnic unity of the two 
Koreas and as something which divides the two warring states. He has also aptly 
represented the very intimate nexus between politics and football in South Korea by 
analyzing key historical episodes, one of which is the 2002 World Cup and its positive 
outcome for the South Korean people. In addition, the development and changing 
culture of football in North Korea is covered with a special focus on why women‘s 
football in North Korea has become more important than men‘s football as a source of 
national pride since the late 1990s.18  
 
As for literature on North Korean football, little has been published in North Korea itself 
and what little there is not easily accessible. Football of Our Nation (2001) consisted of 
the football history in North Korea and of football skills and tactics. What struck me 
most deeply throughout the history section was North Korea‘s efforts to improve its 
football by frequent international contact until the early 1960s, by which time they had 
developed a unique national football style. An all-out attack, as this official history 
argues, became established as the main feature of North Korean football in this 
period.19 Football: Past and Present showed that the North Koreans regarded what is 
often described as their miracle of 1966 as having made them the foremost football 
power in Asia, thus ensuring that their national prestige was very much at stake when 
                                           
18 G. Podoler, ‗Nation, State and Football: The Korean Case‘, International Journal of the History of 
Sport, 25 (1), 2008, 1-17.  
19 Byung-ha Kim et al., Football of Our Nation, Pyongyang, 1963, 16-25.  
19 
 
they played international matches against other Asian countries later. 20 Significantly, 
some statements made by Kim Jong Il regarding the role of football in North Korea 
were included in published collections in 1997 and 1998. These are essentially primary 
sources but are helpful in understanding the North Korean leader ‘s intentions and 
plans.21  
 
North Korean football has never been thoroughly researched by South Korean 
academics. If we consult The Sports of North Korea (2004), by Lee Hak Rae and Kim 
Dong Sun, we get only a glimpse of the history of North Korean football.22 Kang‘s 
Football is Korea (2006) and the work of Jung Hee Jun, a  sports sociologist, looked at 
North Korean football largely within the context of North-South relations, hence they 
had limitations in locating the nature of North Korean football in a wider perspective.23  
 
Sometimes fiction can be helpful to historians and two novels published in Pyongyang 
with sporting themes and based on real events provide some important insights into 
North Korean football. Ham Yong Gil, a former North Korean sports journalist, in his 
novel Comets (2003) has shown how the historic quarter-final game against Portugal in 
1966 was portrayed by the regime to its people. North Korea‘s 5-3 defeat was 
                                           
20 Dong-gyu Lee et al., Football: Past and Present, 140-141.  
21 ‗With regard to Popularising Sports and quickly developing Sports Skills: Kim Jong Il‘s statement to 
the Central Committee of the Chosun Worker ‘s Party, 19, May, 1986‘, in A Selection from the 
Statements of Kim Jong Il, vol. 8, Pyongyang, 1998, 400-423; see also ‗With regard to developing 
Sports: Kim Jong Il‘s statement to the leaders of North Korean sports, 2, June, 1989‘, Ibid, vol. 9, 
Pyongyang, 1997, 333-341. 
22 Hak-rae Lee and Dong-sun Kim, The Sports of North Korea, Paju, 2004.  
23 Kang, Football is Korea, 103-107, 137-145; Hee-jun Jung, Sports, Korea Fantasy: A Korean Social and 
Cultural History, Seoul, 2009, 86-91, 126-129.  
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attributed to unfair refereeing in the match.24 An earlier novel, A Laurel Wreath (1999), 
by Kim Duk Chul, a former North Korean basketball player, pointed to some problems 
of North Korean football, such as age fraud, and also described the gloomy atmosphere 
in Pyongyang after the national team‘s failure to qualify for the 1994 World Cup.25 His 
novel provides some useful insights into how both North Korean society and its men‘s 
football ran into difficulties after the end of the Cold War.  
 
Two persons who escaped from North Korea into the South and are now working as 
journalists have written of their experiences regarding North Korean society and football. 
They provide important evidence particularly in relation to the World Cup heroes of 
1966 who experienced a dramatic reversal of fortunes when they lost favour with the 
regime.26 However, as far as this thesis is concerned, the most important information on 
North Korean football was obtained through an interview with Moon Ki Nam, a former 
North Korean footballer and coach to both the men‘s and women‘s national teams, now 
living in Seoul. Given the difficulties in obtaining information from North Korea this was 
invaluable. Due to his direct and continuing involvement in North Korean football as 
player and coach through many years, the interview with him has allowed me to come 
close to the realities of North Korean football, which had been hitherto cloaked in a 
shroud of secrecy.27 
 
 
                                           
24 Yong-gil Ham, Comets, vol. 1, Pyongyang, 2003, 360-362. 
25 Duk-chul Kim, A Laurel Wreath, Pyongyang, 1999, 3-80.  
26 Sung-ha Ju, A Pyongyang Story Written in Seoul, Seoul, 2010, 201-20; Chol-whan Kang and P. 
Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag, New York, 2005, 95. 
27 Interview with Moon Ki Nam, Seoul, 18 Oct, 2010. 
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Finally, it should be noted that there is a small body of work by foreigners relating 
mainly to North Korea‘s 1966 World Cup heroics and how they impacted on other 
countries. Martin Polley, drawing on Foreign Office documentation in the National 
Archives has dealt with a thorny issue of sports diplomacy - whether the North Korea 
team would be permitted to participate in the 1966 tournament as the state which it 
represented was not recognized by the British government – and how this was 
resolved.28 What happened to the North Korean team when it arrived in England and 
how they were remembered was the subject of Daniel Gordon‘s documentary film The 
Game of Their Lives (2002) which explored the reason why people in Middlesbrough, 
where the North Korean team was based, took their Asian visitors to their hearts.29 John 
Foot, in his study of Italian football, Calcio (2007), has focused on the impact of North 
Korea‘s defeat of Italy in the qualifying stages of the tournament and the impact of this 
event on Italian football.30 
 
(3) Main themes and sources 
 
As we have seen, the history of football has not attracted much attention in Korean 
academic circles. What we know about it has generally been written by sports 
journalists rather than historians. We should not underestimate their contribution to our 
understanding of the subject. Journalistic essays and newspaper articles – details of 
controversies, reports of matches and important anecdotal evidence – help us to grasp 
                                           
28 M. Polley, ‗The Diplomatic Background to the 1966 Football World Cup‘, The Sports Historian, 18 (2), 
1998, 1-18.  
29 The Game of Their Lives, (2002) Documentary Film, Directed by D. Gordon. UK: VeryMuchSo.  
30 J. Foot, Calcio: A History of Italian Football, London, 2007, 488-494.  
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the intricacies of Korean football. However, the literary bias towards history written by 
journalists means that it is safe to say that the history of Korean football has not 
generally been regarded as an aspect of cultural history, albeit with some possible 
exceptions. One consequence of this is that Korean scholars, when they have turned 
their attention to football, have tended to overemphasize the government‘s role in its 
development. Similarly, though it is important, too much emphasis has probably been 
placed on the symbolical significance of football in relation to the independence 
movement. This means that the view we have of the development of the game in Korea 
currently focuses on the impact of strategies devised by political leaders and squeezes 
out the contribution of the people involved at lower levels on and off the field.  
Bridging this gap is one of the aims of this thesis. It is also important to widen the 
focus of inquiry to explain, not just how and why Korean football engaged 
internationally, but how Korean football was seen from the perspective of other 
countries. This is another question that has not been adequately addressed to date. In 
addition, it is now possible to take advantage of some new and previously unexploited 
sources – for example, the accounts of North Korean exiles such as Ju Sung Ha and 
Kang Chol Whan, the oral testimony of Moon Ki Nam - thereby providing a new lens to 
help to observe Korean football in a broader and richer context.  
 
A number of key themes are identified and explored in this thesis. The first to which we 
turn our attention is nationalism and regionalism in Korean football under Japanese rule. 
The pioneering study of Korean sports history, Lee Hak Rae‘s A 100-year History of 
Korean Sports (2001), has underscored that argument that the Koreans, during the 
colonial era, tended to view any sporting victory over Japan as a form of compensation 
23 
 
for Japanese political suppression. He went on to argue that sports had helped to 
provide the conditions in which independence movements could emerge by inculcating 
national consciousness into the minds of Koreans.31 It is beyond doubt that Korean 
sports in this period were intertwined with their resistance against Japan as other 
studies have shown. 32  In particular, it is in this period that the people‘s sense of 
allegiance for the Korean eleven became deeply rooted since football, undoubtedly 
offered the best opportunities in sporting terms of revenging the oppression and 
arrogance of the Japanese colonizers. This sense of national identity embedded in 
Korean football was strong enough to make it a national pastime with an enormous 
following.  
 
However, there is another defining characteristic of Korean football in the Japanese 
colonial period that merits our attention: the division between Pyongyang in the north 
and Gyungsung (Seoul) in the south, which was emphatically reflected in Korean 
football in particular. This split was evidenced by the two separate All Chosun Football 
Championships (ACFC) held at Gyungsung and Pyongyang respectively, and by the 
rivalry that was forged through the Gyungsung-Pyongyang football matches which 
became a popular fixture of Korea‘s sporting calendar. Kang has indicated that the 
popularity of this football match was caused by the regional enmity between the 
northern part and southern part of Korea. He has explained the historical and social 
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background to this conflict, indicating the contrasting social milieu of the two cities.33  
There is some published work on the nature of this rivalry. The Gyungsung-Pyongyang 
football match was chronicled in detail by Yun and Choi in A National Pastime: Football 
and its Bright Morning (1997). 34  Meanwhile Ohshima has focused on the football 
culture at Pyongyang, explaining why and how Pyongyang came to rise as a real 
football city.35 It is important to assess the phenomenon of regionalism in the Korean 
football which co-existed alongside nationalism at a time when the Korean people had 
to bear the brunt of Japanese imperialism. Though, for patriotic Koreans, the 
relationship between football and nationalism was undoubtedly important, many of 
them were at the same time entangled with this internal, inter-regional rivalry in football 
and in other spheres.  The published diaries of Yun Chi Ho, especially for the years 
1921 to 1943, and recent work by Kim Sang Tae in 1988 are particularly important in 
this regard because they explain the extent to which Korean intellectuals were 
concerned with this schism.36 The importance of this theme also justifies the extent to 
which the three major newspapers under Japanese rule, Donga Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo, and 
Chosun Joongang Ilbo have been relied upon rather heavily in this thesis because these 
dailies were the sponsors of the Gyungsung-Pyongyang football match and the two 
ACFC. The dual purpose of Korean football functioning simultaneously as the focal point 
of for both national identity and inter-regional rivalry has paralleled elsewhere such as 
rugby union in Wales. While great significance was accorded to defeating any team 
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from England from the late Victorian period onwards, rugby in Wales was also marked 
by an intensive inter-regional contest, notably between the south-west and south-east, 
as Smith and Williams have indicated.37  
 
However, it also has to be recognized that the importance of domestic football in terms 
of its popularity waned over the course of the second half of the twentieth century. 
How can we explain this phenomenon? First of all, the North and South Koreans have 
been extremely obsessed with their international fixtures, especially when their national 
teams have played each other, thus the inter-regional rivalry between Gyungsung and 
Pyongyang dating from the colonial times was completely transformed into an intense 
international contest. Moreover, within the Cold War context, the two nations tended to 
regard the football ground as their alternative battle field. Thus the result of the Korean 
Derby was often regarded as a visibly critical measure of their national power by the 
rival regimes. It was for this reason that the respective political leaderships of North and 
South Korea intervened heavily in football and always paid great attention to the 
development of their national teams. Indeed, enhancing elite football skills in the two 
countries for the purpose of boosting their national prestige in the international arena 
have largely stemmed from government initiatives. Football has been nicely fitted into 
their national projects, not least because it offers a number of prestigious international 
stages, including the World Cup, the Olympics and the Asian Games, on which political, 
economic or ideological superiority could be demonstrated. In addition, the deep-
seated, traditional rivalry with Japan provided a supplementary reason for governments 
to inject resources into the development of their national football elevens.  
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Domestic football in the two Koreas has been considerably obscured by the importance 
of international football fixtures. Comparatively little attention has been devoted to 
domestic football in the media. In the South, high school baseball had greater popular 
appeal than domestic football even in the 1970s. By,  1971, when President Park Chung 
Hee‘s Cup Asia Football Tournament (Park‘s Cup), in which South Korea‘s national team 
usually participated, was established, high school baseball tournaments had become 
deeply entrenched in the hearts of South Koreans, particularly who had left their home 
town to grab an opportunity to make a living in an increasingly industrialized and 
urbanized society. The attraction of these baseball tournaments drew on the strength of 
local patriotism and would crucially contribute to the formation of strong ties between 
local professional baseball clubs and fans in the 1980s, a factor which was largely 
absent in South Korean professional football. 38  This has been the major difference 
between the two professional sports in South Korea in terms of their popular appeal. 
 
The second theme to be explored in this thesis locates Korean football in the wider 
context of international relations in an era of sports globalization. Undoubtedly, the 
politics of the Cold War exerted a powerful influence on both North and South Korea 
from partition onwards. It was a situation which led the two Koreas as two new nation-
states to focus in a competitive fashion on gaining recognition abroad. As they sought 
friends abroad, football, as the most widely disseminated sport in the world, began to 
play an important part in support of foreign policy. Footballers from North and South 
Korea effectively became ambassadors for their respective countries as they sought to 
improve their image internationally and to establish new diplomatic relationships. The 
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governments of the rival nation-states accorded great importance to the pursuit of 
foreign policy objectives through football, especially in the 1970s. By entering 
international competitions and seeking fixtures with teams from other countries the 
strategy of the regimes in both Seoul and Pyongyang were following a strategy similar 
to that of Franco‘s Spain in the 1950s, where relative diplomatic isolation had also been 
a problem. In 1959, it was said of Real Madrid that they had done ‗much more than 
many of our embassies scattered round the world‘.39 The governments of North and 
South Korea expected their national teams to have much the same effect. 
 
This emphasis on football diplomacy had the additional advantage of enhancing the 
skills of Korean players by exposing them to international competition. However, North 
and South Korea did not take quite the same path in this respect. In the 1980s there 
were few opportunities for North Korean players to compete against foreign sides who 
could help them learn and improve, mainly because its government turned its back on 
the capitalist world in this period, and thus the development of football in the North 
was thwarted. At the same time their southern counterparts, with the confidence that 
their emerging economy and ascending global positioning justified, frequently played 
against world class teams, particularly after the Seoul Olympics of 1988. Moreover, the 
situation of North Korean football in this respect did not improve in the 1990s.  It was 
already difficult to find opponents and this problem worsened in the aftermath of the 
break-up of the Eastern bloc following the fall of communism in the 1990s. As they 
prepared for the World Cup in England in 1966 the North Korean heroes had been able 
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to play warm-up matches against strong East German clubs, such as Hansa Rostock.40 It 
was no longer possible for North Korea‘s footballers to gain experience in this way.  
 
One indication of how serious this problem had become came in 1989 when North 
Korea‘s ‗Dear Leader‘, Kim Jong Il, officially acknowledged the difficulties of being cut 
off from the rest of the football world and called for more friendly matches against 
foreign opposition. 
 
Along with stepping up football training, playing as many away 
matches as possible in countries with high degree of skills is 
required in order to develop [our] football. We have to allow our 
footballers to play many away matches in order to develop their 
courage and skills, as they would play football matches in the South 
in the future. If such Latin American countries as Brazil, Uruguay, and 
Argentina invite our football clubs, we should go to play there 
without reservation. … It does not matter that our nation has not 
established diplomatic relations with those countries.41 
 
Despite the urging of Kim Jong Il, however, there was only a limited improvement in the 
1990s when the national team‘s exposure to foreign opposition was largely restricted to 
Asia. Indeed, the South Koreans were probably the most powerful adversary 
encountered by the North in any friendly match in this period. In contrast to the 
isolated North, South Korea became one of Asia‘s major football powers by qualifying 
for the final stages of four successive World Cup tournaments between 1986 and 1998. 
While football in the North had been stagnating, South Korean players had been 
                                           
40 Corriere Della Serra, 25 June 1966.  
41 ‗With regard to developing Sports: Kim Jong Il‘s statement to the Leaders of North Korean Sports, 2, 
June, 1989‘, 334. 
29 
 
gradually learning how to deal with the world‘s established football giants. Though 
success proved elusive South Korea learned through trial and error, a process that 
ultimately led to success in the 2002 finals, when its team progressed to the semi-finals. 
 
In the era of decolonialization, it was natural for Asian and African nations in the wake 
of their liberation, to look for ways to publicize their existence as a nation-state. 
Participation in sporting events of global significance was especially suitable for this 
purpose and events like the World Cup and Olympic Games could also help to 
strengthen a sense of identity for the people of these ‘new‘ states. ‗In participatory 
terms, the World Cup and Olympics‘, as Tomlinson and Young have argued, ‗offer a 
platform to all nations, and most of all small nations of the world that is unrivaled by 
any other cultural or political body, even the United Nations‘.42 However, for so called 
Third World countries the World Cup proved more problematic than the Olympics due 
in part to the relatively unfavourable distribution of World Cup final places. Only one 
place from sixteen, for example, was open to African and Asian countries in 1966. It 
might also be argued that it is inherently more difficult to achieve a good result in a 
team sport, like football, than in some Olympic sports where outstanding individual 
talent can guarantee success.  
 
However, in 1966, North Korea proved that it was possible for an Asian country to make 
a mark through its performances on the field in the final stages of the World Cup. It 
can be argued that this did not just impact on North Korea but also helped to increase 
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the global impact of the World Cup, not least because the event was broadcast around 
the world via television. Thus the process of sport globalization was progressed by the 
success of this inscrutable team from the ‗Far East‘. North Korea‘s exploits, coming after 
the controversy regarding FIFA‘s unfair allocation of final places that led to the African 
boycott, was a palpable sign of what could be characterized as a formative phase of 
globalization. The era of European and South American domination had not yet passed 
but the possibility of a new world order in football was glimpsed for the first time.   
 
There is some literature which has outlined how the North Korean miracle in 1966 and 
South Korean jubilation in 2002 were influenced by football globalization and also how 
they have impacted on it. Paul Darby‘s Africa, Football and FIFA (2002) and Peter Alegi‘s 
African Soccerscapes (2010) provide insights into how Africa changed the world‘s game 
which might be usefully applied in connection with North and South Korea.43 Sensing 
the African associations‘ deep discontent and the growing demand for a power shift in 
the governing body of world football, the Brazilian, Joao Havelange, built an alliance 
with Third World countries, which undermined the privileged position enjoyed by 
European nations within FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) and 
enabled him to defeat the Englishman, Sir Stanley Rous, in the presidential election of 
1974. Havelange rewarded his allies by increasing the number of World Cup final places 
thus making it easier for African and Asian countries to reach the final stages of 
football‘s mega event and establishing a trend towards globalization which could not be 
reversed.44 Significantly, these developments coincided with the emergence of South 
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Korea as a leading football power which was also capable of providing the necessary 
economic and technological infrastructure to co-host (with Japan) Asia‘s first World Cup 
finals in 2002. 
 
The patrons of Korean football provide the third major theme of this thesis. It will be 
argued that in most cases they devoted their energies and resources to the 
development and promotion of the game either because they saw it as fulfilling an 
important social function or because they were carrying out the government‘s 
intentions. A study of patrons also reveals how the social and political circumstances at 
a particular time have impacted on Korean football. During the colonial period, for 
example, many football patrons were involved in either education or missionary work or 
in the newspaper industry. They were primarily influenced by the passion of 
disseminating modernity and the spirit of independence into the wider society.  At a 
later date, some patrons invested their capital in football either for their pure pleasure 
or because it might help further their political ambitions. For example, in the wake of 
the Korean War, the most influential football patrons in the South were the military but, 
in the early 1960s, the military began to give way to politicians and high-ranking public 
officials. In the 1970s entrepreneurs began to emerge as major patrons of football 
which became increasingly an extension of corporate business. Yet their active 
involvement with football was largely attributable to their desire to assist government 
initiatives rather than the pursuit of profit via sport. This trend has persisted in South 
Korean football, in the era of the professional football league, established in 1983. The 
principal source used here for tracing the involvement of patrons is Wolgan Chukgu 
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(Monthly Football), South Korea‘s first football magazine, which covers football affairs 
off the field in detail, unlike other Korean newspaper sources, at least until the 1980s. 
Chugan Sports (Weekly Sports) was also useful, and is particularly helpful in relation to 
the origins of professional football in South Korea.  
 
As Henry Kissinger once observed in relation to the contradictions of North Korea, 
though it 'proclaims itself to be a Communist state, its actual authority is in the hands 
of a single family'. 45  Inevitably, considering the infamous absolute power exercised 
personally by Kim Il Sung and his son, football in North Korea largely been in their firm 
grip. Hence, it is important to grasp how far and in what sense North Korean supreme 
leaders developed their interest in football in response to changing conditions. The 
reorganization of North Korean men‘s football in the 1970s and the growth of North 
Korean women‘s football in the 1990s were indeed both closely bound up with Kim 
Jong Il‘s political strategy.  Though North Korea is a very closed and secretive society it 
is possible to access contemporary sources which can help to explain the leader‘s 
changing attitude to football over the years. Along with formal pronouncements on 
football made by Kim Jong Il, periodicals such as Chollima, the only popular magazine 
in North Korea, Nodong Shinmun, the party organ, and Chosun Shinbo, the Japan-
based pro-North Korean press, have been useful in this respect. Given the emphasis on 
women‘s football from the 1990s onwards and the regime‘s proximity to and 
dependence on China, studies of Chinese women‘s football are also important in 
throwing light indirectly on developments in North Korea.46 In particular, these studies 
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also offer comparative insights between North Korean women‘s football developing 
under a rigid socialist system and its Chinese counterpart which has been more 
influenced by capitalist commercialism.47 
 
Along with Kim‘s family, perhaps the only group whose power within the Party allowed 
them to intervene heavily in North Korean football was the Gabsan faction. This faction, 
who had encouraged football when engaging the armed struggle against the Japanese 
during the colonial era, seemed to have been especially critical in providing the 
framework that brought success in the 1966 World Cup. However, its members and 
those associated with them were later discredited and appear to have suffered a similar 
fate to that of the Starostin brothers, Moscow Spartak footballers of an earlier era, who 
were deported to the labour camps by Beria, the notorious chief of the security forces 
and honorary president of Spartak‘s main rival, Dinamo.48 It has been reported that the 
Gabsan faction, along with some North Korean footballers, were purged in the 
whirlwind of power struggles in the North after the World Cup.49 The origin of the 
faction‘s involvement in football is well described in Football of Our Nation and in a 
biography of a former North Korean party official which was published in 1961.  The 
latter particularly emphasized the keen anti-Japanese sentiments amongst the northern 
labourers when a football tournament was held during the Japanese rule.50 Edelman‘s 
research on how influential cadres at the highest levels of the Party exercised their 
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political leverage on Soviet football in the era of high Stalinism is also instructive and 
provides insights which are useful when dealing with the role of the Gabsan faction in 
North Korea.51 
 
The fourth and final major theme to be discussed in thesis relates to how Koreans, from 
both North and South, have played the game. Is it possible to discern a distinctive 
Korean national style and, if so, does that style cross the boundary separating the two 
ideologically opposed nation-states? When academics seek to define a distinctive 
national football style, they often find themselves deconstructing cultural and racial 
stereotypes. 52  Moreover the media in each nation has a tendency to reproduce 
particular images and aesthetics repeatedly and to see these reflected in the 
performance of their national football teams. In addition, the notion of a style of play is 
difficult to pin down, because it is often based on subjective rather than objective 
assessments and is closely linked with ideas of how a nation sees itself and is seen by 
others. Football Europe and the Press co-authored by Crolley and Hand was valuable in 
this respect. It demonstrates the role of the press in shaping and disseminating ideas 
about national football styles, which are often regarded as reflections of a national 
identity.53 Ideas of national style, as John Marks has argued in his study of French 
football do not always correspond with reality. He has suggested that to associate 
‗champagne football‘ with the French team which won the World Cup in 1998 was by 
no means appropriate.54 However, it is arguable that the style of football in a given 
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territory could represent the hidden metaphors or cultural values of that society. Also, in 
any international competition it becomes clear that there clearly are differences of 
football styles which add interest and excitement for global viewers. ‗What does seem 
to be true‘, as Lanfranchi et al have argued, ‗is that most of those who have discussed 
national styles over the years have certainly thought that they were talking about 
something real‘.55  
 
Moreover, there are particularly good reasons for analyzing styles of play in relation to 
North and South Korean football. Although teams from both countries made an 
impression on World Cup competitions in which they played, the characteristics of 
Korean football as it has been and is played have been little researched. Where research 
into this theme might have special significance is in relation to Cold War history where 
it is clear that contrasting football styles were often described ideologically with the 
assumption being made that individualism characterized teams from the capitalist West 
and collectivism characterized teams from the communist East. Analysis of the Korean 
style of playing, however, provides an opportunity to investigate the question of 
whether it provides a case study of a national football style transcending an ideological 
border. Thus assessing the extent to which North and South Korean approaches to the 
game have been and are similar is at the core of this theme.  
 
There was a stereotype in the South that North Korean football was combative and 
unsophisticated. On the contrary, North Korea regarded their football as well-organized 
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with no individualism. The mutual stigmatization of North and South Korean football 
was especially severe in the 1970s and 1980s, but has since been gradually eroded. 
These stereotypes derived from fierce hostility tended to culminate in the ‗Korean 
Derby‘. However, unfortunately, contemporary South Korean press coverage of these 
matches is insufficiently detailed to allow for systematic analysis and, in North Korea, 
there was little in newspaper match reports that would be helpful in identifying and 
analyzing contrasting styles, even when the North beat their southern neighbours. Thus, 
oral history has been used to help overcome this problem through interviews with 
former players from North and South.  
 
Kowalski and Porter‘s research into Cold War football should be noted as an attempt to 
locate perceptions about how football is played in a wider cultural context. It analyses 
match reports and press comment relating to both the Moscow Dinamo team that 
toured Britain in 1945 and the outstanding Hungarian team that beat England 6-3 at 
Wembley in 1953 and 7-1 in Budapest in 1954 and shows how they were subject to an 
‗ideological filter‘.56 How West German football was regarded in the East and vice versa 
and, in particular, the West Germany-East Germany clash at the 1974 World Cup finals 
has also been the subject of some academic attention.57 These studies have added to 
our knowledge regarding popular misconceptions about ideological adversaries on and 
off the Cold War football field and suggest ways of approaching the question of the 
characteristics that North Korean and South Korean football might have in common and 
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those which might make them different. In addition, some more general works on 
national style and football tactics generally have helped to shape discussion of this 
theme, notably the chapter on ‗National Styles‘ in the  the FIFA Centennial Book58 and, 
more recently, Jonathan Wilson‘s Inverting the Pyramid, an exhaustive study of the 
historical development of football tactics.59  
 
It is clear that the style of play between the North and South has not been identical, a 
difference that had its origin before the division. However, it will be argued here that 
the difference has been largely derived from accounts found in the local media and that 
it may be misleading. In addition to using the recollections of those who played for 
North and South Korea at the highest level this thesis relies heavily on the foreign press 
in dealing with the football style of two Koreas. A variety of Asian newspapers in English 
– principally the Straits Times in Singapore, the South China Morning Post in Hong 
Kong and The Times of India - have been consulted for this purpose, along with some 
Japanese newspapers, particularly Nikkan Sports. The rationale for using these sources 
was, firstly, that most of the competitive football played by North and South Korea   
has been in Asia, and secondly, that coverage in the foreign and international media 
was less likely to be influenced by local pressures and preconceptions than   coverage 
in the Korean press. The British press, particularly newspapers based in the north of 
England, where the North Korean team was based, is also used try to understand the 
playing style and tactics of the heroes of 1966. In this way, it is hoped to strike a 
balance between what the two Koreas wished others to see and what they actually saw.  
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(4) Thesis structure 
 
The discussion in this thesis is organized chronologically rather than thematically.  
Firstly, this has an advantage when seeking to describe changes that have taken place 
over the whole period since 1910, and secondly, this arrangement is helpful when it is 
necessary to compare and contrast the experience of the two Koreas, as distinct regions 
in the Japanese colonial period and as separate nation-states in the period of the Cold 
War and beyond. However, the principal themes of the thesis are developed in separate 
sub-sections within each chapter. 
 
Chapter one provides a broad overview of the origins and early diffusion of the modern 
game of football in Korea through to the 1940s and the regional differences and 
rivalries that shaped its development. It seeks to explain why and how football was 
taken up as a national game under Japanese rule while also outlining the importance of 
early international contacts through and how tours abroad and matches against foreign 
clubs helped to strengthen Korean football and raise playing standards. 
 
Chapter two develops these themes further in the context of the 1950s and early 1960s 
as the two Koreas emerged from the trauma of civil war. It demonstrates how, with the 
encouragement of the state, North Korea strengthened its profile through football and 
became a significant force in international football especially through its participation in 
tournaments such as those organized in connection with GANEFO, the Games of the 
Newly Emerging Forces. This chapter also examines parallel developments in South 
Korea where the alliance between football and nationalism was cemented by their early 
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successes in Asia.  One important common factor for both North and South Korea in 
this period was that in both countries the military was assigned a leading role in the 
development and promotion of football. The impact on football of Koreans from the 
north moving south, both before and after the war, is also discussed. 
 
The North Korean ‗miracle‘ in the World Cup finals of 1966 and its implications for 
football in both North and South Korea is the principal theme of chapter three. As to 
the former, the impression made by the North Koreans on their English hosts is closely 
scrutinized as well as the importance of their first appearance in the global football 
arena where they were the first Asian team to make a significant impact.  Ironically, the 
greatest impact of the North Korean ‗miracle‘ was on South Korea where the shock 
effect of their rival‘s success prompted a massive effort by the government assisted by 
big business to improve the quality of elite players and the national team. Equally 
ironically, North Korea failed to build on the foundation that had been established in 
1966 and this is explained largely in relation to the internal politics of the regime. 
 
Chapters four and five bring the story of football in the two Koreas through to 2002 
when South Korea successfully co-hosted the World Cup finals with Japan, the first 
finals to be held outside Europe or North and South America. As football was 
globalized South Korea, with its expanding modern economy, was well placed to exploit 
the greater opportunities that were created by FIFA under Havelange to participate in 
the World Cup and other international competitions. This was also reflected in the 
emergence of professional football in South Korea after 1983. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union led to political rapprochement in this period and the chapter four traces the 
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political ramifications of some hard-fought matches between the two Koreas and the 
brief experiment with a unified Korea youth team. Chapter five is divided into two 
sections which consider, firstly, the success of South Korea in the 2002 World Cup and 
its political and social ramifications and then, secondly, the impact of the South‘s 
success on football in North Korea where men‘s football fell back in relation to the 
women‘s game which, the government believed, was more likely to bring success and 
international prestige to an increasingly isolated country.  
  
The conclusion, while highlighting the dramatic twists and turns that have characterized 
the development of football in Korea, seeks to draw together the four key themes 
identified in this chapter. Most importantly, the idea of a Korean national football style 
that exemplifies the ethnic homogeneity of the two Koreas and transcends political and 
















The development of Korean football under Japanese rule, 1910-44 
 
Modern sports began to be introduced into Korea when it opened the door to Western 
countries from the final quarter of the nineteenth century. Despite resistance to foreign 
economic and cultural invasion, especially amongst local Confucian landlords who 
wished to maintain the hierarchy of feudal society, modern (i.e. Western) culture and 
technology came to be perceived as a useful mechanism to enlighten the public as well 
as strengthen the nation.60 A full-scale reform of the education system was required to 
achieve this purpose. Various modern schools were soon set up by nationalists, 
missionaries and the government during the Korean Empire period (1897-1910). 
Gymnastic exercise was incorporated into the curriculum of these academic institutions. 
Most gymnastic programmes practiced at the schools until the Japanese annexation of 
Korea in 1910 were essentially paramilitary, because a number of retired army officers 
assumed the role of teaching gymnastics for ‗modern boys‘ at these schools.61 Football 
and tennis were played as an extra-curricular physical activity at the grounds of mission 
schools and baseball and basketball were taking root in Gyungsung with the great help 
of the Young Men‘s Christian Association (YMCA).62  
      
The diffusion of modern sports in Korea was a gradual process. There were good 
reasons for this relatively slow diffusion. Enthusiasm for modern sports was for the most 
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part restricted to a small number of the sons of the modernizing elites who attended 
academic institutions in the main urban centres. However, the vast majority of Koreans 
at this time lived in an agrarian society and their lives were still dominated by 
agriculture and traditional rural values. At the start of the twentieth century they were 
largely excluded from the modernization phenomenon. Moreover, it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that the level of industrialization and urbanization in Korea at this 
time was insufficiently advanced for the working classes to take up imported sports as a 
means of break from soulless urban life and the monotonous production line. Indeed, in 
the alleys of Gyungsung, the capital city, according to a contemporary British 
geographer, mud-walled hovels provided only the most basic accommodation and 
commerce was limited to huckstering transactions.63 Even during the first decade of the 
Japanese colonial eras after 1910, modern sports were the preserve of Japanese 
expatriates and of the schoolboy sons of Korea‘s social elite. Thus Korean society had 
yet to develop the characteristics which would allow modern sports to flourish. With the 
exceptions of those organized by schools or the YMCA, almost all sports tournaments - 
particularly baseball and tennis - were staged by the Japanese rulers.64  
 
Even if the growth of modern sports in the late nineteenth century was slow and patchy, 
there is evidence that a variety of traditional Korean games rather were being widely 
practiced in rural regions and also in many cities. Kite-flying was a national institution 
and pitch-penny was a popular pastime for boys. On the fifteenth of the first month by 
the lunar calendar, tugs-of-war in the country villages was commonplace. When these 
festivals were held, it was the tradition that the village turned out en masse under the 
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full moon. Out of all traditional games, however, it was the stone-throwing fights 
between neighbouring villages that generally attracted the largest and most enthusiastic 
crowds. These contests occurred only in spring when the fields were bare, which meant 
that both ample space and spare time were available for the contest. The excitement of 
these battles was not confined to the provinces. The heaviest traffic on the electric 
tramway in Gyungsung, as a foreign observer noted, was when the crowds went out of 
the city gates to watch these stone fights.65 
 
Though the process was gradual, some change was apparent by the first decade of the 
twentieth century when, even if they did not participate themselves, the rise of athletic 
meets (Undonghoe) meant that workers had opportunities to watch the sons of the 
elite at play.  Track and field athletics often became the focal point of sports days in 
which several schools participated. Since most of these interscholastic sporting events 
were held in communal places rather than schoolyards, members of the local 
communities were able to access them as spectators. School sports thus often supplied 
the occasion for a community festival, while at the same time providing an opportunity 
to express Korean national consciousness by hoisting a national flag and making 
patriotic speeches. 66  As we shall see later, It was the 1920s that peasants and 
proletarians began to get opportunities to play modern sports, especially football, with 
the foundation of many regional young men‘s clubs across the nation in response to 
growing patriotic fervour generated by the First of March Movement in 1919. This 
movement acted as a powerful social agent for the dissemination of modern sport. It 
not only promoted sports tournaments and tours but also held athletic meets which 
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attracted large crowds.67 At this point, it could be argued, it first becomes possible to 
see the emergence of modern sports as a form of mass leisure in Korea.  
 
In the period just before and after the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 many 
Korean intellectuals were attracted to theories of social Darwinism then prevalent in 
Europe and the United States.  Their overriding concern was that Korean culture was 
civilian rather than military and somehow effeminate, making Korea vulnerable in terms 
of competition between nations and ‗the survival of the fittest‘. In this climate it began 
to be recognized that physical culture was important. A population that was muscular 
and physically-fit was seen as an essential component of the modern nation-state and 
sporting events were increasingly viewed as providing an arena of competition in which 
competing nations could demonstrate their capacity to survive. The significance of these 
ideas for Koreans was encapsulated by a contemporary novelist when Son Kee Jung 
became the first Korean to win an Olympic gold medal, by triumphing in the marathon 
at the Berlin Olympics of 1936: ‗I want to cry for all mankind! Do you still name us a 
frail race?‘68  
 
In view of the Japanese annexation and the prevalence of social Darwinist thought in 
early twentieth century Korea, it is not surprising that many modern sports were woven 
into the fabric of Korean nationalism from the outset. Winning over Japan on any sports 
field provided Koreans with an opportunity to relieve their pent-up frustrations and this 
was especially so with football. When a Korean football team defeated a visiting 
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Japanese team from Waseda University in 1927 there was much rejoicing and the event 
was treated as if it had been a full international match.69 A useful comparison can be 
made with rugby in Wales or football in Scotland where ‗any match against the ―auld 
enemy‖ (England) was seen as an outright national competition‘.70 
 
However, Korean nationalism in this period was not the only factor in   attracting 
people to football. The popularity of the game was also linked to regionalism and was 
especially manifested in a keen rivalry between Pyongyang and Gyungsung (the old 
name of Seoul), which was later formalized in the Gyungsung-Pyongyang Football 
Championship. The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the social and political 
context in which this rivalry was set and the different football cultures and styles that it 
embodied. The roles of YMCA, schools, individual patrons and newspapers, will also be 
assessed to keep this chapter in balance.  It is also important to consider the 
international perspective as external influences had a vital role in introducing football to 
Korea and developing it further during the first half of the twentieth century. 
 
(1) The arrival and diffusion of football in Korean schools 
 
Although it has been suggested that football was introduced by British sailors in 1882, 
its origins in Korea are not entirely clear.  There is clear evidence, however, that football 
was being played at the English Language School in Gyungsung during the late 
nineteenth century.  As an editorial in Dokrip Shinmun observed in 1896:  
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 When students of the English Language School kick a ball on the 
school ground in the afternoon, their vigorous movements and 
combative spirit are one hundred times better than those of 
Japanese students and equal to those of American and English 
children. 71  
 
At around the same time a French teacher, Martel, who had been educated in England, 
was known to teach football to the students of French Language School.  Also the ‗old 
boys‘ of the foreign language schools, most of whom worked as interpreters for the 
palace, were encouraged to continue playing football by their English teachers and 
formed Deahan Cheyuk Gurakbu (Korean Sports Club).72 The Korean Sports Club played 
its first official football match against Hwangsung YMCA in 1906.73  
 
It was not long before the students of private middle schools and various young men‘s 
clubs in Gyungsung began to follow in the footsteps of the old boys from the foreign 
language schools. Five schools took the initiative in introducing football to a wider 
public. One of them was Bosung, conveniently located in downtown Gyungsung, which 
attracted football enthusiasts and onlookers to its grounds in the afternoon. 74  The 
grounds of the Hwimoon and Baejae schools also hosted major football tournaments.75 
Baejae, the first mission school established in Korea, formed a football team as early as 
1902 and predominated over middle school football until the mid 1920s.76 It was on 
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their playing field that goalposts were erected in Korea for the first time in 1914, 
prompting other football clubs and school teams to ask for friendly matches with 
Baejae.77  
 
Eventually, in the 1920s, Baejae were overtaken by another mission school, Gyungshin, 
whose popularity was so great that they regularly attracted crowds of around 10,000 to 
their ground. 78   Their fame reached a peak with their 4-3 victory over Waseda 
University in 1929. 79  They had to play this match under the name of Gyungshin 
Gurakbu (Club) rather than Gyungshin Middle School since Waseda had refused to play 
against a school team but the Gyungshin team was made up entirely of the school‘s 
students. 80  It is a measure of their achievement that a Korean adult team lost to 
Waseda a day later. The immense public interest in these two games was vividly 
portrayed by a cartoon in the newspaper Chosun Ilbo which pictured a huge crowd, 
some of them watching the game while hanging onto trees or clutching the school 
walls.81 
 
During the 1920s varsity football also began to thrive in Gyungsung.  Yeonhee College, 
which had been founded in 1915 by a missionary, Horace Grant Underwood, British by 
birth but raised in the USA, soon established itself as the best college football team in 
the city.82 They gained the ACFC under the auspices of the Chosun Cheyukhoe (Chosun 
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Sports Association) in four consecutive years from 1925.83 In the late 1920s and early 
1930s Yeonhee found itself struggling for supremacy with Bosung College and their 
intense rivalry generated great interest in inter-college football. Bosung was a relative 
newcomer to the sport but developed a marked preference for football while Yeonhee 
was noted for its enthusiasm for American sports, at least for the colonial period.84 It 
was Bosung that inaugurated the All Chosun Middle School Football Championships 
from 1928 while Yeonhee inaugurated tennis, baseball and basketball tournaments for 
middle school students.85 This did not mean that their rivalry on the football field was 
any less intense. ‗Yeon-Bo‘ contests were renowned for keen competition and 
intermittent brawls. In 1931 a fight between two players was transformed into a battle 
involving the supporters of both sides. Yeonhee withdrew from this match after their 
centre-forward, who was on the ground at the time, had his left eyebrow lacerated by a 
kick. This disgraceful affair prompted harsh criticism in the newspaper Donga Ilbo of the 
excessive passions which football could arouse.86  
 
(2) Religious organizations and regional young men’s clubs 
 
Most modern sports, along with the concept of ‗muscular Christianity‘ came to Korea 
via the YMCA in the early twentieth century.87 Sport was seen as a way of ensuring that 
young men led healthy and virtuous lives. It was ‗character-building‘ and brought them 
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into contact with the influence of the church. Baseball and basketball, in particular, owed 
their inception and dissemination to the YMCA.  In these two sports many friendly 
matches between Korean teams and dozens of games against foreign sides at home 
and abroad were arranged by the YMCA.88 Admittedly, the YMCA was also involved in 
the development of Korean football. As indicated earlier, the Hwangsung YMCA had 
featured with the Korean Sports Club in the first official inter-club match in Korea and a 
further 56 matches took place between the two clubs in 1906 and 1907.89 The influence 
of the YMCA was still evident in the 1920s. The Central YMCA hosted the Chosun 
Student Christian Young Men‘s Football Tournament in 1924. This tournament was 
designed to cement solidarity amongst Christians in Korea and only schools that had 
already joined the Chosun Student Christian Young Men‘s Association were permitted to 
enter the competition.90 Of the all activities pertaining to football on the part of the 
YMCA, the inauguration of ACFC by the Pyongyang YMCA was the most important 
contribution. The championship, held in Pyongyang, rapidly developed into one of 
Korea‘s major football tournaments, instilling a local pride into the minds of the people 
of Pyongyang, as we shall see later in more detail.  
 
Competition between different religions played a part in the development of Korean 
football. The YMCA‘s enthusiasm for football prompted the Buddhist Young Men‘s 
Association to follow in their footsteps and established what later would develop into 
the most formidable football club in Gyungsung. This Buddhist team was mainly 
composed of the students of Hwimoon Middle School where many disciples of monks 
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were enrolled. Their training ground was Taego temple.91 Buddhist temples with empty 
lots were frequently used for sporting activities. In the first decade of the twentieth 
century the French Language School, and the Hwangsung YMCA held athletic meets at 
such venues.92 The Buddhist club was initially very successful, winning the ACFC at 
Gyungsung in 1922, but folded in 1925 for financial reasons.93  
 
The religion of Chundo (‗the religion of the heavenly way‘), closely associated with the 
rise of Korean nationalism, also established football clubs in this period.94 The Chundo 
Football Club founded around 1920, went on a football tour to Pyongyang and the 
north in the same year.95 Though it participated in the ACFC in 1921, it withdrew from 
the tournament in protest at the unsportsmanlike behaviour of opponents from 
Pyongyang who had vehemently contested a referee‘s decision.96 It is interesting to 
note that the Chundo club did not participate in any major football championship after 
this affair. Thereafter, the religion of Chundo concentrated on encouraging Korean 
football generally rather than running its own football club. A Chundo magazine, 
Gaebyuk, published the football newspaper for the ACFC at Gyungsung in 1923.97 In 
addition, some local branches of the Chundo religion sponsored various football 
tournaments in the 1920s and 1930s, and it is recorded that a Chundo football coach 
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gave instruction on the game to boys at Ulsan in 1925.98  
 
These religious football clubs were not the only kind important to the diffusion of 
football in Korea. The foundation of religious clubs coincided with the emergence of 
regional young men‘s associations springing up like mushrooms. This phenomenon 
resulted from changes within the Korean independence movement as it adjusted to 
Japan‘s colonial policy.99 After the First of March Movement in 1919, an independence 
demonstration on a vast scale in which ‗more than two million Koreans directly 
participated‘, had been brutally suppressed, there was some relaxation in Japan‘s 
colonial policy ostensibly due in part to the pressure of world opinion.100 Freedom of 
association and freedom of assembly were now permitted and the independence 
movement turned away from political radicalism and began to encourage Koreans to 
express their identity in other ways. In these new conditions allowed a variety of young 
men‘s clubs began to prosper. 
 
In this social climate, a variety of young men‘s clubs began to prosper, and their active 
involvement in sports enabled the general public in the hinterland away from the big 
cities to play football.101 Hitherto young men from the socially underprivileged classes 
had played by kicking an inflated pig‘s bladder and the like on rice paddies after the 
harvest. Now they were able to join clubs to play the modern version of the game. This 
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development was helped in the early 1920s by the development of the railroad network 
which facilitated ‗barnstorming‘ as clubs began to travel in search of friendly 
competition and to gain bragging rights over neighbouring villages and further 
afield. 102  Newspapers gave valuable publicity and sometimes financial support to 
encourage regional competitions.103  
 
Some clubs were especially ambitious.  In 1921 the Muo Football Club of Pyongyang 
made the long journey to Gyungsung and the southernmost part of Korea, beating 
three local sides and thus maintaining ‗Pyongyang‘s honor‘. 104  These barnstorming 
matches were increasingly supplanted by numerous regional football tournaments on 
the model of the ACFC. South Chosun, West Chosun, North Chosun, and the All Gando 
Football Championships were initiated in 1923-24105 A football championship was no 
longer an entertainment for Korean city dwellers only.  As early as 1922, Jaeryung, a 
town in the north-west, had staged the first Hwanghae Province Football Championship, 
in which a town side was thrown out of the competition for bringing in six players hired 
from the Muo Club.106 Five teams comprising peasants and labourers from various 
hamlets took part in a football tournament held at Hamheung in 1929. These teams 
attracted attention because their players wore straw sandals, a clear indication that 
football was becoming the game of the people throughout Korea.107  
 
                                           
102 KFA, History of Korean Football, (1986), 179.  
103 Donga Ilbo, 4 Apr 1921; 11 Apr 1921.  
104 Ibid, 26 Aug 1921.  
105 For South Chosun, Ibid, 1 Nov 1923; for West Chosun, 19 June 1923; for North Chosun, 3 Sept 
1923; for Gando (a Chinese territory where many Korean immigrants resided), 29 May 1924.  
106 Ibid, 12 June 1922.  
107 Ibid, 23 Aug 1929.  
53 
 
(3) The rise and fall of Gyung-Pyong football   
 
At this time it was the people of Pyongyang whose interest in football was unmatched 
by any other Koreans. Pyongyang itself was described as a ‗football city‘ and clubs had 
been set up by enthusiasts in every village in the province. Young men who could not 
play the game were said to be very rare.  These conditions encouraged the Pyongyang 
Football Association to inaugurate the All Pyongyang Village Football Championship in 
1937.108 Whenever the All Chosun Football Championship was staged in Pyongyang it 
was referred to as a festival of football and it was as if the city was on holiday.109  
 
There is a long queue of those seeking to buy tickets at the stadium 
gate and tramcars [to the stadium] are crammed solid with a throng 
of football fans to the delight of the West Chosun Electric Company. 
Why are spectators so abundant although today is not a Sunday but 
a Monday? Perhaps they have abandoned company business in 
order to enjoy the last day of the football festival …. [Even] the aged 
know about ―corner kicks‖ and can speak of ―penalty kicks‖; and 
even snotty-nosed children who are aware of ―offside‖ will try to 
dispute a referee‘s decision. 110     
 
During the three days of the championship in 1932 a total of more than 90,000 of 
Pyongyang‘s football-mad spectators visited the stadium. Given that the population of 
Pyongyang was about 167,000 at the time, this represented it was an enormous 
attendance.111  
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At this juncture, it needs to be asked why football had become so important to the 
people of Pyongyang and why it had become so embedded in the popular culture of 
the region. In part, it seems, this phenomenon was related to an intense eagerness for 
modernity of which football, in its modern codified form, was a signifier. Over the 
course of the later years of the Chosun dynasty (1392-1910) Pyongan province, 
including Pyongyang itself, had developed into a society predisposed towards 
modernization. The province‘s culture was shaped by a combination of its emergent 
mercantile middle-class and a relatively relaxed social hierarchy. Another important 
factor was that the Korean political system tended to discriminate against people from 
Pyongyang. This fed both the intense eagerness for modernity and a powerful 
antagonism towards the Giho region comprising the provinces of Gyungsung, Gyunggi 
and Chungchung to the south.112  There was also ardent aspiration for education in 
Pyongan. In 1908, the newspaper Hwangsung Shinmun had extolled northern Pyongan 
as the province that ‗had sold the most books, bought the most newspapers, and built 
the most schools‘.113  The foundation of social organizations including young men‘s 
associations, was more evident in Pyongan than elsewhere in Korea.114 The province‘s 
intellectuals took pride in rapid modernization, boasting that Pyongan was the ‗most 
advanced‘ region. 115  Pyongyang‘s rising middle-class was attracted by the idea of 
representative self-government and by the ideology of individualism: they eagerly 
subscribed to Christianity as an exemplar of modernity.116  
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In 1932, the Christian community in Pyongyang accounted for 38.5 per cent of all 
Christians in Korea.117 At the time the population of Pyongyang constituted only 13.8 
per cent of the total population. In the city of Pyongyang the shops closed on Sundays 
and it was often referred to as the ‗Jerusalem of Chosun‘. 118  There were so many 
churches that they were able to mark the opening of the ACFC in 1924 by ringing their 
bells in chorus.119 In these circumstances, Christianity and particularly Presbyterianism 
and Methodism, the two major denominations, played a critical role in disseminating 
and developing football in Pyongyang.  Soongduk and Gwangsung Elementary Schools, 
and Soongsil and Gwangsung Middle Schools, founded by Presbyterian and Methodist 
churches respectively, were noted as reservoirs of local footballing talent. In addition, 
many Sunday schools keenly encouraged young boys to play football by setting up 
football clubs.120 Football constituted a litmus test of modernization for Pyongyang and 
its development in this region was accentuated by a sense of rivalry with Giho, 
particularly Gyungsung. Football was played without goalposts until the news arrived 
that they had been erected at the Baejae ground, causing Pyongyang to follow this 
example. 121  The Muo Football Club of Pyongyang was established in 1918 but its 
establishment was hastened by a visit from Central YMCA who shocked local 
enthusiasts by their highly-developed skills and modernized football uniforms. This 
encouraged Pyongyong enthusiasts to adopt the same practices as their rivals from the 
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Inter-regional rivalry was very intense almost from the start. There were two national 
football tournaments in Korea during the colonial period. Unsurprisingly, one was held 
at Gyungsung and the other at Pyongyang. Both were established in the same year - 
1921.  On 12 February, the second day of the ACFC at Gyungsung, the Soongsil Club of 
Pyongyang lodged a protest against an offside decision and this resulted in an outbreak 
of violence between Gyungsung and Pyongyang supporters. One of the fans from 
Pyongyang was forced to hide himself in the house of an American missionary to avoid 
a beating from the Gyungsung people who were pursuing him.123 The President of the 
Chosun Sports Association, Ko Won Hoon, ascribed this incident to regionalism.124 Later 
in 1921, after two teams from Gyungsung absented themselves from the ACFC at 
Pyongyang because they feared retribution, there was another brawl.125 Yun Chi Ho, the 
president of Central YMCA, was highly critical of this disgraceful affair attributing it to 
intense regional rivalry. 
 
When the Pyong Yang team [All Soongsil] saw that they were to be 
beaten, they and their friends, the Pyong Yang people, rushed at the 
referee Hyun, stopping him, throwing stones at him and shouting to 
kill the Seoul man. The police had to take out pistols to protect the 
referee and barely saved him from the infuriated mob … During the 
five centuries of Yi [Chosun] Dynasty, the people of the North 
Western provinces were placed under political disqualifications and 
treated with humiliating discriminations. That the North-Westerners 
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had a just cause for hating the Southern Koreans ― especially those 
of the ruling caste, goes without saying. But is this the time to 
nurture the spirit of an-eye-for-an-eye-and-a-tooth-for-a-tooth and 
seek revenge? If everybody wants to get even with his enemies in 
Korea when shall we ever become a united race? 126 
 
Korean political circles at this time were divided on regional lines and the struggle 
between the Giho and the Northwestern faction was the most keenly contested. As the 
leader of the Giho faction, Rhee Syng Man, was in exile in the United States and his 
movement required domestic underpinnings. The Heungup Club was established in 
1925 by Shin Heung Woo, Yun Chi Ho, and Yu Eok Gyeom and others for this reason.127 
Shin and You harboured acute resentment towards the northwestern people, as the 
following extract shows.  
 
Sometime ago, the girls of the Ewha College invited Yi Kwang Su, 
the well-known [North-Western] novelist, to deliver a lecture on 
some literary theme. The program was printed. Only a few hours 
before the appointed hour, Yu advised the American principal of 
College not to permit Yi to speak to the girls because he had 
divorced his former wife. What a slap that must have been to Yi! The 
Ewha College some days ago wanted to invite Chung Doo Hyun [a 
North-Western man of letter], the brother of my son-in-law, to teach 
some subject in the College. I hear Cynn [Shin] neatly turned that 
down with the suggestion that particular subject should be taught 
by a woman teacher and not by a man! 128 
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This had implications for Korean sport and football in particular. 
 
The Chosun Sports Association, which administered Korean football until the early 1930s, 
was presided over by Shin, Yu, and Yun who were all deeply involved with Central YMCA 
and hailed from Giho. As leading politicians from the north-west had played an 
important part in impeaching Rhee, the president of the Korean Provisional Government 
in 1925 it was not surprising that they soon became embroiled in arguments with 
representatives of the Giho people on other matters, some relating to sport.129 When 
the American secretary of the Pyongyang YMCA was controversially recalled home, Kim 
Dong Won, the Association‘s president, and Cho Man Sik, the general secretary, blamed 
the behind-the-scenes machinations of Shin Heung Woo.130 Interestingly, both Kim and 
Cho made important contributions to the development of the ACFC at Pyongyang; Kim 
worked as the president of the championship from 1922 to 1924 and Cho assumed the 
post in 1931. 131  The corresponding political organization of the Heungup Club, 
Dongwoohoe included four members who were directly involved in Pyongyang Football 
Club and the Gwanseo Sports Association that hosted the championships at Pyongyang 
after 1925.132 The whirling vortex of the Gyungsung-Pyongyang politics could not be 
disassociated from football.  
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The Gyungsung-Pyongyang Football Championship inaugurated in 1929 reflected this 
situation. The Pyongyang side was comprised mainly of footballers from Soongsil 
College and Muo Football Club; the Gyungsung team was dominated by players from 
Yeonhee College, Gyungshin Middle School, and the Chosun Football Club.133 In 1929-
1930, the Gyungsung team included some footballers who were originally from the 
North-West.134 One of them was Kim Won Gyeom of Gyungsung‘s Bosung College 
where Pyongyang footballers were prominent in the late 1920s, thus adding to the 
inter-regional tensions.135 The Gyungsung-Pyongyang championship was characterized 
by ‗rough play‘ and ‗excessive competitiveness‘ in this period. 136  Many players 
intentionally kicked and threw their opponents with the referee‘s connivance. They were 
encouraged by shouts from the fans to ‗hit them‘, ‗kick them‘, and ‗kill them‘.137 Such 
wildness seems to have been a product of intense inter-regional rivalry, and the 
outcome was that many footballers suffered injuries. This was one of the main reasons 
behind the suspension of the championship from 1931 to 1932. 138  When it was 
resumed, however, violent incidents continued, reaching a crescendo at the Gyung-
Pyong tournaments in April and September 1933. The Pyongyang team attempted to 
kick the Gyungsung footballers‘ legs rather than ball during the match at Pyongyang in 
April.  In September, the Gyungsung players retaliated with ferocious tackling that 
resulted in a Pyongyang footballer requiring hospital treatment for a severely injured 
ankle.139 The personal enmity between Kim Won Gyeom (northern man) and Lee Young 
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Min (southern man) reflected these antagonistic sentiments.140  
 
When the Pyongyang Football Club officially came into existence in January 1933, the 
Gyungsung-Pyongyang Football Championship entered a new phase. Up to this point 
the two teams contesting the championship were representative sides with no 
permanent composition and players drawn from different clubs but this now was 
changing.141 The Pyongyang Football Club, probably anxious to stage the tournament 
to raise funds required for their forthcoming Tianjin tour, wrote to Kim suggesting that 
the championship should be resumed and that he should lead Gyungsung team.142 At 
the same time Lee Young Min was working to establish the Gyungsung Football Club in 
the south. When the championship did take place in April, Lee did not participate 
because the Gyungsung team was organized by his old enemy Kim.143 Instead, he 
continued his work to establish the Gyungsung Football Club in association with his 
friends, Lee Yong Gyeom and Lee Young Sun, graduates from Severance Medical and 
Yeonhee Colleges respectively. The chief director of Gyungsung Football Club was Yeo 
Woon Hyung and one of his fellow directors was Yu Eok Gyeom.144 Yeo was relatively 
moderate politically in comparison with Yu. Nevertheless, it was he who later that year 
suggested that Yun Chi Ho should ‗form a party composed of loyal Southerners to 
counteract the unscrupulous plots and plans of the N. W. [North-Western] party‘.145 In 
this political climate it was not surprising that football relations between Gyungsung 
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and Pyongyang were so difficult.  
 
On September 1933, another Gyung-Pyong Football Championship took place at 
Gyungsung.  Both Kim Won Gyeom and Lee Young Min were selected but did not join 
their respective teams.146 A month later, with both the Gyungsung and Pyongyang clubs 
established and having agreed to meet on a regular basis, the real championship was 
contested between the two clubs for the first time.147  As the manager of Gyungsung 
Club, Lee Young Min showed a bias towards current and former Yeonhee and Severance 
College students in selecting players. During the three-game-series at least six players 
connected with these colleges were fielded in every game.148 Meanwhile, Kim Won 
Gyeom sought to rebuild the Chosun Football Club for a tour of Japan and China. This 
created a problem for the Gyungsung club. In 1934, with the Gyung-Pyong 
Championship imminent, it seemed that three key players would be absent for at least 
some of the time owing to Chosun Football Club‘s upcoming Tianjin tour. As it 
happened these players barely took part in the championship and they set off for 
Tianjin before the tournament drew to a close.149 As a consequence Pyongyang gained 
an easy 4-0 victory over a weakened Gyungsung team in the third game. By 1935, as a 
consequence of this series of controversies, Lee Young Min, by then a director of the 
Chosun Football Association, had consolidated his influence on Korean football while 
Kim Won Gyeom had been denounced as a criminal.150 These events did not help 
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Thereafter the Gyung-Pyong Football Championship was suspended until 1946. This is 
partly explained by the Pyongyang club‘s decision to give priority to their Tianjin tour in 
1936 rather than contest the championship with Gyungsung.151 This tour also coincided 
with the Inter-City Football Championship.152 Yet, though there was no confrontation on 
the field, inter-regional rivalry continued to characterize Korean football politics. 
Pyongyang voiced their discontent over the selection of the Korean squad for Japan‘s 
elimination match for the Berlin Olympics. Of sixteen players chosen, only five were 
from the Pyongyang club.153  
 
There were other difficulties that helped to sour relations between the two clubs. 
Whereas Gyungsung sometimes included players, notably Kim Won Gyeom,   who 
came from Pyongyang, their north-western counterpart was comparably pure-blooded. 
When the Gyungsung Football Club had been founded, its chief director had asked Choi 
Il, executive director of the Pyongyang Club, for permission to conscript Pyongyang 
footballers who were attending academic institutions in Gyungsung.154 At this time the 
Gyungsung had a pressing need for players with excellent skills such as Jung Yong Soo.  
In 1933, Kim Won Gyeom wrote to Choi Il explaining that Jung was desperately required 
to strengthen Gyungsung‘s defence and a transfer was arranged. 155  However, the 
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Gyungsung Club‘s requests were not always granted.  The two clubs vied with one 
another for the services of Kim Young Keun of Soongsil School, regarded as a key 
player by Pyongyang, who also played for Gyungshin in Gyungsung. The dispute 
remained unresolved and Kim played for neither side in the 1935 tournament.156  
 
Underlying these problems were more fundamental differences. A relatively high 
proportion of Pyongyang Football Club‘s players were engaged in commerce or the civil 
service; whereas the Gyungsung players were mainly college students. The average age 
of players at Pyongyang was higher than at Gyungsung.157 Playing styles were also 
different.  At Gyungsung there was an emphasis on individual skills and tactics whereas 
Pyongyang was renowned for physical strength and will to win.158 The Pyongyang style 
reflected the culture of the region in which the club was based. It is said that the 
people of Pyongyang are characterized by strength and determination: ‗Those who 
drink from the Daedong River are never beaten‘.159  
 
The Pyongyang people‘s aggression and boldness is well illustrated by the enduring 
popularity there of the stone-fight, a Korean folk game. This stone- throwing game, a 
foreign observer had noted, took place between different parts of the same town or 
contiguous villages and was often accompanied by fights between men wielding clubs. 
Not surprisingly the result was ‗bruised arms, broken heads and unlimited invective‘.160  
One of the leaders in Pyongyang sports circles at this time, Cho Man Sik, had taken 
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part in this game in his youth and also possessed a talent for Nalparam, a martial art 
practiced at Pyongyang which was similar to Taikwondo.161 The tradition of the stone-
fighting lasted much longer in Pyongyang than in any other province and was still 
evident in the mid 1930s. 162  A contemporary newspaper noted that it was stone-
fighting and Nalparam that had made the Pyongyang people strong.163 This may help 
to explain why football and basketball – ball games involving frequent bodily contact – 
were taken up with such enthusiasm in Pyongyang. Indeed, the newspaper Donga Ilbo 
pointed out in 1936 that there was very little evidence of baseball and lawn tennis of 
Pyongyang, attributing inactivity in these sports to them being unsuitable for 
Pyongyang people who were more naturally disposed to sports requiring physical 
strength.164  
 
There was also a marked distinction between the two All Chosun Football 
Championships held at Pyongsang and Gyungsung respectively. After 1930, the 
Pyongyang tournament included a section for company teams. This was intended to 
encourage the interest of local factory workers in football and reflected the region‘s 
ascending industrial economy.165 A sizeable number of factories were crowded on the 
left side of the Daedong River at Pyongyang where Korean-owned which the rubber 
and hosiery factories were prominent.166 Between 1930 and 1936 the Byungwoo Club 
(‗The Friend of Arsenal‘) and teams from three Korean - and one Japanese-owned 
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rubber companies dominated the company section of the championship.167 In 1934, no 
less than thirteen company teams took part but thereafter company participation 
notably diminished and only six teams – all from Japanese companies - took part in 
1939.168 The absence of teams from Korean-owned factories was regarded with some 
apprehension in the press.169  However a trend was established and from the late 
1930s onwards the power balance of company football was tilting towards Japanese-
owned factory teams.  Japanese company teams won the Meiji Shrine Games at Tokyo 
in 1941 and 1942   but with teams were composed almost entirely of Korean 
players.170 
 
Meanwhile, the involvement of company teams in the ACFC at Gyungsung was 
insignificant, with the exception of Chuldoguk (Railway) and Daechang Shoe Store.171 
The lion‘s share of Gyungsung football was taken by such college teams as Yeonhee, 
Bosung and Soongsil. Such was the dominance of these colleges between 1927 and 
1931 that the Chosun Sports Association decided to move the goalposts by restoring a 
separate college section of the championship in 1932.172 Henceforth, other adult teams 
were to compete with each other without having to meet the challenge of formidable 
college teams. An indication of the prowess of Gyungsung college football was provided 
by the Bosung team which whitewashed all of the thirteen Japanese college teams at 
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the All Japan College Football Championship in 1939.173  
 
The social complexion of the crowds who attended the championships in the rival cities 
was very different. According to Kim Wha Jip, who played in the Gyung-Pyong Football 
Championship in the 1930s, ‗the youth accounted for the vast majority of fans at 
Gyungsung, while women working for textile and rubber factories and children formed a 
major part at Pyongyang‘. 174  In Gyungsung football was an entertainment mainly 
enjoyed by the modernized elite class in which students and salary men were 
prominent.175 The culture of Pyongyang football was more socially inclusive. According 
to one press report in 1936, it was a ‗marvelous spectacle‘ to see ‗young and old ladies 
and Gisaengs – the Korean equivalent of Japanese Geisha - rooting for the team ‗at the 
top of their voices‘.176 The Pyongyang Gisaeng was a nationally famous entertainment; 
there was even a Gisaeng school.177 Some traditional Pyongyang Gisaengs, like the 
singer Wang Soo Bok, had embraced modernity and achieved public prominence and 
there were links between this branch of the entertainment industry and football. In 1935 
twenty-three Gisaengs staged a concert to raise funds to enable the Pyongyang 
Football Club to participate in the Meiji Shrine Games.178 A year later a performance in 
aid of the Pyongyang Football Club‘s Tianjin tour was staged by Chungchoonjwa, a 
troupe of entertainers attached to the Dongyang theatre at Gyungsung, and thereafter 
this was repeated whenever they visited Pyongyang. In return for this financial support, 
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Pyongyang Football Club would use its influence to settle various problems between the 
troupe and the police. 179  
 
Pyongyang‘s football fans regarded the Gyung-Pyong Championship as being especially 
important. For them, their beloved football supplied a field on which they could 
demonstrate their resistance to the centralizing power of Gyungsung, just as Korean 
football in general provided a way of challenging Japanese domination. This led to a 
confrontation with the authorities in April 1934 when news leaked out of a Football 
Control Decree drawn up by the education and management bureau of Japanese 
Government-General at Gyungsung.  If this decree had been implemented, it would 
have allowed only one ACFC to be played anually, effectively prohibiting the Pyongyang 
tournament. 180  Cho Man Sik, president of the Gwanseo Sports Association in 
Pyongyang, took the lead in opposing the decree and dispatched two officials to 
Gyungsung to make their opposition clear.181 He argued that the decree effectively 
disregarded the interests of an organization like the Gwanseo Sports Association which 
relied on the ACFC as a source of income. The Association successfully argued its case 
by pointing to the example of Japanese baseball. Although it had been subject to a 
Baseball Control Decree since 1932 an exception had been made for the two Middle 
School baseball tournaments sponsored by the Asahi and Mainichi newspapers.182  
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(4) Newspaper support for Korean football 
 
During the colonial period, newspapers were the pre-eminent medium capable of 
instilling a sense of Korean national identity and nationalist sentiment in the population 
at large. At the same time they were also commercial enterprises engaged in a battle 
for circulation. Sports tournaments were very important for Korean newspapers; they 
helped them to achieve commercial viability and to pursue wider social and political 
aims. Primarily sports events were used to enhance a particular newspaper ‘s image and 
enlarge its circulation. It is crucial, however, to understand that there was not a wide 
newspaper readership at the time in Korea.183 Newspapers did not function as daily 
necessities for most Korean people.184 The situation was not comparable to that of 
France where the French sporting paper, L‘Auto, had increased its circulation and 
attracted subsidies from cycle manufacturers by exploiting the growing popularity of the 
Tour de France in the early twentieth century.185 Although Korean newspapers made an 
important contribution to the growth of football, they were not able to profit in the 
same way. 
 
Some important characteristics of the development of football coverage in Korean 
newspapers are clear. This link between newspapers and football was generally made as 
a result of the initiatives of journalists or other employees who were former sportsmen 
or had a close connection with sports. The establishment of the Chosun Sports 
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Association in 1920 owed much to Byun Bong Hyun, a journalist at Donga Ilbo and a 
former baseball player who had made the case for an all-embracing Korean sports 
organization in a series of articles. Of the ninety sponsors of the Chosun Sports 
Association, twelve were connected with Donga Ilbo. Almost all of the sporting events 
set up by the Chosun Sports Association, were assisted by Donga Ilbo, as in the case of 
the ACFC at Gyungsung. Many regional branches of Donga Ilbo followed this lead in 
the early 1920s. 186  For example, the ACFC at Pyongyang was sponsored by the 
Pyongyang branch of Donga Ilbo from the outset.187 In addition, there was a very 
intimate relationship between Donga and the Gwanseo Sports Association which 
underpinned this development. The Association was based at the Pyongyang branch of 
Donga Ilbo and Kim Sung Up, a key figure in the Association, worked for the paper.188  
Though other newspapers - Chosun Ilbo, Sidae Ilbo, and Joongwoe Ilbo - intermittently 
supported the championship – Donga Ilbo was the main sponsor. For the 1940 
championship Donga installed fifteen news-boards at various locations in Pyongyang to 
display the latest scores.189  
 
The Gyung-Pyong Football Championship in 1929 was the brainchild of Lee Won Yong 
and Choi Jung Mook.190 Lee Won Yong was a sports writer for Chosun Ilbo and Choi 
Jung Mook, a lawyer, worked as the head of the paper‘s Pyongyang branch in the late 
1920s.191 Lee Won Yong, a former baseball player, had an enormous interest in sports 
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business. He founded a sports shop at Gyungsung and later published a sports 
magazine entitled Chosun Cheyukgye. 192  Newspapers were involved in 1922 when 
American professional baseball players competed with All Chosun team at Gyungsung, a 
key moment in the development of sport as commercial entertainment in Korea. The 
game was promoted by Lee Won Yong and sponsored by Chosun Ilbo.193 Personal 
connections were always important. During the late 1920s, the financially hard-pressed 
Joongwoe Ilbo had employed the son of Baik In Gi, a wealthy landowner as a means of 
soliciting Baik‘s investment.194 Baik‘s son, Baik Myung Gon, who was employed part-time 
by Joongwoe while continuing as general manager of Chosun Football Club.195 The link 
was strengthened when Ma Chun Sik, a Chosun footballer, became a Joongwoe sports 
journalist. When he was dispatched to Shanghai in the late 1920s, he became aware 
that leading figures in Chinese sport and also Koreans residing in China would welcome 
a visit from the Chosun club. When Chosun visited Shanghai in 1928 the tour was 
promoted by Joongwoe Ilbo. 196  
 
Almost all of Chosun Joongang Ilbo‘s sports coverage was inextricably related to its 
president, Yeo Woon Hyung. He was a sportsman himself, having played football at 
Pyongyang Christian School in the early 1910s and captained the YMCA Baseball 
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Club.197 When he was released from prison in 1932, Yeo became a cult hero, not only 
on account of his endeavours for the Korean independence movement but also because 
he cultivated his image as a sportsman thus provoking great enthusiasm amongst 
Korean youth.198 He became president of the Gyungsung Football Club in 1933 and of 
the Chosun Football Association in the following year.199 Meanwhile he employed Lee 
Young Sun and Jung Yong Soo, both from the Gyungsung Football Club, as sports 
journalists for his newspaper.200 In the mid-1930s the Chosun Joongang Ilbo and the 
Gyung-Pyong Football Championship were inextricably linked. 
 
It is possible to observe an interesting connection between the state of newspaper 
finances and football. Whenever new capital was injected into newspaper companies, 
they eagerly publicized football events, particularly international matches, as a means of 
engaging the attention of the public.  When newspaper companies ran into financial 
difficulties, however, they tended to cut down or even scrap their football coverage. 
Thus, the expansion and contraction of football news may have provided an indication 
of the changing fortunes of Korean newspaper companies.  
 
At least until 1935 Donga Ilbo was the most financially stable Korean newspaper and 
the one with the largest number of subscribers.  This helps to explain why Donga was 
so influential in Korean sports circles.201 The Donga‘s generous sports sponsorship was 
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certainly advantageous to sports enthusiasts but was also driven by self-interest. This 
was made clear in 1927 when Donga Ilbo postponed the Club Baseball Championship, 
which it sponsored, in order to make way for the Invitation Football Matches which 
Waseda University had agreed to play in Korea, which were also sponsored by Donga 
Ilbo. It was considered that an ‗international‘ contest between Korean and Japanese 
teams was likely to be more significant and to attract more public interest than the 
baseball championship. 202  To underline its commitment Donga Ilbo arranged for 
pigeons to be released at the invitation matches, the first time this had been done in 
Korea.203 Donga was financially stable; the situation at Joongwoe was less favourable. 
Having hosted the Invitation Football Matches involving Meiji University of Tokyo in 
May 1928, Joongwoe attempted to cash in on the popularity of football at Pyongyang 
by staging an ACFC in 1930.204 However, it was unable to follow this up in 1931, 
because the company owning the paper went bankrupt.205 
 
The Gyung-Pyong Championship had been made possible by donations from, among 
others, the head of the Jeonnam branch of Chosun and this paper   sponsored other 
sporting events in 1929 including a further series of Invitation Football Matches 
involving Waseda University.206 However, in the early 1930s, Chosun Ilbo found itself in 
dire financial straits being heavily in debt and forced to lay off staff.  It seems likely that 
Chosun Ilbo‘s problems were one of the factors which led to the suspension of the 
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Gyung-Pyong Championship.207  
 
It was not until 1933, when it was taken over and rescued by a gold-mine tycoon from 
the North-West named Bang Ung Mo, that Chosun Ilbo got back on the right track.208  
Three years later, in 1936, it was much advantaged in its battle to achieve the highest 
circulation when its main rivals ran into difficulties. Donga Ilbo was suspended by the 
Japanese authorities for publishing a photograph from which the national flag of Japan 
on Son Kee Jung‘s shirt had been intentionally deleted. Chosun Joongang Ilbo who also 
carried a photograph with the flag being erased voluntarily suspended its publication in 
the wake of the Donga Ilbo affair. Only Chosun Ilbo cleverly avoided trouble by 
choosing a photograph which had been taken by a Japanese news photographer from 
an angle where the flag on his flannel shirt had been invisible so that there was no 
need to delete the flag.209 As the Korean newspaper with the largest circulation after 
1936, Chosun Ilbo was able to resume its relationship with sport, lending its resources 
to many sports events, including the All Chosun Inter-City Football Championship 
between 1938 and 1940.210  
 
By then Chosun Joongang Ilbo had already launched what was up to that point the 
biggest football event ever staged in Korea: the Invitation Matches played by the 
Donghua Football Club of Shanghai. The elaborate arrangements included a music 
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concert to welcome the team. In addition an aeroplane carrying words of welcome 
dropped a ball and a bunch of flowers into the Gyungsung stadium.211 The price of an 
admission ticket for the match was more than three times that of the Gyung-Pyong 
Football Championship that was held in the same year. Chosun Joongang Ilbo also 
issued vouchers enabling their readers to watch the game at a 20 per cent reduced 
price.212 This football event was so successfully promoted that almost 30,000 gathered 
at the Pyongyang Gilimli Stadium on the day. 213  When the All-Gyungsung Team 
triumphed over Donghua an extra edition was published in order to make the result 
known as quickly as possible.214 At this time, this was considered the most efficient 
medium for the prompt distributing of sports news as radio had only very small 
number of listeners.215 There was an attempt to build on this success by increasing 
financial support for the All Chosun Inter-City Football Championship which was held 
under the auspices of Chosun Joongang Ilbo in 1936.216 This championship proved very 
significant in attracting those who had not previously been interested in football. For 
example, local patriotism transformed Kim Won Ju, a female writer who had never 
watched a game before, into a fan of her hometown team, Jinnampo.217 However, the 
relationship between Chosun Joongang Ilbo and the Inter-City Championship was short-
lived as the newspaper was discontinued after 1937. 218  It seems likely that the 
relationship between football and the press in this era was probably more beneficial to 
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football than it was to the press. 
 
(5) Individual football patrons  
 
It is also important to detail the considerable impact of a few powerful individual 
patrons on the development of football in Korea. These patrons largely fall into two 
categories: they were either the heirs of a landowners or professional men. Bak Myung 
Gon and Bae Seok Whan were typical members of the leisure class who had benefited 
from inherited wealth. In 1925, when the Buddhist Young Men‘s Association faced 
financial difficulties, it was transformed into the Chosun Football Club by Baik Myung 
Gon and went on to become the most prestigious team in Korea.219 So great was their 
patron‘s wealth that Donga Ilbo became   concerned about the Chosun club‘s ability to 
monopolize the best Korean footballers.220 In 1926 and 1928 the club went on tours to 
Japan and China by virtue of his benevolent assistance; the tour to Japan was the first 
ever made by Korean footballers. 221  Baik rented a house at Gyungsung to 
accommodate the players for two months before the Japanese tour and financed this 
luxurious trip to the amount of 7,000 won.222 Apart from Chosun Football Club, he 
financially backed a Korean Jazz Band and he was known as the most extravagant 
person in Korea.223 Every Christmas, he held a party to which the footballers were 
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invited, the event gingered up by many a Gisaeng as well as the jazz band.224 However, 
his chronic habit of wasting money along with a decrease in the price of rice from the 
mid-20s onwards eventually restrained his patronage.225  In 1934, despite his financial 
problems, Baik backed another Chosun club football tour to Japan and China but 
stretched his resources too far.  With the Chinese tour on the verge of cancellation, Lim 
Chang Bok donated 300 won for this journey. This new benefactor was associated with 
a petroleum company in Tianjin and he was also a famous tennis player.226  
 
Gyungsung Football Club was financed by Bae Seok Whan who had inherited several 
hundred won after legal proceedings against his half brother.227 He also sponsored Bae 
Jong Ho, a footballer for the Chosun Football Club who was to become a key player in 
the Japanese national side in the late 1930s, so that he could study at Waseda 
University.228 Bae Seok Whan‘s lifestyle was reminiscent of Baik‘s. He squandered his 
money on womanizing and purchasing expensive automobiles and motor-bikes. Having 
once been the king of Korean high society, he fell on hard times and degenerated into 
the owner of a grogshop after the Korean War. 229 Other patrons were less extravagant. 
In the mid 1920s, Hwimoon Middle School‘s football and baseball were financially 
supported by Jeon Hyeong Pil, later to become the most famous art collector in Korea. 
At the time he was a member of Hwimoon baseball team. He always made sure that the 
footballers and baseball players of Hwimoon Middle School were served a square meal 
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after matches and training sessions. 230  Another landowner and philanthropist, Jeon 
Young Joon donated his land to the general public of Jeju Island who had experienced 
difficulties in finding a space on which to play football. The land donated by him 
became a public stadium.231  
 
Yet patronage of football was sometimes derived from other motives cloaked in the 
garb of benevolence. During the 1930s, with the introduction of the company section of 
the ACFC at Pyongyang, many factory teams were established by affluent entrepreneurs. 
It has been argued that companies effectively institutionalized their commitment to 
paternalistic capitalism by sponsoring such teams. However, it should be remembered 
that the newly-organized company section emerged at a time of labour unrest over the 
wage system, notably at rubber factories from the late 1920s onwards. 232  In these 
circumstances, the owners of rubber factories might have expected their company 
teams to improve the soured state of industrial relations. It is highly probable that such 
considerations help to explain Song Seok Chan‘s interest in the Gwanseo Sports 
Association after 1930.233 Song Seok Chan, the director of the Association, was one of 
the principal shareholders of the Seogyung Commerce and Industry Company, mainly 
dealing with rubber. In April 1930 the workers at Seogyung went on strike. A month 
later the company‘s team was entered in the ACFC at Pyongyang.234 It is important to 
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look at the active participation and relatively good results of rubber factory teams in 
the championship during the early 1930s in the context of the difficult industrial 
relations of the period. 
 
Elsewhere local patriotism was boosted by local worthies who made Hamheung and 
Majang into new football strongholds.  Hamheung, the central city of Hamgyung 
Province in the northernmost part of Korea, rapidly developed into a significant power 
in Korean football. By recruiting young players from the Pyongyang Club who were 
rarely fielded and ex-Yeonhee College footballers, Hamheung won the Meiji Shrine 
Games at Tokyo for two years in a row (1939-40).235 The meteoric rise of Hamheung 
football was made possible by three enthusiastic supporters in the city. Kim Myung Hak, 
a surgeon, who went riding with high-ranking Japanese officials, orchestrated the 
foundation of the football club.236 The other supporters were Moon Tae Soo and Lee 
Sung Joo. Moon employed in the financial department of South Hamgyung provincial 
office, had sufficient wealth to donate 20,000 won in order to establish the Hamheung 
Women‘s Normal High School.237 Lee, who was involved in the theatre business, was 
also a director of the Chosun Football Association. They provided all the Hamheung 
footballers with employment, either in their own businesses or in   Japanese companies, 
by using their social connections with Japanese entrepreneurs and civil servants to good 
effect.238 The footballers were allowed to leave their work at two in the afternoon, 
which guaranteed enough time for training.239 Preferential treatment of this kind was 
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unprecedented and was clearly advantageous for Hamheung.  Most Korean footballers 
were in jobs, where they had a hard time juggling their work and football commitments. 
In 1936, for example, one Pyongyang footballer-cum-clerk who had been selected for 
an overseas football tour was released by his employer only at the last minute.240 At 
Majang the football Club was eagerly supported by Lim Heung Soon, a member of 
Gyungsung municipal assembly as well as the general manager of Gyungsung Football 
Club.241 Lim, a key figure in the town, established the club in pursuit of enhancing local 
pride and fulfilling his political ambitions.  Majang, though a small town and a suburb 
of Gyungsung, took part in the Inter-City Football Championship in 1940 and 1941, 
beating the prestigious Gyungsung Football Club.242  
 
Other examples of sponsorship by entrepreneurs involve owners of shoe stores who 
may have had particular reasons for their commitment to football. The Daechang Shoe 
Store set up a football team, participating in the ACFC at Gyungsung in 1929. The 
company was already linked with football as the offices of the Chosun Football Club 
were located at the shoe store. 243  Han Gyung Sun Shoe Store‘s football team 
participated in the All Chosun Games in 1936. Its owner had an eye for publicity and 
had promised Son Kee Jung, the marathon winner at the Berlin Olympics, that he would 
have free shoes for the rest of his life.244 Significantly, both these shoe stores also 
traded in sporting goods, which was presumably a factor which drew them to 
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football.245 Daechang and Han Gyung Sun also provided ticket agency facilities for 
football championships. In addition, Daechang printed match programmes and supplied 
footballs for the first Inter-City Football Championship in 1936.246   
 
(6) Overseas football tours and Korean footballers abroad  
 
In the period when it was under Japanese colonial rule, there was very limited sports 
interchange between Korea and the West. Korea‘s external football contacts were largely 
limited to Japan and China. Patriotic sentiments spilled over in the stadium whenever 
any football match against Japanese opposition took place. A significant historical 
moment pertaining to Korean football nationalism came when the Soongsil Middle 
School won the All-Japan Middle School Football Championship at the Koshien Stadium 
in 1928. The Soongsil coach had instructed his footballers to speak only in Korean 
during the game against their Japanese opponents, an instruction that stoked the 
flames of nationalism.247 At a celebration party after the match one Korean exile in 
Japan was moved to say that ‗you [Soongsil] came here to save us‘. 248  When the 
Soongsil footballers arrived back in Pyongyang there was an unprecedented motorcade. 
They were welcomed with great enthusiasm; eighty wons and two automobiles were 
donated to the school.249  
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At times, Japan‘s ethnic discrimination against Koreans caused much displeasure. Only 
two Korean footballers were chosen for the Berlin Games although the Gyungsung club, 
representing Korea and strengthened by some players from Pyongyang, had won 
Japan‘s two major national championship that were regarded as try-outs for the 
Olympics as well.250 The Gyungsung club boycotted the Olympics in protest at the 
unfair selection process and the president of the Chosun Football Association, Yeo 
Woon Hyung, also took a militant stand.251  On this occasion the Koreans were not 
alone in feeling that they had been unfairly treated. This biased selection also prompted 
the Kansai (West Japan) Football Association to protest. Of the twenty-five members of 
the squad called up just three were from Kansai and they boycotted the camp training. 
The Kansai Association thought of this as favouritism towards Ganto (East Japan) and 
explained it by pointing to Ganto‘s monopoly on the council of the Japan Football 
Association.252 Admittedly, the Japanese head coach, an old boy of Waseda University, 
preferred the short-passing style to the kick and rush style practiced by Korean teams 
and teams from the Kansai district universities.253 But, as far as Koreans were concerned, 
the composition of Japanese football team for the Berlin Games simply reflected the 
discriminatory treatment to they were routinely subjected by their Japanese rulers.254 In 
the end, after many twists and turns, one Korean footballer, Kim Yong Sik, did play at 
the Berlin Games. He helped Japan upset Sweden 3-2.255  
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After the Berlin Games, thirteen Korean footballers were conscripted into the Japanese 
national squad.256 Tokyo was due to host the 1940 Olympics and with this very much in 
mind, the Japan Football Association was anxious to strengthen its team even if that 
meant selecting Korean footballers. There was also a political dimension because the 
idea of a national football team in which Japanese and Koreans would play together 
seemed a good way of demonstrating in practice the concept of Naesun Ilche, the idea 
that Japan and Korea were united in a single body, a prominent feature of the 
propaganda circulated by the Japanese colonial government based at Gyungsung.257 
However, progress towards integration was not immediately apparent. In March 1938, 
during the course of a world tour, the Islington Corinthians arrived in Japan and 
suffered a 4-0 thrashing by a Japanese Olympic XI. Spectators, who had expected 
something better, were disappointed by a somewhat languid display by the English 
amateurs who were tired from their journey. Their diarist admitted: ‗I am sure that had 
we not suffered from staleness… a different score would have resulted‘. But Koreans 
who watched the match, like Lee Young Min, were also displeased because only one 
Korean player was included in the side. 258 By the time of the East Asian Games in 1942, 
however, this was no longer the case. With the Far Eastern Games discontinued 
following a dispute over the affiliation of Manjuguk (the Japanese puppet regime 
established in Manchuria in 1932) and the Tokyo Olympics abandoned, the Japanese 
government, much influenced by fascist ideology, required a new tournament in order 
to display its national strength. This climate led to the East Asian Games of 1942 in 
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which Japan, China, Philippines, Mongo, and Manjuguk participated.259Japan‘s football 
team, now including Korean footballers, won easy victories by lopsided scores over 
China, Mongo, and Manjuguk.260 In the Games, two Korean footballers also played for 
China. 261  A further indication of the strength of Korean football came after the 
tournament when a Japanese team comprising five Korean football talents was defeated 
by a Korean selection.262  
      
In the 1930s, the visit of the Islington Corinthians aside, significant   footballing 
contacts with teams from the West were few, though matches were often played against 
teams of foreign sailors visiting Korean ports, mainly weak sides.263 It was when they 
toured China that Korean footballers had opportunities to face against quality Western 
teams. In Shanghai in 1928, the Chosun Football Club played against British Army teams 
such as the Coldstream Guards, Royal Corps of Signals, and the Northamptonshire 
Regiment. The Chosun players and officials also learned much about sportsmanship and 
sophisticated football skills through watching the intra-squad match of a foreigners club 
based in Shanghai. It was a good lesson for the Club whose play had been 
characterized by foul play and reckless long kicking. Chosun Football Club struggled to 
defend against the aerial attacks of their taller counterparts notably, in the match 
against the Coldstream Guards.264 For exiles living in Shanghai - most of them were 
                                           
259 A. Morris, Marrow of the Nation: a History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China, 
Berkeley and London, 2004, 164-5; A. Guttmann and L. Thompson, Japanese Sports: A History, 
Honolulu, 2001, 126-7; Ohsima, Legend of Kick-off , 84-86. 
260 Ibid, 85.  
261 KFA, History of Korean Football, (1986), 273.  
262 Maeil Shinbo (Morning), 17 Aug 1942.  
263 KFA, History of Korean Football, (1986), 273-274.  
264 Donga Ilbo, 4, 9, 17, 10 Feb 1928. 
84 
 
badly off - the visit of Korean team was a great consolation. At the same time the 
Shanghai football tour brought the Korean footballers into contact with the nationalist 
movement.  In 1936, at a banquet held by the Provisional Korean Government which 
was based in Shanghai, Yeonhee College‘s footballers were very touched to see the 
Korean national flag for the first time.265  
 
The All Tianjin Foreigners Team was probably the strongest side faced by Korean teams 
in China. Though they played against them five times in 1936, the Pyongyang Football 
Club gained only one victory. 266  After this win, many Westerners - mainly military 
personnel and women who had read enthusiastic accounts of Pyongyang‘s talent in 
local newspapers - gathered at the stadium to watch the return match but on this 
occasion the Tianjin team, reinforced by fielding four key players, defeated 
Pyongyang.267 Contact with the Tianjin team was especially important as it introduced 
Pyongyang to the ‗W-M‘ formation that was then the normal practice in Europe but 
relatively unknown in Asia. It played an important part in Japan‘s victory over Sweden at 
Berlin.268 A passing game honed by well-organized training was another legacy derived 
from contact with the Tianjin Team. Korean football being awash with individual dribbles 
and long kicks needed a more scientific approach to the game at this time. In 1938, a 
critic in Donga Ilbo pointed out the deficiencies of Korean football with a succinct 
summary of a game between Keio University and Gyungsung Football Club which had 
‗left an impression of a victory in terms of physical strength, but an utter defeat in 
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terms of skill‘.269 Indeed, physical strength and endurance were the most characteristic 
features of Korean football, a tendency that Hamheung footballers typified by playing 
‗180-minute training games‘ to strengthen their stamina.270 
 
Korean students studying abroad were also important in bringing the modern game of 
football to Korea. Student teams from Tokyo and Shanghai visited their homeland from 
the early 1920s, a period when conventional football rules were still not widely 
implemented. These student teams played friendly matches against local teams helped 
modern football rules and skills to take root in every region of Korea. 271  The 
Hakwoohoe club for Korean students in Japan made frequent visits to Korea to play 
football matches up until 1939.272 Hakwoohoe had participated in the Ganto Football 
Tournament hosted by the first Japanese football club at Tokyo in 1918 but had failed 
to win a match. 273  Over the next few years they worked hard to improve. Two 
tournaments for Korean footballers studying at Japanese academic institutions were 
staged by Hakwoohoe and the Chosun YMCA in Japan in 1924 and 1925. These were 
held in an attempt to prepare Korean students to take on and match any Japanese 
team.274 This preparation bore fruit when Hakwoohoe defeated seven Japanese sides in 
1928. The Kyobun Middle School team from Hiroshima – all   Korean  students - were 
another important influence. Having won the 1931 All Japan Middle School Football 
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Championship, they visited Korea in 1933.275 The Kyobun Middle School also helped the 
Korean student team in 1931 by providing accommodation and training facilities before 
their tour of the homeland. This tour had been arranged by Choi Il, who would later 
transform Pyongyang Football Club into a permanent side in 1933.276  
 
Some Chinese-educated Korean footballers who took part in the Shanghai student team 
became major figures in the Korean football circles. Shin Ki Joon, an old boy of 
Shanghai‘s Jiao Tong University, visited Korea as the leader of the Shanghai Student 
Football team in 1922. He later became a professor at Yeonhee College where he strove 
to develop college football. In 1928 Shin was appointed president of what was the first 
national organization in Korean football, the Chosun Football Referees Association.277 
He also arranged Yeonhee College‘s football tour to China in 1936. Another member of 
the Shanghai Student Team, Hyun Jung Joo, was such a gifted footballer that he was 
selected to play for the   Chinese national team in the early 1920s. He later coached 
Yoenhee College and was a director of both the Gyungsung Football Club and the 
Chosun Football Association. 278 
 
It was in Gando, the north-east part of China, that the football fever of Korean 
immigrants was most evident. Gando, was transformed by a massive influx of Korean 
patriots and ordinary Koreans occurred in this period. By 1935 the number of Koreans 
immigrants had reached 460,000, accounting for approximately 75 per cent of Gando‘s 
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population.279 Gando football rapidly thrived on the initiative of the schools. From 1923, 
an inter-school football tournament was held in Gando but it was marked by frequent 
conflicts. In 1924, there was a riot at a match attended by more than 10,000 supporters 
of   Dongheung Middle School, which had been established by Korean nationalists, 
and the referee was beaten severely on account of an allegedly biased decision in a 
match against a mission school. The incident continued into the next day with students 
throwing stones and wielding sticks, and the police only managed to bring the 
disturbance to an end by firing warning shots from guns.280 The highly-competitive 
attitude amongst the Korean schools in Gando was exacerbated by the fact that some 
had been founded by Western missionaries or Korean Christians, while others were 
established by nationalist organizations Sabbatarianism became an issue in these 
circumstances caused a problem. When   Sunday fixtures were scheduled in 1925 the 
two mission schools who objected were disqualified and asked for financial 
compensation.281  
 
Once Manjuguk was established all football activities in Gando came under Japanese 
administration and the Manjuguk Football Championship was set up. Teams from 
Gando dominated this competition on the base of the region‘s keenly contested schools 
football which drew much of its strength from Korean players. The 1942 East Asian 
Games saw thirteen Korean footballers playing for Manjuguk holding the second 
rank.282 Some footballers from Gando would go on to make major contributions to the 
                                           
279 Donga Ilbo, 26 Feb 1936.  
280 Dong-sub Choi et al, A Football History of Ethnic Koreans Living in Yanbien, Yanbien, 1992, 29; 
Donga Ilbo, 29 May 1924. 
281 Choi et al, Football History of Ethnic Koreans, 15, 26-27, 30; Donga Ilbo, 19 May 1925. 
282 Choi et al, Football History of Ethnic Koreans, 65, 73.  
88 
 
development of football in North and South Korea. Lee Jong Gab, for example, 
participated in the 1954 World Cup in Switzerland and later became the vice president 
of the Korea Sports Association. 283 For the North Koreans, Heo Jook San came to 
exemplify the ideal communist footballer after he died as a hero in the Korean War. 
When he was sent to the front he took his football shoes. ‗After defeating the 
Americans‘ he is supposed to have said, ‗I will come to play football for the General, 




Under Japanese imperialism, the idea grew that the ideal modern Korean was a 
muscular Gunja (Confucian gentlemen) capable of playing a part in the movement for 
liberation. 285  It was believed that football was very much conducive to producing 
muscular Gunja and that playing football would help to rectify the disadvantage of 
Koreans‘ short legs.286 Indeed, Korean footballers may have been the most successful 
group in embodying muscular Chosun with its fervent anti-Japanese sentiments. 
Victories over teams from Japan were greeted with widespread jubilation, which in turn 
helped to make football a national sport in colonized Korea. This footballing dominance 
over Japan boosted ethnic pride to a level where nationalism and football were 
identified with each other. There was a popular belief that ‗football is Chosun‘.287  
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In explaining the rapid penetration of football among ordinary Koreans it should be 
remembered that the game had certain advantages: it was easily understood, it was 
relatively cheap pastime for both players and spectators, and it took up little time. 
However, the importance of many social agencies in disseminating and popularizing 
football in Korea should not be forgotten. The YMCA was one of the most important. 
Although it focused on developing basketball and baseball it proved to be the West‘s 
most active agent for introducing football in Korea, especially in the 1910s and 1920s. 
Mission schools were especially important in nurturing elite footballers and, more 
significantly, ensuring that many more were bitten by the football bug. Baejae, 
Gyungshin, Soongsil Middle School, and Yeonhee College, in particular, took the lead in 
this process. The influence of the mission schools was clearly evidenced by 
Sabbatarianism impinging on the scheduling of the ACFC at Gyungsung. Pyongyang, 
the most Christian city in Korea also sought to respect the Sabbath when arranging the 
schedule for the championship. 288     
 
Korean newspapers were not only important as a way of publicizing football; they also 
promoted or sponsored a number of football tournaments. However, it seems that this 
active involvement did not lead directly to an increase in circulation. As one newspaper 
executive has explained newspapers hoped by this strategy to build a close relationship 
with Korea‘s working class.289 The twin aims of enhancing a newspaper‘s popularity and 
inspiring patriotism explains the boom of football sponsorship by Korean newspapers. 
Newspaper companies in the colonial period often saw themselves not as enterprises in 
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search of profit but a means of advancing the independence movement.290 Similarly, 
individual patrons who invested in football were mainly interested in prestige rather 
than profit. Tapping into the growing enthusiasm for football and local pride were the 
main factors that seem to have motivated them, with the possible exception of the 
owners of Pyongyang‘s rubber factories, as I have shown earlier.  
      
Top Korean footballers could play in international matches for Japan especially after 
1936 when the Japanese football authorities were anxious to strengthen the national 
team in advance of the proposed Tokyo Olympics of 1940. Chinese tours including 
matches against some Western select teams exposed Korean footballers to higher levels 
of skill and gave them new tactics to emulate, such as the ‗W-M‘ formation and 
sophisticated passing game. These excursions, at times, seem to have provided a rare 
opportunity for Korean footballers to get information on European football. Kim Yong 
Sik, a member of Chosun Football Club on the 1934 Tianjin Tour, bought football 
magazines and a book written by Kenneth Hunt, a famous half-back for Wolverhampton 
Wanderers and England. He was touched by Hunt‘s advocacy of fair play on reading the 
book and began to modify his own game accordingly.291 Also he designed the jerseys 
worn by Bosung College in emulation of Sunderland whose team had been pictured in 
a foreign football magazine.292  
 
It is often said of Korea that the North is dominated by football and the South by 
baseball. In as far as this is true it is due to an accident of geography. The North of 
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Korea was comparably far from Japan which was submerged by a wave of baseball fever 
that swept across the country in the 1930s to such an extent that a German visitor in 
1938 thought that baseball was more popular in Japan than in the United States.293 
Japanese influence was relatively weak in the North. That was the reason why 
Gyungsung Textile Company had an emphasis on developing the northern market 
where Japanese goods did not permeate as deeply as in the South.294  
 
Baseball as a social phenomenon in Korea at the time of colonial rule, was largely 
confined to the South, particularly Gyungsung.  Company and middle school baseball 
teams at Gyungsung predominated over Korean baseball.295 Enterprises founded by the 
Japanese particularly encouraged the establishment of company baseball teams. These 
teams encouraged a few important Korean baseball talents, Lee Young Min for 
instance.296 In addition it is argued that baseball was more suitable to the propertied 
class who had sufficient leisure time and capital to enjoy the game. Some contemporary 
Korean critics argued that baseball was ‗too expensive to be universally adopted to this 
land‘.297  Moreover, the nationalist movement did not see baseball as a sport that they 
could recommend to their countrymen. Yeo Woon Hyung argued: ‗We cannot win over 
Japanese through baseball due to lack of money, and football requires just shoes and a 
uniform, so only in football – which costs less money – are Koreans able to beat the 
                                           
293 A. Grix, Japan‘s Sport, Berlin and Limpert, 1938, 63, cited in Guttmann and Thompson, Japanese 
Sports, 89.  
294 Ik-jong Joo, Scout of a Large Army: the Gyungsung Textile Company under Japanese Rule and Kim 
Sung Soo and Kim Yeon Soo, Seoul, 2008, 202.  
295 Hong-rak Yu, Il-pyong Chun, and Jong-nam Lee, A History of Korean Baseball, Seoul, 1999, 266; 
Hong-rak Yu and Jong-nam Lee, From Gillete to Lee Young Min, Seoul, 1997, 186.  
296 Ibid, 193-195.  





Through this combination of factors football was able to seep into every corner of 
Korean society and achieve unrivalled popularity in the era of Japanese administration. It 
was football‘s popularity which persuaded the Gyungsung Broadcasting Company to 
broadcast Gyung-Pyong Football Championship via radio in 1933. This was the first 
Korean-language radio broadcast of any outdoor sports event.299 The way in which 
football developed in Korea was also linked to regional identity and inter-regional rivalry. 
Football was perceived by the people in the north of the country as one of the arenas 
in which they could demonstrate their successful modernization and to challenge 
Gyungsung‘s centralism. For them, the success of Pyongyang and Hamheung Football 
Club was significant in this sense. In a same vein, football certainly put the north on the 
map, which was reflective of the northern people‘s growing confidence during the 
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Chapter 3  
 
Korean football in turbulent times, 1945-65 
 
When the Gyungsung-Pyongyang football championship was resumed after liberation 
from Japanese rule in 1945, the Korean people could not sense that it would be the last.  
However, intense conflict between left and right in association with American and Soviet 
intervention in Korean politics led to the outbreak of a tragic civil war in 1950 which 
lasted until 1953. From then onwards, in football terms, regional rivalry between the 
north and south was transformed into a competition between rival nation-states, a 
process that was shaped by the impact   of Cold War politics on football in the two 
Koreas. In this unusual situation,  football became increasingly important, not least 
because its pre-existing widespread popularity made it useful to North and South 
Korean politicians seeking to rebuild their respective nations after the war while also 
gaining international recognition. 
 
It was the South that took the lead in this contest by participating in the London 
Olympics in 1948 and the World Cup finals in 1954, though these expeditions brought 
only one victory. The South was more successful in regional competitions winning the 
Asian Cup in 1956 and 1960 and emerging with the reputation of being Asia‘s football 
powerhouse. In assessing this achievement, it is important to note the important role of 
the South Korean military, the source of many players in the national team, and also the 
critical contribution of some northern footballers who had crossed the border before 
and during the Korean War. Also in this period Korean-Japanese football rivalry 
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approached its high- water mark coinciding with diplomatic conflict between the two 
countries. For Koreans, for whom life as a Japanese colony was a recent memory, both 
animosity and national pride were projected onto the matches against Japan in the 
1954 World Cup preliminaries as evidenced by the Korean manager‘s pre-match pledge: 
‗If we do not win over Japan, we are going to plunge into the Straits of Korea‘.300 
 
In the meantime, football in the North was unable to make a corresponding impression 
on a world audience, since international fixtures were largely confined to the 
Communist bloc. It was not until the 1960s that the emergence of competition between 
the Third World nonaligned nations provided more frequent and more diversified 
opposition. The first GANEFO in 1963 offered an arena in which North Korean football 
could gain confidence and experience. Encouraged by their footballers‘ runners-up 
finish in this competition, the North Korean regime began to take a serious interest. It 
sanctioned the publication of a book which praised ‗the brilliant record of our 
footballers in the First GANEFO‘, and attributed this success and the growth of football 
generally to ‗the Party‘s profound consideration and adequate instruction‘ 301  The 
preface has also explained that the book was intended to propagate North Korean 
football skills and tactics with alacrity.302 With the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations 
in the early 1960s, North Korean Juche, literally self-reliance and independence, was 
increasingly required as it became necessary to find a position that was independent of 
both Moscow and Beijing.303 This idea of Juche began to prevail over all cultural and 
sports practices in North Korea and this facilitated the birth of a distinctive football 
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style. It was this relentlessly attacking style based on speed and agility that eventually 
shook the world in 1966.  
 
This chapter will indicate the extent to which anti-communist and anti-Japanese 
sentiments were bound up with the South Korean football in the period 1945-65. At the 
same time, the contribution of North Korean footballers to the development of football 
in South Korea and the leverage of the military on football will be analyzed. As for 
North Korean football, here are two main questions to be answered: firstly, how was its 
distinctive national style formulated and developed in this period; and secondly, to what 
extent could it be differentiated from football in the South?  
 
(1) The last Gyung-Pyong Championship and the first Olympics 
 
Although the 38th Parallel effectively divided Korea after its liberation, the border was 
still porous until the autumn of 1947 owing to the relatively loose border control 
practiced by the Soviet army stationed in the north. 304  Indeed, three northern 
footballers crossed the border before the match at Seoul between Bosung and Yeonhee 
College Old Boys took place in 1945.305 However, significant sporting contacts between 
Seoul and Pyongyang were revived in earnest from early 1946, at a time when a joint 
USA-USSR Commission was meeting to discuss the process of establishing a provisional 
government for Korea.  In January, a Seoul-Pyongyang ice hockey match was played 
outdoors in Seoul with Pyongyang winning 3-0, though this did not attract much 
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attention as ice-hockey was not a major sport and the weather was cold.306 It served, 
however, as a curtain-raiser for the revival of traditional football rivalry dating back to 
the Japanese colonial period. The Gyung-Pyong Football Championship - along with 
basketball games between the two rival centres - was staged in Seoul in March. The 
sponsor of this event, Jayu Shinmun, explained the importance of this event and why it 
should be held. At a time when the USA-USSR Commission was meeting and the 38th 
Parallel was a matter of primary concern, reviving a championship which meant so 
much in Korean sports circles would testify to national unity.  
 
This revival of this popular football event which had been discontinued since 1935 
served to entertain the people of Seoul, attracting over 40,000 spectators to the first 
match.307 Public interest in Seoul was heightened by the fact that the Pyongyang side 
arrived with a fine record against Soviet military teams, against whom they had played 
five matches – winning three times, drawing once and losing only once.308 The Soviet 
army, having at first underrated the ability of Korean footballers, had been forced to call 
on all available Russian football talent in the North after a series of defeats.309 Colonel-
General T. F. Shtykov, one of the USSR‘s representatives on the Commission, took a keen 
interest and attended these matches.310 He was the ‗real supreme ruler of North Korea‘ 
during 1945-48 and the key liaison between the Soviet military in Pyongyang and Stalin 
in Moscow.311  
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Before the tournament began, Kim Yong Sik, captain of the Seoul team, predicted 
Pyongyang‘s predominance due to the reputation established by their performances 
against the Russians, but Seoul managed to gain a 2-1 win in the first game. 312 
Pyongyang revenged this loss in the second game with a score of 3-1, making good 
use of their greater stature to establish supremacy by cutting off Seoul‘s aerial passes.313 
However, it was the biased decisions of the referee, Kang Gi Soon who had arrived in 
Seoul as the manager of the Pyongyang team – that made the greatest impression on 
the home supporters. He appeared to turn a blind eye to Pyongyang‘s rough fouls to 
the fury of the Seoul crowd and his performance prompted the Seoul manager to 
criticize him in a newspaper column. 314  Thus the hostile atmosphere which had 
characterized Gyung-Pyong Championships during the Japanese colonial era 
immediately reappeared, though in the new circumstances this was no longer simply a 
manifestation of regionalism. 
 
When the Pyongyang team returned home, a party was staged to celebrate their victory, 
even though the overall result of the two matches was a tie. The highly controversial 
referee of that day declared Pyongyang as the winners on the basis of the 4-3 
aggregate score. Some Pyongyang footballers wished to stay in Seoul where they had 
relatives but Lee In Won, the leader of the Pyongyang team and a staunch communist, 
would not permit this to happen, insisting that all the players should go back north.315 
Pyongyang‘s participation in this Championship had been authorized by an interim 
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‗People‘s Committee‘ headed by Kim Il Sung. While the Pyongyang team was in Seoul 
this committee constituted the first central government in February 1946 and began the 
process of land reform a month later.316 As negotiations at the USA-USSR Commission 
broke down, moderates in the south who wished to negotiate unification with the 
communists increasingly lost their influence while the right-wing led by Rhee Syng Man 
moved rapidly forward with a plan for a separate government.317 The establishment of 
the two republics in Korea came in 1948. Thus football matches between Seoul and 
Pyongyang now entered a new phase where international rivalry replaced inter-regional 
rivalry. 
 
Under the US Military Government during 1945-48, football in the south was largely 
promoted by a newspaper, Seoul Shinmun, which was the second most circulated daily 
in 1947.318 In this period the Chosun Football Association was reconstituted in Seoul 
Shinmun‘s conference room and various football tournaments were held under the 
newspaper‘s sponsorship at the urgent request of Lee You Hyung whose Spartan 
training methods had made his Hamheung team famous in the late colonial period.319 
Lee You Hyung had an important connection with Ha Gyung Duk, the newspaper ‘s 
president, who had been his   senior at Soongsil Middle School in Pyongyang where 
he probably played football. Ha Gyung Duk later assumed the presidency of the KFA.320 
Though, as indicated earlier, Jayu Shinmun had also contributed to Korean football by 
                                           
316 Cumings, Korea‘s Place in the Sun, 227.  
317 G. Henderson, Korea: the Politics of Vortex, Cambridge, 1968, 134.  
318 Joon Choi, A History of Korean Newspapers, Seoul, 1990, 347.  
319 KFA, History of Korean Football, (1986), 283, 286; Lee, People‘s History of Korean Football, vol. 1, 
105-109.  
320 KFA, History of Korean Football, (1986), 282; Korean Newspaper Research Institution, A Journal of 
Korean Journalists, Seoul, 1981, 372.   
99 
 
sponsoring the last Gyung-Pyong Championship, it now turned its attention to baseball. 
It began to sponsor virtually all the major baseball tournaments. This initiative was 
masterminded by the editor-in-chief, Lee Jung Soon, a baseball enthusiast since his days 
at Baejae Middle School and Yeonhee College.321 Along with his school alumnus, Lee 
Young Min, he was the driving force behind the foundation of the Chosun Baseball 
Association in 1946. 322 It is safe to say that the school background of key individuals 
were highly significant in dictating newspaper support for particular sports in this era. 
 
Club football in the south between the liberation and the Korean War was dominated 
by teams whom the public utilities patronized. Of the teams the Chosun Jeonup 
(Electricity Company) was regarded as the strongest side. This club provided 
accommodation and a US military vehicle for its footballers and these very favourable 
conditions helped to lure many football talents from other clubs allowing Chosun 
Jeonup to win a domestic tournament just four months after its foundation in 1947.323 
Their closest rival was the Choil Yangjo, a team subsidised by a private brewing 
company by virtue of its sports-loving president, Kim Young Gi, who also founded a 
basketball club.324 It followed that the South Korean national football team being due 
to participate in the 1948 London Olympics, was mainly comprised of footballers from 
the two big clubs with the exception of one college goalkeeper.325 Yet the selection of 
this team was embroiled in controversy due to the inclusion in the squad of Lee You 
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Hyung and Bae Jong Ho, two veterans employed by the Chosun Football Association 
who were brought out of retirement.  Kim Yong Sik, player-cum-coach of Chosun 
Jeonup vehemently criticized their inclusion. Though Kim‘s criticism might also have 
been grounded in personal antagonism towards Lee, the controversy led to a damaging 
split so that the squad never had a joint training session before setting off for 
London.326  
 
There were other problems lurking in the background. The dispute over selecting 
footballers was also a consequence of the Chosun Sports Association‘s financial 
difficulties which were so severe that it could not afford to send sufficient players and 
coaches to London. The mysterious last minute exclusion of the national football coach 
may have reflected these circumstances.327 Despite these problems and against all the 
odds the Korean football team won its first match in London beating Mexico 5-3; 
according to a recent history of the 1948 Olympics, ‗everyone was amazed when they 
beat Mexico‘.328 Their next opponents, Sweden were wary of Korea because they had 
been unexpectedly beaten at Berlin in 1936 by a Japanese team which had included 
Kim Yong Sik, one of the veterans in the Korean side.329 But Korea in 1948 was no 
match for Sweden, the eventual winners of the Olympic tournament. Sweden inflicted a 
12-0 drubbing and the Korean players were said to be so shocked by Sweden‘s 
scientifically-planned attacking game that they lost track of the number of goals they 
conceded. Even a contemporary Korean newspaper provided an incorrect   scoreline.330  
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This result did nothing to resolve the internal divisions that had arisen in Korean 
football as a result of the original squad selection. Ten young college footballers 
defected to the north in response to the alleged favouritism of the selectors towards 
veteran players in their thirties, a development that was even more shocking than the 
12-0 defeat by Sweden. 331  These college footballers, being dissatisfied with their 
exclusion from the Olympic squad, had been persuaded by the Hyun Hyo Sub, the 
former treasurer of the Chosun Football Association, acting as an agent for the north.332 
According to the account of one contemporary footballer, Hyun told the college 
footballers that they were being invited to compete in a tournament which teams from 
Seoul had competed in on previous occasions. Such tournaments had been played since 
the colonial period so it was unlikely that this invitation would have aroused suspicion. 
Yet the college footballers from Seoul would soon become the north‘s propaganda 
tools.  Radio broadcasts from Pyongyang described them as taking part in a sports 
championship commemorating the establishment of the North Korean regime.333 Later, 
after the outbreak of the Korean War, some important football figures in the South were 
abducted by North Korea, but their contribution to North Korean football was small in 
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(2) Northern footballers’ contribution to the South  
 
 For the years of the colonial period, a host of northern footballers came south, most of 
whom played football at Bosung and Yeonhee College in Seoul. Kim Yong Sik, Lee You 
Hyung, Park Gyu Jung, Chung Guk Jin, all of whom played at the London Olympics, fell 
into this category. The goalkeeper in the Olympic team, Hong Duk Young, had also 
came south in 1946, joining the general exodus of landowners and disaffected 
intellectuals dismayed by the institutions that were emerging under the new regime in 
Pyongyang.334 Three Pyongyang footballers who had played in the last Gyung-Pyong 
Championship, had been eliminated at the last stage of the selection process for the 
London Olympics and the controversy that ensued reflected the importance of the 
northern contribution to football in the south, even before the Korean War.335 Their 
assistance may well have been as vital for football as the supply of electric power from 
the north was for industry in the south during the period of US Military Government. 
When the North cut off their electric power supply in May 1948, South Korea suffered 
from a severe electric power shortage.336 
 
However, it was during the Korean War that the northerners who would become the 
core actors in South Korean football crossed the border. A vast majority of northern 
footballers, it seemed, came over to the south around the end of 1950 at a time when 
the allied forces retreated southward due to China‘s abrupt entry into the war along 
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with hundreds of thousands of refugees did.337 Park Il Gab and Choi Jung Min arrived in 
the south at this time. Park had participated in the last Gyung-Pyong Championship and 
had led the North Korean football team which won at the tournament held at the 
World Festival of Youth and Students at Prague in 1947. 338 A future South Korean 
football icon, Choi was first spotted and trained as a centre-forward by Kim Yong Sik 
who was then coach at a military academy in Gyungju.339 However, when the military 
academy closed, Choi was sent to play for a team in Daegu, military officers having 
decided that it was in ‗our nation‘s interests‘ that he should continue to play football 
rather than serve in the army.340 
 
At the Chosun Bangjik textile mill in Deagu Choi met other northern footballers who 
had moved south during the war and Chosun Bangjik rapidly assembled a team 
composed of excellent players from Pyongyang which became noted for its energetic 
attacking game.341 However, the position of northerners in the south was precarious. 
When Chosun Bangjik won a tournament for the first time in 1951 it was seen as 
particularly significant for those players from the north regarded suspiciously by the 
South Korean regime as displaced persons.342 They had found that their footballing 
skills did not make them exempt from irritating investigations as the police routinely 
interrogated northern refugees in their efforts to hunt down communist infiltrators.343 
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Most northern players who had come south were in need of some kind of protection 
and some, including Choi and Park, were favoured by being channeled into the CIC 
(Counter Intelligence Corps) from 1952 onwards. This was a military intelligence agency 
headed by Kim Chang Ryong, one of the president‘s henchmen, notorious for his 
political manoeuvering. Once they had been transferred to the CIC, Choi and Park were 
sheltered from anti-red hysteria and protected from police intervention.344  
 
Now that their status in South Korea had been stabilized, Choi and Park were used to 
inject much-needed new blood into the veteran-dominated South Korean team.  Choi, 
in particular, became a household name as nationalist sentiment began to attach itself 
to the South Korean team at the time of the first official international matches between 
South Korea and Japan in 1954. After creating two decisive goals in the first leg of this 
World Cup qualifier Choi was identified as the prime target and a Japanese newspaper 
stressed the urgency of finding a young centre-forward with the same physical 
attributes. 345  Along with Choi, Park and Hong Duk Young also made critical 
contributions in helping South Korea edge out Japan over these historic two games. The 
coach of the Japanese national team was especially impressed with the speed Choi and 
Park and the remarkable power of their kicking.346 Their speed dovetailed nicely with 
the South Korean kick and rush tactics, particularly in the first leg which was played on 
a heavy pitch that rendered the Japanese passing style was ineffective347 Goalkeeper 
Hong, another northerner, was also reckoned by a Japanese commentator to have been 
one of the most impressive Korean players. The exploits of these three northern 
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footballers in 1954 was an early example of the success of what became known as 
the ‘38 Ddaraji‘ a term widely used in South Korea to describe displaced people from 
the north who had to endure their discrimination and relatively harsh living conditions 
after crossing the 38th Parallel.348 In the years that followed quite a few ‘38 Ddaraji‘, 
people noted for their frugal lifestyle and their enthusiasm for education, would be 
successfully assimilated into the mainstream of South Korean society.349  
 
The first South Korea-Japan football match in 1954 was a significant event for a war-
torn country and a dejected people faced with an enormous task of reconstruction. In 
Seoul crowds flocked to tearooms and gathered in front of news agencies to listen to 
the radio broadcasts, ‗clapping their hands whenever a goal was scored for Korea‘ in a 
5-1 first leg win over Japan.350 Buoyed by this overwhelming first leg victory, the South 
Korean government took the extraordinary step of providing electricity so that every 
household could receive the live transmission of the second-leg match (which was also 
played in Tokyo) despite the chronic shortages of electric power.351 As they returned to 
Seoul after a 2-2 draw in the second leg with their place in the World Cup finals 
assured the South Korean team was greeted by an overjoyed population who crowded 
into all the train stations on their route.352  
 
The reason behind the South Koreans‘ fervent response to their footballers was not so 
much advancement to the World Cup finals as the defeat of their former colonial 
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oppressor.  ‗At the time, the popularity of World Cup [in Korea] was not as high as it is 
now and even Korean footballers did not know much about it‘, Hong later recalled.353 
South Korea‘s mood was succinctly encapsulated by Donga Ilbo: ‗The Japanese wailed 
with their feet raised and the Koreans smiled with their hands up‘.354 The captain of the 
Korean team, who came from Pyongyang, explained the victory in a way that appealed 
to national pride, arguing that it had been made possible by a combination of typical 
Korean tenacity and their physical strength: ‗Japanese [footballers] must fall down when 
struck by our [Korean] bodies‘.355  
 
What made this response especially remarkable was the fact that these matches almost 
did not take place. The mood of national euphoria in South Korea was especially 
intense because the match had been played at a time when diplomatic friction between 
the two nations was reaching its peak. There was an acute dispute over a fishery zone 
and the disputed ownership of an island (Takeshima/Dodko) lying between the two 
countries, a situation that had been exacerbated by a Japanese bureaucrat‘s insensitive 
remark with regard to the colonization of Korea in the late of 1953. 356  Growing 
antipathy towards Japan in South Korea was in line with President Rhee Syng Man‘s 
hard line anti-Japanese position.  
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In ensuring that the matches were played the efforts of the Sports Association of 
Korean Residents in Japan were especially important. This organization helped to 
prepare the way for the World Cup preliminaries by sending a squad to the National 
Sports Championship held in Seoul in 1953.357 After this visit, they began to discuss the 
matter of forthcoming matches against Japan with the Korean Sports Association. Their 
main intention was to use football to improve the image of Koreans in Japanese society. 
At the same time the Association was seeking to secure a dominant position over the 
pro-North Korean organization in Japan. With the vast majority of Koreans in Japan 
retaining their former Korean (Chosun) identity rather than opting for South Korean 
citizenship and thus making themselves literally stateless, this ideological competition 
was unavoidable.358 This initiative was orchestrated by Shin Hee, the vice president of 
the Sports Association of Korean Residents in Japan. He was a champion of anti-
communism having been crippled by a communist shooting attack in North Korea 
before settling in Japan.359 When he met Rhee Syng Man, Shin Hee guaranteed to 
cover the South Korean team‘s expenses in Japan, a significant sweetener in view of the 
nation‘s dire financial position at the time. The expenses would be underwritten by 
many Korean entrepreneurs and celebrities in Japan including a famous professional 
wrestler, Rikki Dozan.360 However, despite these guarantees, Rhee still would not allow 
the Japanese team to enter South Korea. This meant both qualifying matches would 
have to be played in Japan in violation of FIFA‘s home and away rule. Thus the Korean 
Football Association had to request that all the games be staged in Japan using 
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inclement weather conditions in Korea as a pretext.361 It was only in 1960 that Japanese 
footballers were permitted to enter South Korea to play in Seoul for the first time since 
the colonial era. Even then the match was surrounded with controversy regarding 
whether to play the Japanese national anthem and hoist the Japanese flag before kick-
off. A South Korean military helicopter was on call to deal with any disturbances that 
might arise on match day. 362  
 
By this time most of the old ‘38 Ddaraji‘ footballers had retired. The most famous of 
them, Choi Jung Min, finally hung up his boots at the age thirty-four in 1962 and the 
performances of the South Korean national team went into something of a slump after 
his retirement.363 Although his absence was not the only factor contributing to this lack 
of success, the fact that no adequate replacement was found helps to explain why the 
1960s has been dubbed as the ‗South Korean football‘s dark ages‘.364 South Korean 
football had relied heavily on his scoring ability and other Korean footballers could 
hardly match Choi in this respect. Indeed, he scored more than seventy goals in twenty-
four overseas football tours.365 When, in 1969, Donga Ilbo reviewed the history of South 
Korean football over the previous decade football, Choi was selected as the most 
important player. At the start of the 1960s, before decline had set in, it was recalled, 
‗South Korean football dominated Asia‘; Choi Jung Min had been its star player, widely 
referred to as ‗golden leg‘, not just in South Korea but throughout Asia.366  
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(3) Football and the military in South Korea  
 
It was during the Korean War that football became strongly associated   with the 
military, signified by the first annual football match between the army and navy played 
in 1947.367 The military, as illustrated by the case of Choi Jung Min, began to give 
special consideration to footballers. The Korean Infantry School set an example by 
assigning talented footballers amongst its cadets, to the least dangerous battle 
positions in the rear.  Thus the lives of many elite footballers were saved.368 To the 
Korean army, football was an effective medium to boost their soldiers‘ morale. Many 
army divisions founded their own football teams and tournaments in which military 
teams participated were held.369 During the Korean War the Infantry school helped to 
stage an international football tournament in the winter of 1951 for the purpose of 
cultivating friendship amongst the allied forces. Soldiers from Britain, Sweden, Denmark 
and Colombia played against with two military and two company teams from Korea 
took part in this tournament.370  
 
In the years following the Korean War, Korean sports in general and football in 
particular was immensely patronized by the military, a trend continuing up until the 
early 1960s. Indeed, the South Korea teams defeated by Hungary and Turkey in the 
1954 World Cup finals in Switzerland were ‗football soldiers‘ who had experienced the 
recent tragedy of fratricidal war. Given the severe economic hardship in South Korea in 
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the immediate post-war years there were few companies with the resources necessary 
to subsidize football. Under these circumstances an inordinate number of football 
talents were sucked into various military teams. The CIC was a typical military football 
team in this respect, producing over forty Korean internationals between 1952 and 1965. 
The success of the CIC club, as we have briefly seen in the preceding section, was 
initially based on the recruitment of talented players who had come from the north, 
such as Choi Jung Min. The CIC football team had been founded by a military officer of 
northern descent, Kim Chang Ryong and northern footballers were scouted for the club 
by a Pyongyang footballer, Park Jae Seung, who then served in the CIC.371 The heavy 
reliance of on this source of playing talent underlines how much South Korean football 
was influenced by northerners, particularly in the 1950s.  
 
It is worth looking at Kim Chang Ryong in more detail. In this era he was a prominent 
symbol of Korean McCarthyism as well as being the most influential patron in South 
Korean football. Kim Chang Ryong, who had served in the Japanese colonial police, had 
fled south after being arrested for his pro-Japanese sympathies and was a fervent anti-
communist. He joined the army on arriving in the south and played a critical part in 
seeking out communists in the aftermath of the Yosu Rebellion led by leftist elements in 
1948 and this brought him to Rhee Syng Man‘s attention.372  Under the Rhee regime 
Kim wielded great power and was entrusted with the task of rooting out corruption and 
conspiracy among high-ranking generals.373 He was a perfect fit for the South Korean 
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anti-communist system, but his red-hunting went to extremes and he was likely to 
accuse anyone whom he disliked of being a communist.374 The foundation of the CIC 
team was also, to a certain extent, related to his staunch anti-communism.  He was 
anxious to establish a strong team in the south to prepare for any future football match 
against the communist north; football was one way in which the south could 
demonstrate ideological supremacy.375  
 
Kim Chang Ryong‘s interest in football patronage also has to be set in the context of 
South Korean military politics in the 1950s. At this time the army was divided by 
factional strife derived from the rivalry of three generals and this situation was 
aggravated by President Rhee who did not want any one general to possess supreme 
power.376 Rhee made the CIC and the Provost Marshal Headquarters (PMH) function as 
a presidential body in order to control military units more effectively.377 These two 
military institutions were thus in competition, though the CIC tended to dominate.378 
Kim‘s intense desire to win ensured that the CIC-PMH rivalry spilled over onto the 
football field. In 1955 a national championship semi-final match between CIC and PMH 
was interrupted with PMH a goal ahead after CIC demanded a change of referee 
following a disputed decision.379 The KFA ordered that the match should be replayed 
but PMH refused. Eventually, the championship was suspended without a winner being 
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declared and both the president of the KFA and the referee resigned.380  
 
Rivalry between the military teams caused referees much trouble in this era. One referee 
later recalled:  
 
The de facto power or authority of such [military] teams as the PMH, CIC, 
Army Service Corps, Headquarters Intelligence Department and Marine Corps 
and so forth, were more or less on the same level. So it was hard to 
distinguish superiority between them and referees usually got in trouble with 
the teams if they made a wrong decision .… Referees did not want to officiate 
some matches, particularly those between the CIC and PMH. Football 
matches were often interrupted by the boorish and rough behaviour of the 
footballers and … referees desperately sought to avoid criticism in any way 
and to proceed with the games as quickly as possible.381  
 
The CIC was notorious for rough play and referees feared intimidation. In 1952, a 
referee called off a game because of fading light with the CIC in the lead. Kim Chang 
Ryong had ordered that all the military vehicles around the ground should    turn on 
their headlights to continue the game, but that was not enough to illuminate the whole 
pitch. After the match had been abandoned the referee was beaten up by CIC soldiers 
acting on Kim‘s orders.382 In 1953, when CIC was defeated by Chosun Bangjik after 
drawing lots, the winners celebrated by cheering and banging a drum. Miffed at this 
scene, Kim Chang Ryong directed the men under his command to arrest the whole 
squad and its officials, including Berlin Olympics‘ marathon winner and national hero 
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Son Kee Jung, who was taken off by force.383 Chosun Bangjik, the biggest government-
vested company in the south, was run by Kang Il Mae who was bestriding Korean 
football as vice-president of the KFA at the time.384 It seems likely that Kim‘s actions on 
this occasion were motivated by personal antagonism as well as football rivalry. 
 
Kim also intervened personally in selecting the South Korean squad for the 1954 World 
Cup finals, using his political muscle to secure the inclusion of his own players.385 His 
blind devotion to the CIC football team and his excessive will to win is reminiscent of 
Lavrenti Beria, head of the secret police during the Stalin era. Beria was a fanatical 
supporter of Moscow Dinamo and he often used his power on behalf of his beloved 
team by ‗interfering in the work of coaches, players, and officials‘.386 He even attempted 
to eliminate his main football rivals, Moscow Spartak, by consigning their star players, 
the Starostin brothers, to a labour camp.387  
 
The preponderance of military football in South Korea could be easily discerned by the 
high proportion of military personnel selected for the national team from the war years 
through until 1962.388  Not surprisingly CIC players were especially prominent. They 
comprised seven of the party of seventeen which played in and won the 1960 Asian 
Cup competition at Seoul.389 However, by the early 1960s, the golden age of South 
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Korean military football was rapidly passing away with the rise of company teams as the 
economy began to boom. In 1963, four CIC footballers were lured away by newly-
founded Cheil Mojik, a woolen fabric manufacturer. Faced with a shortage of players the 
CIC had to field its coach.390 Two years later, the CIC team was disbanded due to the 
shortage of footballers. 391  Along with Cheil Mojik, Geumsung Bangjik (representing 
another textile manufacturer) quickly rose to prominence and military teams were      
downgraded to second-class club status.392 The typical composition of South Korean 
international teams also changed reflecting the new balance of power within domestic 
football.  It was hard to find ‗football soldiers‘ in the South Korean representative teams 
by the mid-1960s.393  
 
The emergence of company football clubs reflected a change in South Korean politics 
and in the economy.  After the military coup in May 1961, it was important for the 
regime to cultivate powerful industrialists and the foundation of the Geumsung Bangjik 
Football Club in 1961 was encouraged by the new government. Later the owner of 
Geumsung devoted himself to politics as a member of the ruling party.394 From an 
economic perspective, the foundation of the Geumsung Bangjik and Cheil Mojik clubs 
could not be disassociated from the rise of textile industry in this period. The former 
was famous for having the nation‘s best training facilities including a well-manicured 
lawn pitch. The latter was notorious for using its financial muscle to poach talented 
footballers from other clubs. In 1963, this prompted another other company club, 
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Daehan Jungseok (a tungsten mining company), to complain about Cheil Mojik‘s 
ruthless recruitment of its footballers.395 However, there was a degree of instability in 
company sponsorship. Geumsung Bangjik was disbanded in 1969 as bank-sponsored 
teams came to the fore and Cheil Mojik dissolved in 1971 due to a slump in the textile 
industry.396 
 
(4) The birth of the North Korean football Style  
 
North Korean sports were transformed in the aftermath of the Korean War. The 
government followed, as in Eastern European nations, the Soviet socialist sports system 
which was very effective in identifying promising individuals at early ages in every 
corner of society and nurturing their sporting talents. The government decreed in 1958 
that all factories with more than a thousand employees should have a full-time sports 
trainer; also youth sports schools and the Pyongyang Sports University would be 
founded. Along with this, agricultural cooperatives, universities, and factories were to set 
up multi-sports clubs by April 1959.397 Three hundred youth sports schools had been 
established by 1960, a major achievement.398  
 
Football, the most popular sport in the North, with its glorious tradition inherited from 
the colonial period, was quick to benefit from such a radical overhaul of the North 
Korean sports system. Various football championships for workers, young students, and 
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peasants were inaugurated in 1959.399  A year later, a team from a steelworks and 
Pyongyang Sports University were permitted to join the major football league in which 
only top-class teams, funded by the people‘s army or other government-affiliated 
organizations had hitherto participated. 400  Under this well-designed framework, the 
central football authorities were able to identify and direct promising young players 
more easily than before. Ensuring that talent was channeled into the top-class clubs was 
already a well established procedure. Arguably the most important transfer in North 
Korean football history occurred in 1957 when Park Du Ik, who worked at a print factory 
and played for its team, was moved to the Pyongyang Club.401 
 
This massive restructuring in North Korean sports was attributable to the importance 
that was attached to raising the profile of the country by competing internationally. 
South Korea had joined the IOC (International Olympic Committee) and FIFA in 1947; 
North Korea followed in 1957 and 1958 respectively. With the assistance of IOC 
members from other communist nations, the North Korean National Olympic 
Committee was aiming to participate in the Olympics with full recognition of its 
separate status rather than the existing provisional recognition. This proved difficult to 
achieve. In 1959, IOC president Avery Brundage proposed a meeting of the National 
Olympic Committees of North and South Korea in the hope that they would agree to a 
joint Korean team participating in the Rome Olympics of 1960.402 North Korea had to 
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take a positive view of this suggestion, since the IOC would only agree to its 
participation if its athletes were part of a joint team.403 South Korea, however, having 
already participated in the Olympics under the name of Korea opposed the idea of a 
unified Korean team and only their athletes took part in the Olympics.404 Thus the only 
‗miracle‘ achieved by Brundage in time for the Rome 1960 was the appearance of a 
combined East and West German team marching behind the same flag; South Korean 
intransigence precluded a similar compromise arrangement for the two Koreas. 
 
In these circumstances competition with South Korea was more likely than cooperation 
and North Korea poured their financial resources into the sports improvement scheme 
with the aim of achieving success in any future sporting hostilities with the South. By 
this time North Korea had developed the economic capabilities required to carry out 
this audacious programme. With unprecedented large amounts of aid from the Soviet 
bloc and rapid reconstruction of major industries, North Korean economy developed at 
‗world-beating growth-rates in the 1950s and 1960s‘, albeit from a low base, which it 
has been claimed ‗far outdistanced the South‘s‘.405 The Chollima movement whereby the 
state compelled many North Koreans to undertake hard labour in order to complete 
strategically important projects with alarming speed cannot be ignored as a major 
cause of their economic success. A multitude of students for example,  were mobilized 
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for construction or extension works of stadiums in Pyongyang during the First Five Year 
Plan and, following the Soviet model, students who exceeded the scheduled amount of 
work would be treated as national heroes.406  
 
North Korean sport was faced with new challenges in the wake of the Moscow World 
Festival of Youth and Students in 1957, an event that was widely regarded in the 
capitalist world as simply a socialist propaganda exercise. In the football tournament the 
North Korean team suffered three humiliating defeats by Albania, Egypt and 
Czechoslovakia forcing them to begin to devise tactics which would offset physical 
disadvantages of height and weight.407 In 1958, the Worker‘s Party decreed that the 
Juche – the idea that Marxist-Leninism could creatively and independently be adapted 
to the actualities of North Korea‘s situation – should be applied to sports.408 Juche, 
which was becoming increasingly popular among North Korean intellectuals, had first 
emerged in 1955 as a rejection of ‗flunkeyism‘ and the blind imitation of foreign 
methods. It was gradually seeping into all North Korean cultural practices and in sport 
it became associated with the development of training methods and tactics designed 
specifically to their players‘ distinctive attributes and characteristics.409 In practice, Juche 
was seen as a uniquely North Korean movement designed to underpin the country‘s 
political, economic, and military independence. It is interesting to note that the coming 
together of the Juche idea and football coincided with the worsening of Sino-Soviet 
relations after 1956, in which Chinese dogmatism and Soviet revisionism were 
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increasingly in conflict. In this tricky situation, Kim Il Sung needed to develop a more 
independent stance and to isolate North Korea from external influences more than ever 
before. He followed his own line but neither ‗in defiance of the Soviet Union‘ nor 
‗arousing the ire of the Chinese‘.410  
 
Thus the changing international political situation seems to have provided a space in 
which what came to be seen as North Korea‘s unique football style could come into 
existence and flourish. This style could be characterized by swift running and long 
passing and a collective commitment to an aggressive attacking game. North Korean 
football pundits took a dim view of the frequent use of the short pass because it did 
not play to the principal strength of North Korean footballers – their sheer speed. A fast 
attacking style, they argued, would counteract the current trend towards defensive 
tactics in international football.411 Indeed, with the Hungarian attacking ‗Magic Magyars‘ 
gone, world football was increasingly paralyzed by the rise of Italian Cattenaccio, a 
notoriously defensive system, originating in ‗the right of the weak‘ and quickly 
becoming mainstream.412  
 
However, for North Korea to be able to mount an effective challenge to such well-
organized defensive systems through a game based on speed and relentless running it 
was necessary to improve endurance and stamina. To achieve this, the North Korean 
football authorities revived the Spartan training methods used by the successful 
Hamheung Football Club in the 1930s featuring, among other elements, mountain 
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climbing and running in sand. 413  The main aim was develop fitness so there was 
relatively little training with the ball. The programme featured road running for 
distances ranging from four to sixteen kilometers with a two-kilogram sand bag 
attached to footballer ‘s legs.414 Strengthening legs in this way was considered essential. 
Park Seung Jin, who ‗had especially strong legs‘, would go on to score two goals in the 
1966 World Cup finals. Such was his dedication that he tied strong elastic around his 
legs and then stretched them. ‗He did this every day‘ and ‗a thousand times for each 
leg‘.415  
      
The organization of football in North Korea, as in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
was highly centralized and designed primarily to maximize the national squad. Almost 
all of the first class clubs in North Korea were located in Pyongyang; regional clubs, with 
rare exceptions, only played in the lower divisions.416 Thus it could be argued that 
North Korean regional clubs were not so much rivals to the clubs in Pyongyang as 
providers. Club football in North Korea was completely subservient to the national team 
as was often the case in communist nations, but in a more intense manner. Before 
going into the international test arena of football success, the North Korean squad 
honed their skills and teamwork in domestic league matches and in friendly games 
against teams from the Soviet bloc and Third World. For example, there were many 
matches against visiting teams from the Soviet Union and North Korean teams were 
invited to tour in return from the late 1950s to early 1960s.417 After the Korean War the 
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best footballers in North Korea – those likely to be selected for the national team - 
normally played in the top domestic league for Joongang Cheyuk Gangseubso (Central 
Sports School), known as Moranbong after about 1965.418 The inclusion of this super 
club in the premier league provided an opportunity to build up teamwork and mutual 
understanding virtually all year long. Sometimes the North Korean national side wore 
the jersey of the Pyongyang Football Club in an attempt to deceive foreign clubs. In 
1961, when the Pyongyang Club beat Spartak in Moscow, the team was in fact the 
North Korean national side playing under an assumed name, a deception that was 
common practice in Soviet football.419  
 
As North Korean football was establishing its distinctive style in the early 1960s, a great 
opportunity to participate in international competition was provided by GANEFO, set up 
by Indonesia‘s President Sukarno in 1963. This development was based on the co-
operation established at the first conference of the non-aligned nations held at 
Bandung in 1955, which had recognized that even ‗communism was a new form of 
colonialism‘.420 This development was very fortunate for North Korea. As North Korea 
lurched closer to China, relations with the Soviet Union worsened and economic aid was 
cut off. It was an indication of North Korea‘s aspirations for autonomy that it was 
prepared to offend the Soviet Union, who responded by condemning the cult of 
personality around Kim Il Sung the and cutting off economic aid.421 Football contacts 
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with the Soviet Union were temporarily suspended.  
 
In these circumstances GANEFO – as a sporting festival based on Third World solidarity 
- provided an ideal arena in which North Korea could demonstrate its independence of 
the Soviet Union. The North Korean football team was remarkably successful in 
Indonesia, scoring twenty-six goals and conceding only two in the tournament and 
losing out in the final to the United Arab Republic (UAR) only when lots were drawn 
after extra time had been played. The Indonesian press extolled the physical and mental 
strength of the North Korean footballers in this hotly contested drawn match.422 Full of 
confidence after this performance the North Korea was granted the right to participate 
in the qualifiers for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.  It was an indication of mounting 
national interest that the Moranbong stadium in Pyongyang, which had recently been 
refurbished to accommodate around 71,000 spectators, could not accommodate the 
crowd for the preliminary game against Burma, and many people   had to watch the 
match from the foot of a mountain overlooking the stadium.423 
 
Given the progress that had been made it was unfortunate that the failure to resolve 
the problematic relationship that existed between the IOC and GANEFO meant that 
North Korea withdrew its athletes from the Tokyo games at a late stage. Athletes who 
had competed at GANEFO in 1963 were banned from participating in the Olympics424 
North Koreans were particularly enraged at the ban imposed by International 
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Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) on Sin Geum Dan who had set the two world 
records in the women‘s 400 and 800 metres in the GANEFO.425 However, the North 
Korean footballers visit to Tokyo was not entirely wasted as they were able to socialize 
with compatriots belonging to a pro-North Korean club in Japan and introduce them to 
their unique training methods.426  
 
Although the enforced withdrawal of North Korea from the 1964 Olympic Games was a 
disappointment it did not hinder their preparation for the qualifying matches against 
South Korea and Australia for the 1966 World Cup. North Korea was able to use the 
1965 GANEFO football tournament, which it hosted, for this purpose while also 
cementing its relations with other Third World countries. 427  Played in a friendly 
atmosphere, the participating nations included China, Indonesia and North Vietnam and 
a total attendance of around 700,000 spectators testified to the popularity of football in 
North Korea, whose team emerged victorious without conceding a goal.428 Interest in 
the game was reaching a peak just as North Korea was about to make its full debut on 
the world football stage when overwhelming Australia by a 9-2 aggregate score in the 
World Cup qualifying matches in December 1965.429 It was at this point that North 
Korean football, with players who ‗galloped like arrows‘, began to make an impression in 
the West mainly because the speed at which they played the game was so remarkable. 
Certainly the chief coach of the Australian national side had never anticipated that they 
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would move so quickly.430  
 
(5) Comparative strength of South and North Korean Football  
      
For the South Koreans, anti-Japanese and anti-communist sentiments became the two 
basic tenets in the years following independence in 1945. South Korean football 
naturally went hand in hand with this political tide. When drawn against Japan in the 
qualifying round for the 1954 World Cup, they had to give up their home game on 
account of their government‘s refusal to allow the Japanese footballers entry into South 
Korea. However, in the end, this did not prove such a great handicap as they were not 
exposed to a culture shock of any kind. The South Korean team could speak Japanese 
fluently and were quite familiar with Japanese culture. Indeed they had been educated 
in an era when the Japanese colonial rulers were seeking to impose a strict Japanization 
policy on Korea and some of them had even been selected to play for the Japanese 
national team. 431  Thus they were familiar with Japan but, at the same time, they   
harboured very strong anti-Japanese feelings and this made them especially determined 
that ‗there would be no way to lose to Japan at football‘.432  
 
The historic victory against Japan in 1954 would have been impossible without the 
contribution of northern footballers who had crossed the border during the Korean War. 
As we have seen, it was the northerner Choi Jung Min, with his formidable power and 
speed, who rose to become South Korean‘s greatest football celebrity after this victory.  
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At this time, immediately after the civil war, refugees from the north experienced 
difficult conditions in the South where the police treated them as suspected 
communists.433 Star players like Choi were valuable assets, however, and were protected 
by the fervent anti-communist Kim Chang Ryong who recruited them to play for the 
CIC and built a successful team in an era when football in South Korea was dominated 
by the military. In the mid 1950s, the CIC was always full of South Korean internationals, 
many of them from the north. After Kim Chang Ryong was assassinated in 1956 - a 
consequence of factional rivalry in the military - six football soldiers in the national 
team paid a visit to the grave of their senior officer. Five of them were from the 
north.434 He had been a tyrant and a bully but they owed him much. 
 
South Korean football nationalism was on a steep upward curve during the 1950s and 
early 1960s by virtue of their achievements in Asia. In October 1960, South Korea 
hosted the Asian Cup, the most prestigious international football won by their team. Yet 
this success was accompanied by an incident in which thousands of discontented ticket-
holders – people who had bought tickets but had been refused admission to the 
stadium - suddenly broke down a gate causing thirty-one spectators to be injured in 
the ensuing stampede.435 The match (between South Korea and Israel) was interrupted 
three times by unruly crowds attempting to invade the pitch. ‗Prime Minister, John 
Chang [Chang Myon] who attended [that match]‘, it was reported, ‗walked out during 
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the first half…because the crowd made it impossible for him to see the play‘.436 The 
immediate cause of this mayhem was the over-issue of tickets and scores of spectators 
who got into the stadium without paying.437 However, this incident reflected a wider 
experience of social unrest in South Korea at this time.  
 
In April 1960, the Rhee Syng Man‘s autocracy had ended amidst intense student 
demonstrations triggered by the ruling party‘s ballot rigging. The sensational success of 
these demonstrations ‗induced all with dissatisfactions to express them as the students 
had [done]‘.438 The political instability gave rise to a military coup led by Park Chung 
Hee in 1961. Thus, for South Korea, the decade of the 1960s began in turbulence and 
this meant that football was given little encouragement by a regime that had other 
priorities. The retirement of Choi Jung Min also contributed to a period of football 
‗stagnation‘ during which South Korean football was fiercely criticized. This peaked after 
South Korea‘s humiliating 10-0 defeat by the UAR at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.439 In the 
wake of this defeat, there was widespread condemnation of the national team‘s 
lethargic performance which some critics judged as having been ‗inferior to high school 
football‘.440  
 
While South Korean football was becoming mired in these difficulties, North Korea was 
formulating its unique football style based on the underlying idea of   Juche. The 
relentless swift movement which characterized the North Korean style required 
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physically fit footballers and a training system based on running that was designed to 
enhance both speed and endurance. The Kim Il Sung regime clearly recognized the 
value of football, by far the most popular sport in the North, as a means to achieve his 
political ends, and much effort went into creating a centralized system that would help 
to nurture football talent and ensure the success of the national team. ‗Over 7,000 
football clubs with a total membership of 240,000 are run at our factories, enterprises, 
rural communities and residential quarters‘, the Pyongyang Times boasted. They are a 
reliable reserve constantly reinforcing the ranks of our footballers‘.441 The infrastructure 
was improved in other ways. Moranbong, the national stadium, was renovated in 1960 
and there were no less than a hundred other stadiums accommodating up to 30,000 
across the country.  A further 3,000 football pitches were provided in those years. The 
commitment of the regime to football in North Korea was such that all government 
departments stopped work for important international matches, such as the Olympic 
qualifier against Burma at Pyongyang in 1964.442 
 
The North Koreans sought to test the football system they had developed by taking on 
foreign opposition. During the early 1960s, their most important opponents were the 
Soviet and China. The defeats inflicted on Moscow Spartak in 1961 and the Chinese 
national team in 1962 gave confidence to North Korean football. The official view was 
that victory over the resurgent Spartak, recovering after a slump from 1958 and the 
third-ranked team in the Soviet Union, was due to following the Party‘s instruction that 
they should ‗sweat more in training‘.443 It was encouraging that the Chinese, after their 
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defeat in 1962, extolled the impressive agility and stamina of the North Koreans.444 
However, after the problems arising from the Sino-Soviet split, it was at GANEFO in 
1963 and at the Asian Football GANEFO in 1965 that the North Koreans were able test   
themselves and their system in serious international competition. 
 
Kim Yong Sik, who watched the match between North Korea and Burma in 1963, 
confidently predicted that ‗―South Korea [could] beat North Korea easily‖‘.445 Yet, North 
Korean footballers were much more disciplined and valued by Kim Il Sung and his 
cadres than their Southern counterparts were by their rulers at the time. The South 
Korean military regime which seized power in 1961 was in no position to afford a full-
scale ideological competition against the North in football, as we shall see later. The 
incumbent President, Park Chung Hee, did not even approve, of playing the 1962 World 
Cup qualifying matches against Yugoslavia, a communist nation, although he changed 
his mind later after seeking advice from the USA.446 Park Chung Hee probably feared 
that giving his approval to this game without first seeking American approval would 
raise awkward questions about his past; he had participated alongside communists in 
the Yosu Rebellion of 1948. 447  While North Korea‘s footballers rushed forward 
confidently to the 1966 World Cup, their southern counterparts came to a standstill with 
little motivation.  
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North Korea’s impact on world football and 
South Korea’s football revolution, 1966-73  
      
Historically, European and South American nations have dominated the FIFA World Cup 
both on and off the field. In contrast, Asian and African countries have played only 
supporting – and generally subordinate – roles at least until 1966 when two significant 
events took place. Firstly, all the African associations boycotted the 1966 World Cup in 
protest against FIFA‘s allocation of just one place in the finals for Africa, Asia, and 
Oceania.448 Secondly, a team representing an Asian nation, North Korea, reached the 
quarter-finals of the 1966 tournament in England, beating Italy, generally considered 
one of the most powerful footballing nations along the way. It could be argued that 
the North Koreans‘ sensational ‗giant-killing‘ exploits, in association with the African 
boycott, marked the beginning of an Asian and African challenge to the established 
order in world football and began the process of making the World Cup a truly global 
event.449 
 
The African boycott was basically grounded in FIFA‘s belief that football in the ‗Third 
World‘ was not capable of competing successfully with the game‘s established powers. 
North Korea‘s surprising performance in 1966 challenged this view and was witnessed 
by a global audience via television and under these circumstances was difficult to 
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ignore. However, the North Korean experience of this momentous series of events 
remains largely unknown, much as the release in 2002 of The Game of Their Lives, a 
documentary film on the 1966 North Korean football squad, satisfied one‘s curiosity to 
a certain degree. Accordingly, this chapter will seek firstly to use accounts drawn from 
both North Korean and English newspapers to reconstruct North Korea‘s road to 
England and its meteoric rise as a world football power during the final stages of the 
1966 tournament. The most significant feature of what happened in 1966 from a world 
football perspective was that North Korea, an Asian nation previously outside the circle 
of established football powers, began to have a wider impact. Much emphasis will be 
placed on the reasons why the North Korean footballers touched a chord with their 
English hosts. The North Korean impact on football in Italy, the victims of the upset, will 
also be discussed.  
 
Secondly, however, it has to be recognized that the legacy of 1966 had its most 
profound impact back home in North Korea and also in the South. In this respect, 
North Korea‘s brief but crucial hibernation after 1966 needs to be explained. It also has 
to be recognized that the success of the North Koreans in England prompted a 
response in the South which embarked on a football revolution from the late 1960s. The 
combined effect of this dramatic series of events would greatly change the course of 







(1) North Korea’s road to the 1966 World Cup 
 
North Korea secured a 1966 berth rather easily with just two games against Australia by 
virtue of the withdrawal of fifteen African and one Asian nation.450 Contrary to what 
some studies have suggested, not all of these sixteen withdrawals boycotted the 
regional qualifying competition on account of FIFA‘s discriminatory approach.451 South 
Korea withdrew because it feared any possible defeat at the hands of North Korea, its 
principal ideological enemy. 452  The Australian Soccer Federation (ASF) may have 
misjudged the situation after early reports that there was ‗a strong chance that North 
Korea will withdraw from the series rather than play against South Korea‘.453 When it 
was decided that the North Korea-Australia play-off matches would take place at a 
neutral venue the Australians had nominated Great Britain and were somewhat shocked 
when Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, was chosen. The ASF vice-president, Jim 
Bayutti expressed anxiety over FIFA‘s decision, fearing that ‗Australia may be facing 
Soccer [sic] matches, before excitable crowds, in very hostile territory‘.454 Phnom Penh 
was one of the cities that had been nominated by the North Koreans.455  
 
Despite this anxiety, Australia was so confident about the outcome of the forthcoming 
matches against North Korea that two hundred ties featuring an Australian crest and 
with the words ―World Cup 1966‖ incorporated in the design‘ were ordered in 
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advance.456 However, for the Australians, the match against the more athletic footballers 
from North Korea would prove to be an uphill battle; they were to be outfought and 
outpaced. Moreover, just as Bayutti had feared, Phnom Penh was far from amicable to 
the Australians. FIFA had initially suggested Hong Kong for the matches, but the 
problem of obtaining visas for the North Koreans seemingly thwarted the plan. 457 
Before the game, a Cambodian daily reported that ‗football fans in Pnom [sic] Penh 
[favoured] the Korean team, for they [wished] to see an Asian team winning the match. 
The Australian players [were] worried on account of some 30,000-40,000 spectators 
supporting the Korean team‖‘. 458  Indeed, at the time, Cambodia had a friendly 
relationship with North Korea. A Cambodian delegation visited Pyongyang two months 
before the elimination tie to arrange an official visit of Norodom Sihanouk, the 
Cambodian head of state, to North Korea.459 There was much satisfaction in Cambodia 
when North Korea thrashed Australia in the two elimination matches by an aggregate 
score of 9-2.  
 
Apart from Australia, both South Korea and Britain were aghast at the news of the 
North Korea‘s victory. Prompted by the imperatives of Cold War politics the South 
Korean government was anxious to prevent North Korean participation and the 
advantage of propaganda opportunities that it presented. The South Korean 
Ambassador in London, General Lee, demanded that the British Foreign Office should 
debar the North Koreans. However, for the British government the issue was 
complicated. At first the British government did consider refusing visas to the North 
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Koreans. However, it soon became clear that this was likely to prove counterproductive 
in that that ‗FIFA might remove the competition from England if the government barred 
a duly-qualified team‘. 460  Thus, the British government rejected the South Korean 
government‘s request to intervene directly pointing out that in Britain ‗the sporting 
bodies were not under government control‘.461 However, dealing with a team from 
North Korea, a state which the British government did not recognize, continued to pose 
tricky problems. 
 
Henceforth the government sought to engineer a ‗typical British compromise‘ whereby 
North Korean flags would be flown but the North Korean anthem would not be played 
except for the opening match and the final. Moreover the team would be referred to as 
North Korea rather than the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (DPRK). 462  The 
British government did not want to jeopardize its relations with Seoul, and explained 
that allowing North Korea‘s flag to be flown did not mean ‗a change in British 
diplomatic policy‘ but simply that, in the unusual circumstances, the government had 
decided to turn a ‗blind eye to the flag‘. South Korean sensitivity on this issue was 
addressed to some extent, however, by changing the design of the official World Cup 
postage stamp so that it did not include the North Korean flag. 463 These efforts to 
placate South Korea were not always successful. At a luncheon to welcome the World 
Cup football contestants, the ambassador of South Korea was invited by mistake. 
Undeterred by this diplomatic faux pas, he improvised a speech which reminded the 
audience that ‗according to the resolution of the United Nations, the Republic of Korea 
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represents the whole of Korea‘.464 
 
The North Korean Football Association remained in a state of high anxiety about 
whether their team would go England while these diplomatic issues were   resolved. 
On February 12 1966, they sent a telegram to the Organizing Committee of the 1966 
World Cup pointing out that they had received no notification of ‗the results of the 
draw of the championship and of the forthcoming February 28 meeting‘.465 Eventually, 
however, a North Korean delegation was dispatched to London to make arrangements 
for their team‘s participation in the World Cup finals. Their visit was successful in that it 
resulted in the Organizing Committee pledging that it would resolve satisfactorily the 
various outstanding issues including the entrance into the Britain of the North Korean 
footballers, journalists and accompanying tourists. 466  With these obstacles cleared, 
North Korea was sufficiently confident to seek a pre-tournament friendly match with 
South Korea, a match that would have reminded all Koreans of the Gyungsung-
Pyongyang Football Championship which had been established during the colonial 
period. 467 However, on this occasion, Cold War politics stood in the way and the match 
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(2) The cult of the underdog and North Korea’s attacking football  
 
From the outset, the North Koreans, the first of the visiting sides to make their 
headquarters in England, provoked curiosity due partly to the secretive nature of their 
country. English people knew very little about North Korea and even less about North 
Korean football. The mysterious character of the exotic North Koreans helped to boost 
ticket sales in Middlesbrough where they would play their matches. As one English 
newspaper reported in typical tabloid style: 
 
The big boom in sales has been sparked off by the arrival of the 
North Koreans… Nobody knows anything about Han Bong Jin and 
his team-mates and they are not exactly enlightening the public. 
They are keeping their tactical plans locked away. They refuse to 
predict the outcome of the matches, and their two imported chefs 
are even keeping the menu firmly under their hats. The only thing 
the traditionally soccer-hungry North Easterners have got out of the 
North Koreans is a new slogan: ―Go to work on a beansprout.‖ 468 
 
Tidbits of gossip about the North Koreans in the regional dailies seem to have 
amplified Middlesbrough‘s interest in them. When the North Korean players were not 
able to eat their meal because of their lateness for the supper at the St. George Hotel, 
they threatened to walk out of the hotel in protest.469 They finally located their practice 
pitch after being rebuffed four times like ‗a woman at a hat sale‘.470 It was also reported 
that the Chileans, drawn in the same group, had banned North Korean officials with a 
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movie camera from ‗spying on their training‘.471  
 
But this initial curiosity over the North Koreans could hardly explain how it was that 
North Korea should become Middlesbrough‘s ‗adopted‘ side. An important reason for 
the immense enthusiasm for North Korean football that developed lay in the cult of 
underdog, a firmly entrenched feature of English football culture owing to annual 
excitement caused by giant-killing in the FA Cup when clubs from the lower divisions 
gained unexpected victories against elite opposition. Later, an English journalist aptly 
compared the North Korean phenomenon with the attraction of the FA Cup after North 
Korea‘s victory over fancied Italy.  
 
It is good for the game the little fellows come up now and again 
and shake everyone, for that‘s what makes our own F.A. Cup such a 
great tournament. 472 
 
The North Korean players‘ average height was approximately five feet six inches; this 
helped journalists seeking to portray them as ‗underdogs‘ and potential ‗giant-killers‘. 
473 Their two biggest players could just about ‗make Middlesbrough police cadets for 
height‘.474 Indeed, they were football ‗minnows‘, 100-1 outsiders for the World Cup.475 
In view of this type of coverage it was not surprising that Middlesbrough fans were 
highly sympathetic to North Korea. As a steward of Middlesbrough FC‘s social club 
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confirmed: ‗Most fans say they‘ll be shouting for the Koreans against Russia tonight.‘476  
 
In their first group-stage match at Ayresome Park the rough play of the Soviet Union 
side helped to confirm this feeling of sympathy towards the North Koreans. The 
Russians committed no less than twenty-seven fouls, stifling North Korea by their 
bullying tactics in which the most notorious villain was Khurtsilava, who was particularly 
‗adept at the use of body-checking‘.477 J.L. Manning, chief sports writer for the right-
wing Daily Mail, lampooned this Soviet team as middle or heavyweight boxers under 
the headline ‗Ringside view of Russians‘, prompting an angry reaction from the head of 
Russian delegation at a press conference. 478  His criticism could not be entirely 
disassociated from the fact that he was very much a ‗Cold Warrior‘, as were many British 
journalists at the time. However, it is important to recognize that Manning‘s comments 
may have been justified. The only South Korean journalist on the spot, Chang Heng 
Hoon, interviewed in 2008, recalled that he was so incensed by the over-physical 
approach of the Soviet players that he cried out: ‗Russian sons of bitches‘.479 After the 
game he criticized the Soviet team as the ‗masters of wild play‘.480 Spectators at the 
match, although they did not have any ethnic relations with the North Koreans like 
Chang, began to adopt the tiny Orientals as their local team. When Koreans earned a 
throw-in, a local fan shouted ‗Borough ball‘ to the referee, as if he was watching 
Middlesbrough FC play at home.481  
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At this juncture, it is instructive to look into how unfashionable Ayresome Park came to 
be chosen as a World Cup venue. St. James Park, Newcastle, had originally been 
selected to stage some World Cup matches, but this plan was thwarted by a row 
between Newcastle United and Newcastle City Council in 1964 over the ground 
improvements that would be required. Middlesbrough was chosen instead and 
Ayresome Park was refurbished at a cost of approximately £125,000.482  As their city 
was often considered to be the ‗poor relation‘ in the North-East of England – especially 
in relation to Newcastle – this unexpected switch of venues became a source of civic 
pride. Significantly, at this time, there were plans to develop Middlesbrough as the 
centre of a vast new city to be called ‗Teesside‘, which it was claimed would become the 
third largest in Britain by the 1970s. 483  Being selected as a venue for World Cup 
matches, therefore, became part of a campaign to put Middlesbrough on the map. John 
Boothby, the Mayor of Middlesbrough, seized the opportunity to make the relevant 
connection: ‗Some people say it was an accident that Middlesbrough was chosen as a 
ground for the games … I think it was an act of God. The people of Middlesbrough feel 
that they are now part of the country.‘484  
 
However, to put this in perspective, the ‗least remunerative games‘ were allotted to 
Middlesbrough. In comparison with the other World Cup cities ‗Middlesbrough had the 
lowest total attendance of all the grounds which had more than one match‘.485 Of all 
the North Korean games played at Ayresome Park, the opening match against USSR 
attracted the largest crowd (22,568). After North Korea‘s unexpected victory over Italy, 
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their quarter-final match against Portugal contested at Goodison Park, Liverpool, 
attracted an audience of 51,780, including many who travelled from Middlesbrough to 
support them.486  Middlesbrough FC was also a football minnow, having just being 
relegated to the English Third Division in 1966.487 The football public of Middlesbrough 
had previously had no opportunity to watch international football at Ayresome Park so 
there was also an element of novelty.  
 
The local context is important in explaining the popularity of the North Korean team. 
For the excited crowds who came to support them at Ayresome Park the heroic exploits 
of their exotic visitors may have helped to compensate for the disappointing 
performances of their own team.  The Guardian commented:   
 
The Middlesbrough crowd roared on their new heroes, ―KO-RE-A, 
KO-RE-A,‖ drowned the fading cries of ―IT-AL-IA, IT-AL-IA,‖ and when 
the game ended, one would have thought that Middlesbrough had 
won the FA Cup. 488 
 
The North Korean footballers were quoted as saying that playing at Ayresome Park was 
like ‗having a game at the Moranbong Stadium in Pyongyang‘.489 In a letter to the 
citizens of Middlesbrough written in 2002, the footballers acknowledged 
Middlesbrough‘s warm welcome and enthusiastic support while recollecting that it had 
given them ‗great strength to win against the Italian team‘.490 They were surprised by 
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the reaction of the British public - a British sailor‘s rushing onto the field to salute the 
North Korean footballers after the match against Chile; the throng of English autograph 
seekers with North Korean flags; a local daily carrying an article on the brief history of 
North Korea written by a North Korean journalist.491 The friendly atmosphere was a 
stark contrast to what the North Koreans had expected about before making their trip 
to a stronghold of Western capitalism.492 
 
However, it was also the style of play displayed by the North Koreans that led the 
English crowds to cheer them. The most salient feature of the 1966 World Cup was the 
excessive use of defensive tactics. ‗Looking for [real] football in the 1966 World Cup was 
very like seeking water in the Sahara‘, as World Soccer observed at the time. The 1966 
World Cup was marked by a win-at-any-cost approach employing reinforced defenses 
of preferably eight men who used ‗late tackles or getting-stuck-in to injure and to 
intimidate‘ the opposition.493 An elderly Newcastle supporter quoted by the Daily Mail 
attacked the defensive or cautious football on display. ‗If this had been the style of 
football when I was a youngster ‘, he said, ‗I would never have become a fan‘.494 Three 
of the four teams in North Korea‘s group were noted for their negative footballing style. 
The Soviet Union sought to imitate the ultra-defensive tactics associated with Helenio 
Herrera allied to pure physical strength. 495 Chile‘s approach was so negative that they 
even played defensively when they were a goal down to Italy. Yet, at the time, the 
criticism of football followers in the North-East of England was directed mainly at the 
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Italians. Before the tournament Edmundo Fabbri, manager of the Italian squad, had 
promised to give ‗British football enthusiasts value for their money with some good 
attacking soccer ‘. 496  Yet, once the competition began, Italy concentrated on their 
notorious defensive game at the expense of their flair. This prompted Brian Clough of 
Hartlepools United, at the time the youngest manager in the Football League, to rebuke 
Italian football:  
 
All we have learned is what NOT to do, I‘m sure Hartlepools fans 
would not keep turning up at the Victoria ground for a whole 
season to see football like that which, say, Italy have been playing. 
They couldn‘t stand it even if we were winning every match. 497 
 
After North Korea had beaten Italy, the manager of Newcastle United, Joe Harvey, 
praised their fast attacking football made possible by their hard training and doubted 
whether the Italians had the heart for this kind of commitment. He wrote that he would 
like his players to climb a mountain and have a rice diet like the North Koreans. The 
North Koreans‘ victory also convinced Middlesbrough‘s manager of the significance of 
‗running and hard work‘.498  
 
Herrera‘s defensive tactics leading to frequent 1-0 victories was characterized as ‗the 
Italian game‘.499 In the 1960s Internazionale of Milan were its prime exponents, having 
employed catenaccio as they scaled the peaks of European club football, frustrating 
English opponents along the way. English teams, according to Jonathan Wilson, relied 
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on ‗thoughtless physicality - keep battling, keep running, keep trying‘ and resented ‗the 
Italian game‘.500 It was easy for English football fans to relate to the relentless attacking 
style of the North Koreans which was in many ways closer to the English tradition.  
 
As the Koreans ran and chased with boyish enthusiasm in the early 
minutes of their first match in the World Cup finals, even ex-
international players in the Press box said: ―They‘ll never keep this 
up.‖ Remarkably, they did.501  
 
In a tournament dominated by defensive football, the North Korean attacking 
 style was refreshing while their commitment and levels of physical fitness were 
 seen as phenomenal. For a Guardian reporter, this was symbolized when a 
 North Korean winger chased a loose ball and ‗collided with the corner flag, 
 breaking it in two‘. 502  The tiny Koreans‘ jumping ability was also remarkable; 
 they often out-jumped the Italians and even the Portuguese giant Torres who was  
almost six feet four inches in height.503 
 
The great reservoir of the North Koreans‘ fitness was their highly regimented Spartan 
training. Stan Ackerley who had played for Australia in the qualifying series against 
North Korea, recalled ‗looking out of his hotel bed room at six in the morning, seeing 
them running in what seemed like a frenzy in the nearby hills‘.504 More surprising was 
that after the first qualifying match had finished at midnight, the North Koreans rested 
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for less than six hours.505 This extreme diligence was a microcosmic reflection in North 
Korean society during the 1960s when, as one defector has recalled, most North 
Koreans worked almost all day long under the banner of the Chollima movement.506 
Chollima, a mythical winged-horse capable of running 1,000 li (approximately 400 
kilometers) without a halt, was for Koreans the epitome of endurance. The North Korean 
footballers, by demonstrating their stamina and tenacity, exemplified this movement in 
North Korean society and it gave them confidence. As their anthem proclaimed: ‗We are 
the glorious Chollima team. We can beat anyone, even the strongest team‘.507  
 
North Korea‘s ‗never-say-die‘ approach based upon their high work-rate was 
instrumental in capturing the imagination of the English crowd. The North Koreans 
‗fought like lions for an equalizer from the restart‘ of their match against Chile.508 This 
North Koreans‘ spirit seems to have prompted loud enthusiasm in the crowd at 
Ayresome Park. When Park Seung Jin‘s last-minute equalizer arrived the celebrations 
brought down some electric strip lightning in the press refreshment room up in the 
stand.509 Meanwhile, the freshness of North Koreans‘ approach allowed their quarter-
final match against Portugal to be described as the rebirth of attacking football. The 
North Koreans, comparative strangers to modern football style as played in Europe and 
South America, continued to attack even when leading Portugal 3-0. Their tactical 
naivety helped to make this match distinctive and memorable albeit though they 
conceded their lead and   finally lost 5-3. ‗All those who stayed at home to watch 
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England on television missed the match of a lifetime‘, wrote the Sunday Mirror.510 The 
North Koreans were also naïve off the field. When their dividend was paid out by the 
organizers they had prepared sacks in order to receive ‗bundles of cash or nuggets of 
gold‘. But they received only a cheque!511  
 
(3) North Korea’s view and mixed responses from abroad 
 
What did the success of their national team mean to North Koreans?  What use did 
their government make of this success? While in England, for example, the 
comprehensive television coverage of the 1966 World Cup turned housewives into 
football fans and an estimated forty million people watched the World Cup final, North 
Koreans, alone among the competing nations in 1966,  had no access to the first 
‗televised World Cup‘.512 However, radio coverage was sufficient to bring North Koreans 
together for the occasion.  Having either listened to the live broadcast or heard the 
good news from their neighbours, North Koreans poured on to the streets to celebrate 
the unexpected victory over Italy.513 It was not the faces of football heroes in 1966 but 
their names that were strongly imprinted on the minds of North Koreans. When Park 
Du Ik, famous for his goal against Italy, violated traffic regulations, the traffic warden let 
him go straight away after seeing his name on his identity card.514 From an economic 
standpoint, the 1960s was the successful decade for North Korea, but the lives of the 
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people, forced to work long hours to achieve the economic growth rate targeted by the 
Party, were tough.515 It was said that North Korean workers were working even harder 
than usual to encourage their footballers in their intensive training. Thus Chollima 
provided a link between the people and the national team.516 Even when propaganda 
is discounted it is clear that North Koreans empathized with their football heroes and 
enjoyed a euphoric moment after hearing the good news from Middlesbrough.  
 
As far as the regime in North Korea was concerned, however, any success achieved by 
the national team was useful for propaganda purposes as a testament to the 
superiority of socialist system. The Party argued that the success of their footballers 
demonstrated the power of people‘s sports in North Korea in contrast to sports under 
capitalism where money ruled.517 Official sources credited the success of the North 
Korean team to Chollima game and the all-out defensive and offensive play they had 
adopted since the early 1960s.518 Meanwhile, North Korean newspapers targeted Italian 
football in particular as a way of exposing the problem of professionalism in capitalist 
sports. The Pyongyamng Times cited the opinion of numerous Italian newspapers which 
claimed that the North Koreans had ‗ridiculed our [Italian] millionaire footballers‘.519 
 
Indeed, the state of Italian football at this time was such that it could easily be 
exploited by North Korean propagandists eager to make a point about the failings of 
the capitalist system more generally. Italian clubs had embarked on a wild spending 
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spree in the 1960s in order to attract the world‘s best footballers; indeed, Luis Suarez, 
the Spanish inside-forward bought by Internazionale from Barcelona for 250 million 
Italian lire (£142,000) in 1961, was the world‘s most expensive footballer. World Soccer 
reported that most of Italy‘s major clubs were in the red after the season 1963-64, 
when the financial difficulties stemming from expensive transfers were much 
exacerbated by a more general economic crisis.520 The crisis was so serious that a ban 
had been imposed on the signing of foreign players, a measure that prevented the 
clubs from paying heavy transfer fees but was also aimed at protecting domestic 
talent.521 Moreover, ‗the decadence of Italian football‘, as La Nazione pointed out, was 
‗but one aspect of the more sweeping decadence of our entire country‘. 522 Italian 
society, in this period was also bedeviled by a corrupt relationship between political 
and business circles.523 Under these circumstances, the nation-wide protest prompted 
by Italy‘s humiliating defeat by North Korea had to be taken seriously and the 
argument for greater control over transfer fees in Italian football was widely accepted 
by all the parties from ultra-right to communist.524 This response owed much to the 
influence of the Roman Catholic Church and communism, Italy‘s two great ideological 
forces; both were ‗against the modern world of consumerism‘ and ‗its commodity 
fetishism‘.525 What was seen as the fiasco of 1966 rubbed salt into the already open 
wound of Italian football where club rather than national interests had been the 
overriding concern after 1945. 
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The 1966 World Cup was the first in which the Third World football countries 
demonstrated their potential. Some critics argued that ‗third-class teams‘, including 
North Korea, had taken places that should have been occupied by Scotland, 
Czechoslovakia and so forth.526 However, the validity of these Eurocentric views was 
undermined after North Korea had beaten Italy and scored three times against Portugal. 
The North Korea‘s party organ, Nodong Shinmun pointed out that some European 
football pundits had predicted that North Korea would not score a single goal in the 
competition and had been proved wrong.527 A North Korean journalist introduced an 
interesting anecdote as a way of representing how the people of Asia were similarly 
prejudiced against the West. Apparently, some Burmese soccer fans had asked a British 
journalist from World Soccer to keep his promise that he would eat his manuscripts if 
North Korea would win a single game.528  
 
The North Korean government sought to identify the success of their World Cup team 
as a victory achieved on behalf of the Third World as a whole and Pyongyang 
newspapers cited favourable comments from other Asian and African nations. 
Indonesian Sports Minister Maladi, chairman of GANEFO, saw the victory over Italy as 
one which belonged in the first instance to North Korea but also to ‗the new emerging 
forces of the world‘.529 Algeria, famed for the role that football   had played in its anti-
colonial struggle, congratulated the North Koreans on their achievement. Nodong 
Shinmum cited an article from an Algerian weekly which praised the disciplined North 
Korean footballers who had overcome physically stronger opponents through their 
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tenacity and willpower.530 The Egyptian media, with their staunch Arab nationalism, 
alleged that North Korea had only lost to Portugal in the quarter-final because the 
Israeli referee had been bribed. Another version of this story had been circulating in 
North Korea on account of the two penalty kicks awarded to Portugal. The referee‘s 
decisions, it was said, could be explained by Israel‘s hostile relations with North 
Korea.531 In relation to the impact made by the Third World in 1966 it was noted that 
North Korea was defeated largely through the individual exploits of Eusebio from 
Mozambique, a Third World country struggling for its independence from Portugal. The 
presence of four Mozambicans in the Portuguese team suggested the ascent of African 
football.532 More generally, the impact made by Asian and African footballers in 1966 
could not be denied. Even the Daily Express, the London newspaper most closely 
associated with the old imperialism, was forced to acknowledge the changing dynamics 
of world football: ‗It could be that the semi-finalists of the 1974 World Cup will be 
Ghana, China, Mozambique and, of course, North Korea‘.533 
 
The success of the national team at the World Cup assisted the Party‘s efforts, via its 
routine propaganda campaign, to persuade North Koreans that the North was superior 
to the South, where life was much harder. Nodong Shimnum, the Party organ 
reproduced an article from a South Korean daily, praising North Korea‘s feat while 
contrasting the golden age of North Korean football with the slump of football in the 
South.534 This was followed by an ideologically correct article in Nodong Shinmun 
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which reported that ‗most South Koreans were pleased with North Korea‘s victory over 
Italy‘. It was claimed that this was a quote from a South Korean newspaper on 21 July, 
but there was no such line in any newspapers in the South on that day. 535 South 
Korean dailies, on the contrary, speculated that fifty of the seventy-five strong North 
Korean World Cup contingent were agents employed primarily to spy on their 
opponents. 536 A story had appeared in a Middlesbrough newspaper that they had 
spent £3000 on camera equipment and bought hundreds of pounds worth of film while 
in the North-East of England.537  
 
It is important, however, to try to see clearly through the mist of propaganda and there 
is evidence that South Koreans followed the progress of the North Korean team in 
1966. According to the South Korean journalist Chang, the people in the South showed 
keen interest in the North Korean football at that time, even though they never actually 
saw North Korea play.538 Even though some 1966 World Cup matches were televised in 
South Korea, the games played by the North Koreans were not covered.539 As news of 
North Korea‘s progress spread it seems likely that it generated complex feelings in the 
minds of South Koreans: antagonism and envy possibly, but along with the hope that 
‗Asian football could become a world beater ‘. 540  These mixed feelings were 
demonstrated by an editorial in Kyunghyang Shinmun which claimed that the North 
Korean squad had been ‗forcibly trained‘ to fulfill its ‗propaganda purpose‘, but 
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acknowledged that they had ‗made a breakthrough‘ in the World Cup and conceded 
that there seemed to be a ‗huge gap between the national team of South Korea and 
the North‘. Perhaps fearing that it had gone too far, an editorial in the same newspaper 
a day reminded its readers that the North was a ‗closed and dictatorial society‘ whereas 
the South was a ‗free and open society‘. Whereas South Korean newspapers had 
reported on North Korea‘s football success in 1966, newspapers in the North had 
ignored the achievements of South Korean sports stars, such as Kim Gi Su, who had 
won the world junior-middleweight boxing championship earlier in the summer of 
1966.541  
 
(4) Football revolution in South Korea 
 
In government circles in South Korea, North Korea‘s performances in England set alarm 
bells ringing, especially as the South was desperately striving at the time to match the 
high rate of economic growth being achieved in the North. For President Park, 
ideological competition between North and South was increasingly a matter of which 
system was most effective in feeding its people and delivering prosperity.542 While this 
was going on, national achievement in sport was one relatively easy way of 
demonstrating ideological superiority. In these circumstances it was clear that the 
President saw advantages in associating himself and his government with sporting 
success, especially because of the way in which the South Korean public was devoted 
to their sporting heroes. This was evident when boxer Kim Gi Su beat the Italian 
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champion to win the world title in Seoul on 25 June 1966 and became an instant 
home-grown sporting hero.543 Kim was moved to tears after being declared the winner 
and the President, who had watched the bout from the start, embraced him with joy as 
he helped the first South Korean world boxing champion to put on his glorious 
champion‘s belt.544 It was no coincidence that Park began to take such a close interest 
when South Koreans won trophies or medals in any field of sport.  
 
Against this political backdrop, the rise of North Korean football created a problem for 
the Park regime and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), which had a 
particular responsibility to monitor what was happening in North Korea, was set to 
work. At this time KCIA was very concerned with gaining access to the secrets of North 
Korean football success. A small group of KCIA agents had been dispatched to England 
at the time of the World Cup.  One of them, posing as a journalist, had asked Chang 
Heng Hoon, a South Korean football writer, to help him access information about the 
North Korean team.545 Later, two South Korean football officials, who had watched 
North Korea‘s World Cup matches, were interviewed by the KCIA and advised that it 
was necessary to establish a strong national side comprising excellent young footballers. 
With this aim in view, Yangji, a club which operated under the auspices of KCIA and 
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The coaching staff of Yangji was composed of the two former famous footballers from 
north, Choi Jung Min and Park Il Gab.547 Yangji‘s players were all in the army but these 
soldiers were paid salaries equal to those paid to players for company teams. Moreover, 
they followed a highly regimented training schedule and were subject to KCIA imposed 
discipline, being allowed time away from the club only on Sundays.548 It is an irony that 
the shock generated by the success North Korean football should have ignited a 
‗football revolution‘ in South Korea which so strongly resembled a communist system of 
state-sponsored ‗amateurs‘. Yangji went on a tour of Europe in 1969 but found it 
difficult to find a top professional team to play them in a practice game. Significantly, 
FC Metz of France finally agreed to play them only after a South Korean embassy 
official in Paris had joked that Yangji were on a par with the North Korean national 
team.549 In Yangji‘s short history North Korea was always the guiding example. However, 
the club was very much subject to the internal politics of the regime and was abruptly 
disbanded in 1970 following the resignation of the head of the KCIA who had taken the 
initiative when the club had been formed only three years earlier.550 The head of the 
KCIA, Kim Hyung Wook had been the President‘s faithful, but had lost his position amid 
an internal power struggle.  
 
As it transpired, the dissolution of Yangji did not disadvantage South Korean football 
because the club‘s quality players moved on to a handful of newly-founded football 
clubs sponsored by banks, though the government was still involved.  The growth of 
bank-sponsored football teams could have not come without Chang Duk Jin, the 
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ambitious director of the financial bureau at the Ministry of Finance who had been 
organizing intra-bureau football matches on Saturday since 1968. His enthusiasm for 
football – along with his status as the first lady‘s nephew - was sufficient to persuade 
commercial banks closely connected with the financial bureau to found their own 
clubs.551 The movement grew rapidly and eleven bank teams had been established by 
1970.552 This trend also corresponded with the sports promotion policy developed by 
the Park administration. From the mid 1960s any company with over 100 employees 
had to set up a sports club.553 It should be noted that South Korean banks had been 
actively involved in running baseball and basketball teams from the early 1960s.554 In 
this respect, it was natural for football to follow this pattern. The popularity of bank-
sponsored women‘s basketball in the 1960s, in particular, may have provided 
encouraged the banks to move into football. Women‘s basketball matches between rival 
banks had proved very popular and it was believed that a successful team could help 
to attract new depositors.555  
 
For talented South Korean players of the 1970s, the clubs run by banks were an 
attractive option as they offered the prospect of a career after football. Significantly, the 
growth of bank clubs meant that more high school and college footballers would 
continue to play after their graduation.556 Many bank footballers went on to take up 
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steady jobs as a bank clerks; some, like Kim ‗Beanpole‘ Jae Han, famous for his headers, 
eventually became bank managers.557 The vast majority of those who had no football-
related employment lined up after their retirement from the game were faced with the 
problems of starting small businesses in order to make a living, often with little money 
and experience. The banks helped South Korean football to fill the gap left by the 
dissolution of the Yangji club.  
 
Even before Yangji folded, the regime had taken steps to ensure that the revolution in 
South Korean football would continue. Two months before Yangi‘s dissolution, Chang 
Duk Jin had assumed the presidency of the KFA; he was appointed because he was 
seen as the person most likely to provide effective leadership in the impending football 
war against North Korea and he made it clear in his inaugural speech that he 
understood that this was his main task. 558  He moved quickly to invite world-class 
foreign teams and inaugurate international competition in order to begin to enhance 
the quality of South Korean football. It seems likely that he used his considerable 
political influence to bring Benfica to Seoul in September 1970 even though they 
required a match fee of $45,000, an enormous sum considering the economic situation 
in South Korea at that time.559 When the South Koreans drew 1-1 against a side that 
included Eusebio and other members of the Portuguese team that had beaten North 
Korea in England in 1966 it seemed that this money had been well spent. It was a 
result that gave a much-needed boost to South Korea‘s confidence.560  
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A more important strategic development, however, was the inauguration in 1971 of 
Park‘s Cup. Chang Duk Jin prepared meticulously for this competition which was 
designed to ensure that South Korea would become the focal point of Asian football.561 
At the time, the centre of power in Asian football was Malaysia where the game had 
prospered under the guidance of its football-loving leader, Abdul Tunku Rahman. He 
was the president of the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) and had established the 
Merdeka Football Tournament in 1958 to commemorate its Malaysian independence 
and the Asian youth football competition (the Rahman Trophy) in 1959 to ‗bind Asian 
countries closer together ‘.562 It was not long before other Asian nations established 
their own international football tournaments to emulate the Merdeka. South Korea, a 
relative latecomer in this respect sought to make the Park‘s cup more prestigious than 
any other Asian tournaments and was not discouraged when only seven teams entered 
in 1971. As a South Korean football official pointed out, the Merdeka tournament had 
attracted only five teams when it was first contested.563  
 
These developments required a great deal of commitment, not least financial backing, 
from the South Korean government if they were to be successful.564 What the regime 
particularly took care of was sports diplomacy. From the late 1960s South Korea began 
to cultivate friendly relations with Israel, mainly because North Korea was aligning itself 
increasingly with the Arab states.565 The Israeli national team made its first visit to Seoul 
since 1960 in May 1973; later there were Olympics and World Cup qualifying matches 
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between the two countries in 1976 and 1977.566 The necessities of Cold War politics 
dictated a change of stance towards Cambodia. Before 1970 Communist Cambodia had 
a close relationship with North Korea; it had been chosen by the North Koreans as the 
‗neutral‘ venue for their 1966 play-off matches against Australia. After the coup d‘etat 
of 1970, however, these conditions no longer applied and South Korea was free to 
invite Cambodia to send its national team to Seoul.567 The first Park‘s Cup competition 
also saw an invitation extended to South Vietnam whose team was very popular among 
South Koreans, many of whom had served in South Vietnam as soldiers or labourers 
since the outbreak of war in 1965.568 South Vietnam was also an important export 
market for goods from South Korea, especially military equipment and supplies, so it 
was important to cultivate good sporting relations.569 It was also important to develop 
good sporting relations with Burma joint-winners with South Korea of the Asian Games 
football competition in 1970 and joint-winners with South Korea of the first Park‘s Cup 
competition a year later. It was the fierce rivalry between South Korea and Burma that 
ensured that the first Park‘s Cup was a commercial success, attracting around 150,000 
spectators despite inclement weather at the start of the tournament.570  
 
These diplomatic initiatives helped to raise the profile of South Korean football, 
especially in Asia, while exposing its top players to rigorous international competition. 
They also helped to ensure that football, and the Park‘s Cup competition in particular, 
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was part of the military regime‘s ‗national modernization project‘.571 When the Park‘s 
Cup started, indeed South Korean society was consumed with a government-driven 
movement that sought to transform ‗thatched roofs‘ into ‗tiled roofs‘ in rural areas. 
However, the so-called Saemaeul (New Community) Movement was not limited to the 
beautification of the countryside. President Park envisaged an era of rapid economic 
growth based on the efforts of hard-working people.  With its call to diligence, self-
help and cooperation, it was also designed to encourage South Koreans to develop the 
qualities required for successful modernization. 572  The New Community Movement 
embraced sport and helped to generate a football boom; over 16,000 new football 
clubs were planned and the KFA inaugurated the ‗New Town‘ competition for them in 
1972. 573  ‗Morning football clubs‘ thrived as part of this movement with individual 
members numbering over 52,000 by 1979. So well-organized were these clubs in every 
corner of the nation that by the end of the 1970s no-one who ran for the National 
Assembly could afford to ignore them. 574  Chang Duk Jin was probably the first 
politician to cash in on the morning football phenomenon when seeking election in 
1971. He had nominated Youngdeungpo as exemplary in its efforts to promote football 
at grass-roots level in 1970 and this town became his constituency a year later. 575  
 
All this raised expectations regarding the South Korean national team. With the 
regime‘s full backing, Chang ensured that South Korea hosted the 1972 Olympic and 
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1974 World Cup Asian qualifying rounds.576 Unfortunately, the team was unable to 
match the public‘s raised expectations and was surprisingly defeated by unfancied 
Malaysia in the Olympic qualifier held in 1971, a result which enraged the South Korean 
public. It was later reported that the hotel where the national squad stayed had been 
besieged with calls from infuriated fans.577 Something was needed to distract attention 
from this disappointing defeat and this was provided by resuming the annual ‗goodwill‘ 
match with Japan, also beaten by Malaysia in the qualifying round. The Japanese 
football authorities had previously rejected South Korea‘s offer to renew the traditional 
rivalry between the two nations, but now they accepted. At this juncture both national 
teams needed the excitement that would be generated by a match against their old 
enemy as a way of sustaining public interest.578  
 
It was a sign of progress, therefore, when South Korea won the 1974 World Cup Asian 
preliminary round at Seoul, defeating Israel, the Asian representative at the previous 
World Cup, in the final.579 This left South Korea requiring a win over Australia in the 
qualifying matches order to secure a place in the final stages in Germany. After drawing 
away from home, however, South Korea disappointed their fans by drawing 2-2 in 
Seoul after having taken a two goal lead. As they left the stadium some South Korean 
fans roared with anger, 'our team is so weak'.580 The question that needed to be 
answered, however, was why had South Korea been defeated? It had not helped that 
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two key footballers had fallen out with the coach before the match. 581  It later 
transpired that there had been much dissension within the squad with the players 
resenting the rigid discipline and long, hard days at the training camp.582 South Korea‘s 
World Cup hopes were shattered in the decisive replay played on neutral territory in 
Hong Kong. At this point South Korea apparently had little to show for all the 
investment made in football by the Park regime while the victorious ‗Socceroos‘ 
returned home to be embraced by the Australian media that began to ‗treat soccer as 
a serious game‘ for the first time.583 
 
However, it is important to keep the broader picture in view. Despite these 
disappointments, football in South Korea was being transformed in the early 1970s with 
the help of the media, particularly television. This meant that it was no longer just a 
mass participation sport but also very much part of popular culture. The number of TV 
sets in use was rocketing at one million in 1973, which was more than a four hundred 
per cent increase from 1969 and some daily melodramas on TV enjoyed a phenomenal 
success.584 International football broadcast on the radio or TV was almost as popular 
and was increasingly regarded as ‗unmissable‘ by South Korean viewers. Television 
broadcasts of World Cup matches in 1970, albeit recorded rather than live, won popular 
acclaim and high ratings. 585  When the national team played in the King‘s Cup in 
Thailand or the Merdeka tournament, it became the custom for South Koreans, 
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including women, who had hitherto shown little interest in football, to gather around 
their radios and TV sets.586  
 
Watching football on television was not restricted to home; for many it was a 
communal experience and it was in the Dabang (tearooms) where South Korea‘s 
football fever was most strongly evident. Tearooms, rapidly expanding in numbers from 
the 1960s, became a convenient place for those seeking to watch any significant event 
on TV, such as the first Apollo moon landing and President Nixon‘s visit to China.587 Of 
the sport events, football and boxing matches were especially popular. As Cha Bum 
Geun scored the winning goal in the World Cup qualifying match against Israel and 
joyous cheers reverberated, the tearooms in Seoul were like small theatres with chairs 
arranged around TV monitors.588 The owners of tearooms began to cash in on this 
situation by raising the price of a cup of tea or coffee for important football matches.589 
The growing popularity of international football led to intense competition between 
local broadcasters over the rights to show matches. MBC (Munwha Broadcasting 
Company) clinched the rights to televise the recorded 1970 World Cup matches in 
South Korea, excluding games played by communist nations, with a record fee of 
34,000 dollars after outbidding two other local broadcasters. 590 When a friendly match 
between the South Korean national team and the Brazilian club Santos, for whom Pele 
played, was staged in 1972, there was cut-throat competition for the exclusive rights to 
broadcast the match between MBC and KBS (Korea Broadcasting System). This resulted 
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in a three hundred per cent increase in the rights to broadcast the match.591  
 
During the 1970s the media began to take an increasing interest in the style of football 
played by the national team. South Korean audiences, as either spectators or viewers, 
were exposed to an increasing number of international matches, albeit mainly between 
teams from Asia. At the same time, routine exposure to international football on TV 
increased awareness of different national styles. It became clear that individual artistry 
and fluid passing were not often seen in South Korean football where the emphasis 
was very much on speed, as had been the case with North Korea in 1966.  Indeed, the 
two most important attackers in the 1970s, Lee Hoe Taek and Cha Bum Geun were 
famous for their speed. 592  However, as we have seen, speed alone had proved 
insufficient against the well-built and skilful footballers of Australia and Israel. Ironically, 
South Korean football, despite the emphasis of speed and the remarkable mobility of 
the players, was sometimes criticized for being ‗slow‘ with too many unnecessary 
passes and poor ball control. 593  For one South Korean football commentator the 
‗Burmese style‘, where speed was allied to one-touch pass-and-move football, was 
more likely to bring results against teams like Australia.594  
 
However, these criticisms had a limited impact mainly because of the South Korean 
obsession with the North. Accordingly, the South Korean approach to football in the 
early 1970s was largely characterized by an emphasis on fighting spirit and endurance 
at the expense of the development of a high level of individual skills. The strong 
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possibility of an international match against North Korea in the near future reinforced 
this trend. 595  As far as training was concerned, South Korea followed the well-
established Northern pattern. National squad players were subjected to training camps 
lasting several months during which time they were expected to run distances and 
climb mountains with the aim of being able to play hard for 120 minutes.596 South 
Korean sports journalists underpinned this regime by the use of military metaphors, 
sometimes referring to Hwarang, a legendary warrior who ‗underwent severe martial 
training and sacrificed himself on the battlefield‘ for Silla, a kingdom of ancient 
Korea.597 Typically, a day before the vital World Cup preliminary match against Australia, 
Kyunghyang Shinmun urged South Korea‘s footballers to demonstrate the ‗Hwarang 
spirit‘ of ‗never retreating on the battlefield.‘598 
 
(5) North Korea: the purge of the World Cup heroes and the ‘Cinema 
Football Club’ 
  
After the 1966 World Cup, internal political struggles accompanied by massive purges 
seem to have dramatically changed the fortune of North Korean football. In March 
1967, the Gabsan faction along some other high-ranking party officials, were purged. 
The pretext was that they had advocated a revisionist economic policy – stressing the 
importance of the quality of goods produced as well as the quantity – also that they 
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had made a hero of the faction leader.599 However, it seems likely that the fundamental 
reason for the purge was mainly intended to strengthen Kim Il Sung‘s absolute grip on 
the party and to intensify personality cult centred on him.600 The Gabsan faction had 
previously been been faithful comrades to Kim Il Sung and strong supporters of North 
Korean football. Many members of the faction had taken the game up enthusiastically 
during the Japanese colonial period; football provided a common interest which helped 
unite those who joined in the armed struggle against the Japanese.601 The association 
between the Gabsan and the North Korean World Cup heroes of 1966 was said to be 
very close. According to one North Korean defector ‘s testimony songs had been sung 
praising key members of the faction.602 This may have had unfortunate consequences 
in that it was reported that most of the players were deported to remote collieries and 
labour camps having been accused of drinking and womanizing on the eve of the 
quarter-final against Portugal. 603  Rumours of this unlikely misbehaviour circulated 
widely but were later denied by the North Korean footballers themselves.604 
 
Irrespective of whether the rumour was true or not, it is clear that the purge of the 
Gabsan faction was detrimental to the further development of North Korean football. 
One consequence was that in 1967 some members of the World Cup team and their 
coach were forced to work as coal miners and manual labourers. One of them, Shin 
                                           
599 Seung-heon Lee, ‗Reshuffling of North Korean Party and Rise of Solipsism: From Restrictive 
Pluralism to Solipsistic System‘, in The North Korean Graduate School of Gyungnam University (ed.), A 
History of Modern North Korea, vol 1, Seoul, 2004, 351-357.   
600 Jong-seok Lee, Research into the North Korean Worker ‘s Party, Seoul, 1995, 296-315.  
601 Kim et al, Football of Our Nation, 14.  
602 Ju, A Pyongyang Story written in Seoul, Seoul, 2010, 215.  
603 Kang and Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang, 95; Young-man Lee, Hundreds of Thousands of 
Stories Intertwined with a Ball, Seoul, 1998, 174-175; North Korea, July, 2006, 130-131. 
604 The Game of their Lives, (2002) Documentary Film, Directed by D. Gordon. UK: VeryMuchSo.  
164 
 
Young Gyu, the captain, whom FIFA president Sir Stanley Rous had described as a 
world-class defender, was sent to work in a pottery factory on account of his bourgeois 
pedigree as the son of a great landlord.605 However, Park Du Ik and Park Seung Jin, the 
two most important goal scorers for North Korea in 1966, managed to avoid this fate 
along with a few of their colleagues.606 In June 1967 they played with Kang Ryong 
Woon, Yang Sung Gook, Kye Seung Wun and Kim Seung Il in a match against a 
Hungarian team; in July 1968 Kim Seung Il also played in a friendly against a East 
German club.607 However, Park Seung Jin was to be deported to a gulag, on suspicion 
of spying around the mid 1970s, where he allegedly survived only through eating 
insects while in solitary confinement. 608  Thus North Korean football lost its prime 
patrons within the political system and its World Cup heroes, at least temporarily, 
disappeared from view.  A further indication of how much the situation had changed 
was that North Korea did not participate in either the 1968 Olympic and 1970 World 
Cup Asian preliminaries.  
 
After the Gabsan episode, Kim Jong Il, son of Kim Il Sung extended his control over all 
cultural sectors in North Korea. His aim was to confirm his status as the only successor 
to his father, but there was also much general propaganda glorifying his personal 
autocracy.609 In these circumstances it was important to have powerful friends in high 
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places and it was largely at Junior Kim‘s insistence that North Korean football began to 
emerge from this period of crisis in the early 1970s, not least because its propaganda 
value was once again appreciated. It seems that some of the 1966 team, having been 
purged, were now reinstated; Lee Chan Myung, the goalkeeper who had performed so 
brilliantly in the World Cup, played in the 1972 Olympic qualifying matches. 610  In 
addition, the more favourable conditions persuaded some elite North Korean 
footballers to end their self-imposed exile. Moon Ki Nam, who had left in 1968 after his 
father had been accused of anti-communist activity, returned to Pyongyang to join a 
super club set up by Junior Kim in 1971. This club‘s official name was the April 25 Club, 
derived from the foundation date of Kim Il Sung‘s anti-Japanese army in 1932, but it 
was known to the players as the ‗Cinema Football Club‘ on account of Junior Kim‘s 
liking for movies and his active involvement in making propaganda films.611 However, 
the situation could still be dangerous. Shin Young Gyu was reinstated and sent to the 
Pyongyang City Club patronized by Kim Sung Gab, younger brother to Kim Il Sung‘s 
second wife. As Kim Sung Gab surfaced as a Junior Kim‘s political rival in the early 
1970s, the latter disempowered the former. One outcome of this political struggle was 
that Shin was sent to a labour camp and his football career came to an abrupt end.612  
 
With the support of Junior Kim, North Korea again sought a place in the final stages of 
the Olympic and World Cup tournaments. After the purge, however, North Korean 
football found itself in a weakened condition and incapable of achieving much success 
at international level, save in some competitions against Asia‘s second-class teams. 
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North Korea football failed to qualify for both the 1972 Olympics and 1974 World Cup. 
As far as the regime was concerned, the national team‘s lack of success reduced 
football‘s propaganda value. The reputation gained in 1966 lingered for a while and in 
the early 1970s North Korea was still regarded as a tough competitor by other Asian 
nations. Before an Olympic qualifier in 1971 an Iraqi daily noted that the North Korean 
team was formidable because it included five members of the 1966 squad.613 Two years 
later, after being heavily defeated by April 25, the coach of the Singapore national team 
argued that North Korea was stronger than South Korea, Burma, and Japan.614 North 
Korea‘s distinctive attacking style – another legacy of 1966 – could still attract 
favourable attention. When April 25 reached the final of the Delhi Cloth Mills (DCM) 
tournament in 1972 one Indian journalist compared their attack to the ‗Gurkhas‘, the 
brave Nepali brigade of Britain‘s Indian Army.615 However, as it struggled to recover 
from the consequences of the purge, it was clear that North Korean football was not 
the force that it had been a few years earlier. As far as the propagandists of the regime 
were concerned men‘s football became less important than women‘s volleyball after 
North Korea beat South Korea to win the Olympic bronze medal at Munich in 1972.616  
 
Although North Korean football was suffering, there was great progress in sports 
diplomacy in this period. After the IOC conference at Warsaw in June 1969 North Korea 
was able to participate in the Olympics under the name of DPRK. For North Korean 
sports this was a defining moment; having to use the name ‗North Korea in 
international sports events had long been a source of discontent and was the reason 
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that they had boycotted the 1968 Olympics. 617  Gathering momentum from this 
diplomatic victory, the DPRK sought to join the Asian Games Federation (AGF). This 
involved some complex diplomatic initiatives and partly explains why North Korea 
refused to play Israel in a 1970 World Cup qualifying match.618 To achieve this it was 
necessary to establish good relations with the Arab nations and, in particular, with Iran 
which was due to host the Asian Games in 1974.  The Iranian football Association 
initially refused to permit North Korea‘s participation in the 1972 Olympic football 
preliminary at Teheran because there were no diplomatic relations between the two 
countries but eventually relented and matches were played in Teheran and 
Pyongyang. 619  Iran and North Korea, agreed to establish diplomatic relations at 
ambassadorial level in 1973.620 Obtaining the consent of the AGF executive committee, 
including three Iranian members, North Korea joined the AGF in November 1973.621 In 
this way North Korea effectively countered South Korea‘s diplomatic overtures towards 
Iran over the same period in which football had also played a major part. When Iran 
played in Seoul in September 1971 Igor Netto, coach of the Iranian team, became the 
first Soviet citizen to be admitted to South Korea.622         
 
Another positive achievement of North Korean sports diplomacy in the early 1970s was 
the beginning of sports exchanges with Japan. After diplomatic relations between China 
and Japan were normalized in 1972, North Korea sought to take advantage of the new 
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situation by developing cultural and economic exchanges with Japan. Football proved a 
useful medium for this purpose. A Japanese high school football team visited 
Pyongyang in 1972 and a North Korean high school football team played in Japan in 
the following year. During their tour, the North Korean team was highly commended by 
the Japanese press; it was called the ‗Red thunderbolt‘, partly due to the ability of its 
players to shoot ‗like a canon shot‘.623  
 
However, not all of the North Korean diplomatic gestures through football in this 
period were successful. Malaysia permitted the North Korean team to   visit in 1973, 
but did not accept North Korea‘s invitation to travel to Pyongyang for a return match; 
neither would it allow North Korea to participate in the Merdeka Tournament.624 Indeed, 
of the many annual football tournaments in Asia, only the DCM in India was open to 
North Korea and even here participation was   denied after an incident involving the 
Club from Pyongyang in their replayed final against East Bengal in the 1973. When the 
match ended in a draw, tournament officials tried to persuade Dokrogang to play extra 
time but they objected and left the field and East Bengal was declared as the winner.625 
The Dokrogang Club‘s refusal to co-operate led to a ban on North Korean teams 
participating in the DCM after 1974 but teams from South Korea were invited to 
participate at the request of the Indian Football Association.626 So within a few years of 
its great success of 1966 North Korea, as a football power, was relatively weak and still 
somewhat isolated.  
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(6) The impact of ‘1966’ on North and South Korean football   
 
In a wider context, the 1966 World Cup offered a foundation for the development of 
the tournament as a global sporting spectacle. The finals tournament was the first in 
which Asian and African countries attracted attention on and off the field. In particular, 
North Korea‘s top-eight finish, the African boycott and the virtuosity of Mozambican-
born Eusebio in Portugal‘s run to the semi-final would eventually help persuade FIFA to 
guarantee Africa a berth in the 1970 World Cup.627 FIFA‘s decision was an important 
step towards what Mason has nominated as the ‗first real World Cup‘ in 1982 with 
twenty-four finalists including two teams from Africa and two from Asia.628  
 
Aside from the euphoria derived from the home team triumph, the English public had 
extra pleasure while watching the team from the Orient in the World Cup. In particular, 
as we have seen, the fans in Middlesbrough saw North Korea as a plucky underdog 
and identified with the team. In the wake of the defeat of Italy, the North Korean‘s 
popularity spread all over England. North Korea‘s historic winning goal even appeared 
in the satirical magazine, Private Eye where British Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
supposedly says ‗Ooh Mai Kok heads it in the net with oriental aplomb‘ while watching 
the slow motion replay of Park‘s famous goal! 629 In addition, a great cheer went up 
from the Wembley crowd watching England-Argentina game as soon as the news of 
the Koreans being three goals up against Portugal was known.630 The other important 
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reason why support for North Korea grew during the tournament was that spectators 
and viewers enjoyed their attacking football; it was more fun to watch than the 
defensive tactics adopted by most of the other teams in 1966.631 The North Koreans‘ 
passion and stamina resonated with the English who loved to watch their non-stop 
running; they were like dogs at the seaside ‗chasing the ball and coming back for 
more‘. 632  There was something about the North Koreans that resonated with the 
English and their love of the ‗bulldog spirit‘ and this helps to explain how one English 
journalist came to define the 1966 finals as the ‗Korean‘s World Cup‘.633 Of course, the 
defeated Italians took a different view of the simple, direct football played by North 
Korea. In Italy Park Du Ik was widely referred to as ‗the dentist‘ because his goal had 
inflicted so much pain.634  
 
As far as the North Korean government was concerned the 1966 adventure was an 
enormous success. It helped to make useful propaganda as it could be argued that the 
style of play that had defeated the Italians and gained admirers in England was both 
distinctively North Korean and distinctively communist. It also raised the global profile 
of North Korea and attracted favourable attention in the Third World. Meanwhile the 
response in South Korea was ambivalent, initially somewhere between happiness and 
unhappiness. However, not surprisingly in view of the Cold War political context, anxiety 
soon set in as the global popularity now enjoyed by North Korean football became 
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clear. Reports appeared in Seoul which suggested that the North Korean team had 
been invited to play by eleven different countries as a result of their World Cup 
fame.635 When Argentina announced its plan to hold a football tournament in 1966 to 
commemorate 150 years of independence, in which North Korea – along with Brazil 
and Chile - would participate, the South Korean embassy in Buenos Aires protested 
about North Korea's participation.636 Sometimes in the years that followed the rise of 
North Korean football was linked to more general anxieties about South Korea‘s 
national security and the threat from the North. 637 
 
In these circumstances, the South Korean military regime began to intervene actively in 
football affairs, a policy initiative that culminated in the launch of the Park‘s Cup in 
1971. South Korea‘s football revolution was undoubtedly a response to North Korea in 
the first instance but also has to be seen in the context of a number of other Asian 
states, notably particular Malaysia and Thailand, seeking to strengthen their sense of 
nationhood by way of football. With an increase in inter-Asian matches the South 
Korean government came to perceive success on the football field as a way of boosting 
their national prestige. Moreover, in these years football found its place in South 
Korean popular culture thanks to televised broadcasts of international matches.  
 
Ironically, the South Koreans had less to fear from North Korea than they realized as 
the advantages that were accrued through the stirring performances of its team in 1966 
were thrown away in the aftermath of domestic political turmoil. As we have seen, this 
                                           
635 Donga Ilbo, 25 July 1966; 30 July 1966.  
636 Ibid, 4 Aug 1966. 
637 See, for example, Wolgan Chukgu, April 1970, 57.  
172 
 
meant that a number of their World Cup heroes were sent to the gulags. However, the 
purges and the self-imposed exile of some talented players did not impact on the 
future of North Korean football as badly as in the case of Hungary when the ‗golden 
team‘ broke up in after the uprising of 1956.638 As Kim Jong Il reinforced his political 
base along with his claim to be the only successor to his father, football regained much 
of its former status in party circles by the early 1970s. Junior Kim who used film as a 
means to propagate the glorification of his father, was unable to neglect the 
propaganda value of the North Korea‘s number one sport. Soon some World Cup 
heroes were reinstated and the super club, April 25 came into being.  
 
The early 1970s was a period in which North and South Korea‘s football were locked 
together like Siamese twins! Both North and South of the border, football began to 
assume greater political significance than ever before and to play an important part in 
state diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy.  Moreover, the preferred style of 
play in both North and South Korea was recognizably similar and, it could be argued, 
distinctively Korean. The national teams of both countries played a ‗push and run‘ game 
relying heavily on the speed and stamina of their footballers. However, it was not 
simply that South Korea was seeking to emulate the methods that had taken North 
Korea to the World Cup quarter-finals in England. Both countries could look back to the 
example set by the intensive training of Hamheung Football Club in the 1930s, 
discussed in the previous chapters. What remained to be decided was which of the two 
Koreas, with their twin-like closeness, would achieve soccer supremacy in what was 
essentially a battle between brothers.  
                                           






The decline of the North and the rise of the South, 1974-91  
 
The keen economic and diplomatic rivalry between the North and South turned into a 
runaway victory for the capitalist South in the 1980s. It was in this period that the world 
became especially aware of the South Korea‘s ‗economic miracle‘; in terms of ‗economic 
globalization‘, as Eric Hobsbawm has argued, the advance of the South Korean economy 
was a perfect example of the process of rapid industrialization which brought countries 
once regarded as belonging to   the ‗Third World‘ in line with the ‗First World‘.639 The 
staging of the Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988 underlined South Korea‘s new status in 
the global economy and the international recognition that it now enjoyed. While this 
was happening North Korea slipped backwards and was increasingly seen from outside 
as an impoverished economy and an unpredictable and potentially dangerous 
totalitarian regime. To some extent this change in North Korea‘s position was due to 
what was happening elsewhere. Even before the Soviet Union was formally dissolved in 
1991 it had established diplomatic relations with South Korea and China had also 
reversed its previous policy to follow suit in 1992. North Korea had been heavily 
dependent on the two communist giants - economically, militarily and politically; these 
important underpinnings were removed and the regime found itself in an isolated 
position and turned in on itself. The winds of change blowing from Eastern Europe had 
no impact on North Korea which remained under the absolute control of the Kims who 
showed little interest in building bridges to the rest of the world. Indeed, it seems likely 
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that they feared that such a policy would undermine the regime‘s efforts to convince 
the people of North Korea that they lived in a great nation.640  
 
The Park regime in South Korea ended abruptly with Park‘s assassination in 1979. It was 
replaced by the Jeon regime, another military government which lasted until 1988. In 
response to the emergence of democratization movements in South Korea, direct 
elections for the presidency were held in 1987, and although the Roh regime that 
followed was yet another military government, it followed a more liberal policy than its 
predecessors. The changes occurring in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 
1990s helped in this respect by liberating South Korea from the straight-jacket of Cold 
War politics. This allowed the government in South Korea to forge new links with both 
the Soviet Union and China and also with their neighbours in the North whose position 
– in diplomatic, political and ideological terms - was now so isolated that they were no 
longer regarded as a threat. Thus competition with the North became less significant in 
this period, a marked difference in comparison with the 1970s. Under these 
circumstances, the two Koreas were able to join the United Nation in 1991, which was 
regarded as a monumental event signifying peaceful co-existence.641 
 
These changes were reflected in the development football in North and South Korea 
over this period and in the developing football relationship between the two countries. 
While South Korea began to enjoy some success in international tournaments, reaching 
the semi-finals of the World Youth Championships in 1983 and qualifying for the final 
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stages of the World Cup for the first time in thirty-two years in 1986, North Korea was 
increasingly marginalized in international football, mainly on account of violent incidents 
that occurred at the 1982 Asian Games. However, the South‘s changing attitude towards 
the North helped to create the conditions for a rapprochment on the field of play, as 
indicated by the historic friendly matches between the two nations in 1990. This chapter 
seeks to explain how these resumed Korean derbies were viewed and how they were 
played in an atmosphere very different from the fiercely contested matches of the 
1970s. The factors that led to North Korea‘s football isolation after 1982 and its decline 
as a football power are examined along with the reasons for South Korea‘s emergence 
as a significant force in the mid 1980s. However, football in South Korea did have its 
problems and these will be assessed by comparing it with professional baseball. 
 
(1) A surrogate war: the Korean derbies  
 
In South Korea anti-communism reached a high point under the Park regime in the 
1970s. Propaganda was prevalent in schools where children were expected to write 
essays and design posters carrying the anti-communist message.642 Lee Seung Bok, a 
nine-year-old South Korean boy who was said to have cried ‗I hate the Communist Party‘ 
before being killed by North Korean guerillas in 1968, was idolized; statues were erected 
in his memory and his edifying story was in Korean school textbooks.643 Moreover, the 
Park regime, having helped create widespread aversion to communism, turned this 
against the opposition within South Korea. Opponents of the regime, regardless of the 
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truth, were labeled as ‗communists‘ in order to justify the imposition of repressive 
measures.644 In these circumstances it seemed that the ideological gulf separating the 
two Koreas was widening and becoming entrenched. As far as the Park regime was 
concerned, North Korea was simply a puppet regime controlled by the Soviet Union. 
While the North Korean party organ described South Korea as a corrupted nation 
exploited by a military regime propped up by the United States.645  
 
Just before the Asian Games held at Teheran in 1974, the South Korean first lady was 
killed by a Korean resident of Japan at the National Theatre in Seoul on August 15, the 
twenty-ninth anniversary of the nation‘s liberation. It was reported  that the assassin, 
who had originally planned to kill the President, had been instructed and assisted by an 
official of a pro-North Korean association in Japan, and this further sharpened pre-
existing hostility towards North Korea.646  
 
Against this backdrop of intensified tension on the Korean Peninsula, it was inevitable 
that much attention was focused on the medal race between North and South Korea in 
Teheran and on football in particular. Kim Il Sung left North Korea‘s players in no doubt 
that they were expected to 'kill South Korean football‘; the regime‘s espionage service 
assisted the preparation by accessing all available films of their rivals in action.647 The 
first Korean derby since the war was of utmost importance to the South as well. 
‗Regardless whether we win the tournament or not‘, observed a monthly football 
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magazine, ‗we must not lose to the North‘.648 At first, the political pressure on the 
South Korean coach was such that he sought to avoid the possibility of being drawn 
into a match against the North. Key players were ‗rested‘ for a first-round match against 
Kuwait in order to avoid a North-South clash in round two and, at a later stage, there 
was a further ‗tactical retreat‘ in a match against Malaysia for the same reason.649  
 
It seems unlikely that these decisions would have been taken by the coach if he had not 
been under political pressure from nervous government officials. A North Korean club, 
April 25, including many North Korean internationals, had made a positive impression 
with a 4-0 victory over Japan in Tokyo six months before the Asian Game. After the 
match the Japanese coach conceded North Korea‘s superiority and praised their energy 
and power.650 KFA officials who had watched this friendly, however, were more confident, 
believing that the North Korean footballers played in a predictable and monotonous 
fashion reflecting the rigid structure of North Korean society and that this made them 
vulnerable.651 This ideological stereotyping of North Korean football in the South was 
very similar to the way in which an English journalist depicted Bulgarian football, after 
the Great Britain-Bulgaria Olympic qualifier in 1956. The Bulgarian team was described 
as ‗an automaton unable to extemporise, or adjust itself to changing circumstances‘.652 
Before the Asian Games, the South Korean coach stated that there was no reason to be 
afraid of North Korea and the team‘s captain was also very confident. Yet this was not 
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enough to convince the Park regime, already nervous after the assassination of the first 
lady, to expose South Korea to the risk of defeat, especially after the Games began and 
North Korea established a lead in the medals table.653 Thus it could be argued that the 
imperative to avoid a clash between the two Koreas on the football field could be 
traced to President Park‘s ‗morbid fear of assassination‘ by the North Koreans at the 
time.654  
 
It did not help that South Korean football faced other problems in this period when it 
found itself relatively isolated in terms of Asian sports diplomacy where an influential 
alliance linking North Korea, China and several Arab states had emerged. These 
countries colluded to boycott sports competitions involving Israel and succeeded in 
expelling both Israel and South Vietnam from the Asian Gymnastics Confederation in 
1974. Later in the same year they succeeded in expelling Israel and Taiwan from the 
AFC.655 South Korea‘s relations with Kuwait, one of the most ambitious Arab nations to 
use the wealth derived from higher oil prices to develop its football, were especially 
difficult. Not only had South Korea opposed the expulsion of Israel, it had also 
supported a Thai candidate rather than a Kuwaiti in the election of the FIFA vice-
president for Asia. This meant that the South Koreans were not invited to participate 
when Kuwait staged the 1975 Asian Youth Football Championship whereas both North 
Korea and China were invited to take part.656  
 
 
                                           
653 Wolgan Chukgu, Sept 1974, 25-26, 28, 31.  
654 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 51.  
655 Donga Ilbo, 11 Sept 1974; Wolgan Chukgu, Jan 1975, 22.  
656 Wolgan Chukgu, Jan 1975, 22-23.  
179 
 
In these circumstances – and particularly in view of the global oil crisis – it became 
important that South Korea should take steps to challenge the diplomatic ascendancy 
established by North Korea in the Middle East and here sport – especially football - had 
an important role. A diplomatic initiative by the Korea Amateur Sports Association 
(KASA) in 1975 saw coaches and players dispatched to various Middle East countries 
while extending invitations to Iran and Lebanon to play in the Park‘s Cup competition.657 
The South Korean youth football team played in international tournaments staged in 
Iran in 1975 and 1976. Perhaps the most important initiative was sending the national 
team to play friendly matches against Libya in 1976 as part of an initiative designed to 
establish diplomatic relations.658 These diplomatic overtures using football helped to 
pave the way for Korean companies seeking to benefit from the construction boom in 
the Middle East, thus helping to increase South Korea‘s overseas earnings 
enormously.659 
 
Football rivalry between South and North Korea was renewed on the pitch in 1976 in 
the semi-final of the Asian Youth Football Championship at Bangkok. When the match 
ended with a 1-0 win for North Korea, the president of the KFA declared: ‗it does not 
matter who wins or who loses as we are all Koreans‘. This, however, was merely 
diplomatic rhetoric. There was a delay of thirty minutes before kick-off while the North 
Koreans argued that one of their team, who had accumulated two yellow cards in 
previous matches, should be allowed to play.  The match was won by a controversial 
goal, scored while the South Korean goalkeeper was on the ground having been hit by 
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the North Korean striker.660 In South Korea, newspapers rebuked North Korea‘s foul play 
and criticized the Malaysian referee, while praising of good sportsmanship of their own 
players for accepting a wrong decision.661 Chosun Ilbo complained that the match had 
not been televised in South Korea, thus denying viewers the opportunity of witnessing 
for themselves the ungentlemanly conduct and rough play of the North Koreans.662  In 
contrast, the North Korean newspaper Nodong Shinmun criticized the South Korean 
players who had surrounded the referee to protest at the end of the game, ‗evoking 
criticism and mockery from the crowd‘.663 It was clear that passions still ran high and 
that the prospects for further football contacts at senior international level had not 
been helped.  
 
Four months after this clash, it was confirmed that North and South Korea had been 
drawn in the same qualifying group for the 1978 World Cup.664 However, a few months 
later, North Korea withdrew from the tournament, a decision prompted largely by 
political considerations; it was clear that the regime was unhappy at the prospect of 
high-profile matches against both South Korea and Israel. 665  There was another 
important factor which explained the North‘s withdrawal. After the North Koreans had 
killed two American officers near the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom on 18 August 
1976 tensions on the peninsula were heightened to an extent that there was a danger 
of full-scale war.666 Although a statement of regret by Kim Il Sung brought this crisis to 
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an end in September, it seems to have been enough to have left North Korean football 
on the sidelines as the regime was forced to concentrate on making preparations for 
war in response to joint South Korea-USA military exercises while, at the same time, 
hunting down potential enemies within its own borders, such as Moon Ki Nam, 
stigmatized as a suspected person, who was excluded from the national team.667  
 
Thus it was not until 1978 that North-South football rivalry was resumed, initially at the 
Asian Youth Football Championship in Bangladesh, a tournament that became notorious 
for the number of over-aged players that were fielded. Over half the North Korean 
players, for example, were over twenty years of age.668 Before the match, Donga Ilbo 
predicted that the South Korean side, though younger than their opponents, would 
triumph on account of their superior technique.669 As it transpired, the match went to a 
penalty shoot-out which was won by South Korea thanks to a save by their goalkeeper, 
who became an instant national hero and was rewarded financially by the KFA, Hanil 
Bank (his club) and also his old school.670 This indicates the importance attached to this 
match in South Korea. Although it was not a senior international, the match provided 
evidence of the ideological gulf separating the two Koreas. When a South Korean 
forward protested to the referee in English after a rough tackle, the North Korean 
defender shouted: ‗Son of a bitch, do not speak the language of imperialism 
(English)‘671 The North Koreans sought, wherever possible, to avoid using the same 
language as the Americans, whom they saw as their enemy and North Korean sports 
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authorities had made efforts to Koreanize sports terminology from the 1960s 
onwards.672  
 
However, this match at youth international level served merely as a prelude to the clash 
between North and South Korea in the final of Asian Games football tournament at 
Bangkok two months later.  After an intense struggle with numerous chances to score 
wasted by both sides the match ended as a 0-0   draw and the championship was 
shared.673 In the eyes of both Koreans and foreigners, the sight of the rival captains, 
smiling and with their arms around each other‘s shoulders, sharing the Asian Games‘ 
podium was a cause for celebration given the hostility usually associated with North-
South relations.674 But it was a merely brief show for the benefit of press photographers. 
Before they posed for the cameras, there had been a tussle between the two captains 
as they tried to push each other off the winner‘s podium.675 The captain of South Korea, 
Kim Ho Gon, recalled later that his first impulse had been to hit his North Korean 
counterpart, but he had suppressed this instinct and suggesting that they posed in a 
friendly fashion.676 There was disappointment among South Koreans, who had watched 
the nail-biting match on TV and were disappointed with the result, their team having 
dominated the play.677 However, few North Koreans were aware of that the match had 
taken place. Nodong Shinmun simply reported that North Korea had won a gold medal 
for football at the Asian Games and did not give any details of the final against the 
                                           
672 Kyunghyang Shinmun, 10 Sept 1990.  
673 Donga Ilbo, 21, Dec, 1978. 
674 Bangkok Post, 21, Dec, 1978; Kyunghyang Shinmun, 21, Dec, 1978.  
675 Chosun Ilbo, 7 Feb 1979.  
676 Chukgu Gajok(Football Family), July 1993, 39; Pressian, 14 Mar 2008.   





In football terms the Asian Games final was important in helping South Korea to 
overcome the fear of North Korea which had persisted since the World Cup of 1966. As 
the game progressed, the North Korean side was found to be way behind of their 
Southern opponents in every aspect, save for speed.679 When North and South met 
again, two years later, in the semi-finals of the Asian Cup, most South Korean 
newspapers predicted victory for their team and the players approached the match in a 
relaxed and confident way, even when their opponents took the lead, eventually 
winning 2-1.680 For Chosun Ilbo this was ‗the best day for [South] Korean football‘, 
especially as the team had been cheered on by 7,000 South Koreans waving national 
flags, most of them working at the time as labourers in Kuwait. There was enormous 
interest in the match in South Korea with half the nation‘s television sets tuned in for 
the live transmission at 1.30 am.681 This coverage was not matched in North Korea 
where the newspapers tended to file reports only after their representatives had 
achieved a good result. Thus matches between North and South Korean club sides in 
the King‘s Cup tournaments held in Thailand, where the North Koreans tended to be 
more successful, were reported in the North Korean press, but attracted less attention in 
South Korea where interest focused primarily on the national team.682  
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(2) Rapprochement on the football field  
 
Gorbachev‘s Glasnost reforms in the Soviet Union and Deng Xiaoping‘s pragmatism 
embarrassed the North Korean leadership, since these policies propelled them into a 
situation where it was no longer possible simply to ignore South Korea. As South 
Korea‘s economy boomed – it made the important transition in the late 1980s from 
being an aid-receiving to an aid-dispensing country – its growing economic importance 
helped to make this position untenable.683 Given the emergence of South Korea as a 
significant regional and global economic force neither China nor the Soviet Union could 
afford to allow ideological considerations and old loyalties to determine policy in 
dealing with the two Koreas. Sport provided one route to building better relationships 
and this was underlined by so-called ‗tennis diplomacy‘ when China permitted South 
Korean tennis players to compete on its soil for the first time in 1984.684 Moreover, with 
the Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988 emphasizing South Korea‘s new status in the world, 
the Soviet Union and its East European allies ignored North Korean appeals to boycott 
the event. Cuba was the only athletically significant communist state to boycott the 
1988 Games.685 
 
Changing attitudes within South Korea itself from the 1980s onwards were also 
important as the idea that their Northern neighbours were simply a ruthless enemy 
regime driven by communism became less prevalent. Instead, increasingly, South 
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Koreans were more inclined to treat people in the North as their blood brothers. These 
changed attitudes were very evident when thirty-five separated families were briefly 
reunited in 1985 for the first time since the split.686 Four years later, Jung Ju Young, 
president of Hyundai, a South Korean conglomerate, visited Pyongyang to explore the 
possibilities of economic cooperation between the two Koreas. It was especially 
significant to find the corporate sector taking the lead in this respect.687  
 
This changing mood was also seen in football. There is anecdotal evidence of 
fraternization between North and South at some tournaments in the early 1980s with 
footballers exchanging banter and food. According to two former South Korean football 
internationals, Choi Jong Duk and Jung Yong Hwan, Southern footballers sometimes 
gave presents or hard currency to Northerners with whom they formed friendships in 
the 1980s and 1990s.688 It helped, of course, that during this period the fear of war 
decreased dramatically, partly because of the end of the Cold war following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, partly because North Korea was now economically weak and 
politically isolated.689 It was significant in this new situation that North Korean were no 
longer viewed as a major competitive threat in the South. When, in the 1986 King‘s Cup, 
the South Korean youth team was defeated by what was virtually the North Korean 
national side there was so little interest in the game that none of the Southern 
broadcasting companies covered it. One South Korean newspaper argued that this was 
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a backward step and requested that all future sporting encounters between South and 
North should be televised, pointing out that ‗South Korean sports‘ power is now by far 
superior to that of the North‘; moreover, South Koreans were now sufficiently mature to 
separate politics and sports.690  
 
It is also important to note that the first indications of anti-Americanism surfaced in 
South Korea during in the 1980s partly because the pro-American military government 
used its military force to stamp down on demonstrations. The regime‘s brutal 
suppression (with American connivance) of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 
1980, for instance, claimed the lives of thousands of citizens.691 Anti-Americanism was 
very evident amongst Korean spectators during the Seoul Olympics in 1988. The 
ungracious behaviour of some American athletes and an American broadcasting 
company‘s distorted coverage of a South Korean boxer stoked up such sentiments. As 
Robert Edelman has noted, the South Koreans were ‗quick to emphasize the contrast 
with the well mannered‘ Soviet athletes and to ‗assert their independence from their 
American masters‘.692 Thus South Korean crowds rooted wildly for the Soviet basketball 
players in the 1988 Olympic final and barracked the Americans ‗to the shock and 
dismay of many American viewers‘.693  
 
During this period there is evidence of the South Korean people drawing closer to 
North Korea in an unprecedented fashion as the traditionally intimate relationship 
between South Korea and the United States came under pressure. The extent to which 
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attitudes were changing was illustrated by a nationwide public opinion poll in 1990 in 
which eighty-two per cent of South Koreans indicated that they would support North 
Korean football team if it took on an American team.694 The atmosphere of Korean 
derby was also changing. There were no violent tackles when South and North met in 
the qualifying round of the 1990 World Cup. The coaches exchanged information on 
the other teams in the group and their squads exchanged mutual good wishes and 
spoke of ‗going to Rome together ‘.695 This amiable mood continued into 1990 and the 
resumption of friendly matches between South and North was announced days before 
the opening of Asian Games in Beijing.696 Chosun Ilbo, the original sponsors of the 
Gyung-Pyong Football Championship by reminding its readers of the address delivered 
by the newspaper ‘s vice-president before the first tournament played in 1929 during 
the Japanese occupation: ‗This football event should not only be celebrated as a game, 
but be blessed to promote good fellowship between Pyongyang and Gyungsung, the 
two biggest cities in Chosun‘.697  
 
The ‗Unification Football Championship‘ between North and South represented the 
revival of Gyung-Pyong Football Championship after a fifty-four year gap, was 
everything that the founders of this patriotic football spectacle in Japanese era would 
have wished. The two matches played in 1990 were notable in that very little attention 
was paid to the outcome; the occasion was regarded as more significant than the result. 
When the North Korean referee awarded a dubious penalty to the home team in the 
match at Pyongyang many in the 150,000 crowd were as baffled as the South Korean 
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players and there was little celebration when the kick was converted to secure a 1-1 
draw.698 There was little partisanship amongst South Korean spectators at the return 
match in the Olympic Stadium in Seoul. When South Korea opened the scoring, there 
were cries from the crowd urging North Korea to ‗score an equalizer!‘699  
      
However, not all was sweetness and light and there were some indications, even during 
the tournament, that the North Korean government was anxious. When some South 
Korean newspapers published articles criticizing the secretive nature of the regime in 
the North Nodong Shinmun responded angrily arguing that such comments might lead 
to their team refusing to play the match in Seoul. 700  It also complained that 
government officials had intervened to prevent North Korean journalists from 
interviewing ordinary South Korean citizens. Indeed, reports in Donga Ilbo suggest that 
the South Korean government may have been heavy-handed in this respect.701 However, 
it seems likely that the regime in the North was already starting to backtrack and was 
finding reasons to reject the idea that North-South friendly matches should be played 
on a regular basis.702 They may have feared that annual visits to Seoul would shake the 
loyalty of North Korean footballers by bringing them into contact with the capitalist 
world. Some North Korean women footballers, who had rarely traveled abroad, had 
returned home from the South having realized that much of the information about their 
neighbours that they were routinely fed by the Pyongyang regime was false. They had 
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shed tears when departing from Seoul.703  
 
Despite these developments the Ministry of Sports in South Korea fell in behind the 
government policy which was to promote cultural and sports exchanges with the North. 
Over-riding the KFA‘s objections, the Ministry pushed ahead with plans to set up a 
women‘s national team.704 The aim, as the Minister of Sports admitted, was to send a 
South Korean women‘s national team to the 1990 Asian Games in the hope that this 
would be favourably regarded by the North and lead to more friendly matches. At this 
time, while North Korean men‘s football was slightly inferior to that of the South, its 
women‘s football was superior, as was proved in the Asian Games when the hastily-
assembled South Korean team were crushed 7-0 by their North Korean sisters. 705 The 
South Korean plan was that women‘s matches should be played as curtain-raisers 
before the friendly matches between the men‘s teams that they hoped would become 
regular fixtures but, ironically, this was ruled out at the last minute owing to the North‘s 
consideration for the South.706 The South Korean female footballers were sacrificed on 
the altar of North-South politics.  Seven of the team that had lost so heavily to North 
Korea were dropped and replaced by good-looking and cultivated college footballers in 
preparation for public appearances in North Korea.707 However, after the matches were 
cancelled, the South Korean women‘s team faded into insignificance.   
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It is worthy of notice that the contrasting playing styles of North and South were much 
discussed during the Unification Football Championship of 1990. At a press conference 
held prior to the match in Seoul, the North Korean coach stressed ‗stamina‘ while the 
South Korean coach emphasized ‗individual skills‘.708 The different approaches to the 
game styles that had made the Gyung-Pyong Championship so interesting in the 
Japanese era was very apparent in both the matches played.709 However, the extent to 
which the playing styles of the two teams actually differed is a matter of opinion based 
on a subjective view of how the matches were played. Only a few years earlier, in 1984, 
a Singapore daily, reporting a match between Kuwait and South Korea, had described 
the South Korean football style as being based on strength and stamina rather than 
skills: ‗The contrasting styles of the two teams [was visible] as they maximized their 
respective strengths for a 90-minute parade of skill and vision by [Kuwait] versus the 
sheer sweat [of South Korea]‘.710 We must be careful not to exaggerate the differences 
between North and South Korean football in this respect. 
 
Despite North Korea‘s anxieties its relatively isolated position meant that the Kim 
regime was prepared to continue developing sporting links with the South and to go 
further in this direction than at any time since partition. Thus it was in 1991 that a great 
enthusiasm for unified North-South teams engulfed the Korean Peninsula. In April, 
athletes from the North and South competed as one team in the World Table Tennis 
Championships and won the women‘s team event. In June, a unified team played in the 
FIFA Youth Championship in Portugal, reaching the quarter-finals after having defeated 
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Argentina, against all odds.711 The symbolic significance of the success achieved by a 
unified team which could be appreciated on both sides of the border had obvious 
political implications in terms of reunification. This success, as Chosun Ilbo has pointed 
out, was taken as a sort of unification in South Korea.712 The North Koreans expressed 
great expectation for the team by rooting for them under the catchphrase of ‗Korea 
dashing for the goal of unification‘.713 When the unification team won over Argentina, a 
Pro-North Korean daily published in Tokyo, Chosun Shinbo underscored that good 
combination play between North and South Korean footballers was a decisive factor for 
the victory.714 However there were also some problems. The policy of drafting equal 
numbers of North and South Korean players into the squad without taking into account 
the differing levels of skills became the subject of press criticism; it was argued that it 
was essentially a political strategy which meant that the team selected were weaker 
than they should have been.715 There were also complaints against North Korea in the 
South because some North Korean players were withdrawn from the unified squad in 
order to prepare for forthcoming Olympic qualifying matches leaving the unified team 
weakened.716  
 
Indeed, where it was in its interests, North Korea continued to operate as a separate 
football power notably by agreeing to send its senior international team to Washington 
in October 1991 to play in an exhibition match against an American team that had 
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been arranged by a Pyongyang-born soccer enthusiast living in New York. At the time 
this fitted in with North Korea‘s strategy of seeking better relations with the United 
States in order to compensate for the allies it had lost in the communist world.717 
However, the outcome from North Korea‘s point of view was disappointing and the US 
State Department went to some lengths to downplay the significance of the event. ‗This 
game is valuable for both sides‘, commented a State Department official, ‗but in terms 
of a political dimension … this is not Ping-Pong diplomacy‖‗ 718  With the Bush 
administration preoccupied with problems in the Middle East following the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and continuing to exert pressure regarding the nuclear issue, the 
North Korean government achieved a lot less than it had hoped for when agreeing to 
the match.719  
 
Though victory achieved away from home against the American enemy had enormous 
ideological significance in North Korea, other aspects of the trip to the United States 
were important in terms of football development. For the first time, the North Koreans 
had a foreigner on the bench in a coaching capacity. Pal Csernai, who had fled from his 
native Hungary to West Germany in the 1950s and then coached Bayern Munich, was 
hired as a technical adviser to in 1991720  This development was highly significant in 
terms of North Korean sports policy and culture. From the late 1980s the regime in 
North Korea was increasingly adopting open-door policies and embracing some aspects 
of capitalism. This was exemplified by the opening of a golf course in 1987, the 
inauguration of an international football tournament with money prizes in 1990, and 
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building a leisure amenity in 1994 to entice foreign tourists.721 Yet, more fundamental 
change, such as granting North Korean players the same freedom of movement as that 
enjoyed by the many East European players who had found foreign clubs, was still a 
step too far.   
 
(3) The Bad boys and Red devils  
 
In the 1970s North Korea became notorious in world football circles for its belligerence 
towards opponents and vehement protests, sometimes involving physical violence, when 
contesting a referee‘s decisions.722 The most violent case in this decade came in the 
Montreal Olympics, where a North Korean footballer struck the referee during a match 
with the Soviet Union, incurring a one-year FIFA ban from international football.723 
Nothing, however, could match the violence which followed North Korea‘s semi-final 
defeat by Kuwait during the Asian Games at New Delhi in 1982. The North Korean 
players were angry with the referee who had awarded a penalty against them in a tight 
match which they lost 3-2. At the final whistle North Korean footballers, officials and 
supporters attacked the referee with chairs and flag-posts. Despite the efforts of lathi-
wielding Indian policemen to rescue the referee, he was badly beaten up and his face 
started bleeding.724 To make matters worse this incident was soon embroiled in a larger 
controversy over bribery allegations when the Thai referee, Vijit Ketkaew, who had been 
so brutally assaulted, related that he had been approached by the North Koreans and 
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given a vase and a bottle of liquor, but that he had rejected their request for favourable 
treatment.725 This was followed by a counter-allegation from a North Korean official 
who claimed that Vijit had accepted a 15,000 dollar bribe from Kuwait; they also 
revealed that they had asked for the referee to be changed after he had appeared to 
favour Kuwait in their quarter-final tie against Iran.726  
 
Although the truth or otherwise of these allegations remains unresolved there were 
widespread suspicions that Arab nations were trying to ‗buy‘ referees. During the match 
the sympathies of the Indian spectators had been with the North Koreans rather than 
the ‗oil-rich‘ Kuwaitis. A Times of India report noted that the 50,000 crowd had ‗cheered 
the North Koreans‘ and demanded that the match be replayed.727 Significantly, the 
South Korean press was also sympathetic to the North; this was an indication of how 
attitudes were beginning to change at this time. Dong Ilbo observed that whenever any 
national team played against an Arab oil-producing country, they were in effect playing 
against ‗fourteen men‘, including one referee and two linesmen. It went on to argue 
that any referee coming from an underdeveloped nation was particularly susceptible to 
accepting a bribe paid in ‗petrol money‘.728 These comments were no doubt influenced 
by memories of a controversial World Cup qualifying match between South Korea and 
Kuwait a year earlier when a referee from Colombia had controversially disallowed a 
South Korean equalizer and ‗raised some protest from the Korean players‘.729  
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The dispute over how the North Korean rampage would be penalized continued for 
some time. At first, the local organizing committee for the Asian Games suggested that 
the matter should wait until the president of FIFA arrived in New Delhi. However, 
Thailand‘s AFC representative rejected this outright, claiming that, ‗The Indian authorities, 
instead of accepting the blame for their poor security measures, [were] now trying to 
find execuses [sic] to save a political friend [North Korea]‘.730 It seems likely, in this 
instance, however, that it was the prospect of cancelling the third-place match, which 
was expected to attract a crowd of over 70,000, rather than favouritism towards North 
Korea which was critical. If North Korea had been expelled from the tournament and 
the third-place match cancelled the organizing committee would have been obliged to 
refund those who had already bought tickets and it was anxious to avoid the financial 
loss that would have resulted.731  
 
Whatever the provocation North Korea‘s violence could not go unpunished and the AFC 
imposed a two-year ban from international football, a decision later confirmed by 
FIFA.732 Predictably, the North Koreans viewed this as harsh and unfair, arguing that it 
was not North Korea but the referee who should be punished.733 Inevitably, the two-
year ban would consign North Korean football to the doldrums but it was also clear 
that its reputation had been seriously damaged by these events. A North Korean 
deputation apologized to the President of Thailand for the misconduct of its players 
and officials and secured an assurance that the matter would sooner or later be 
forgotten but the incident had provided its critics with an open goal. ‗China won the 
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most gold medals for its athletic prowess‘, noted a Thai newspaper as the Asian Games 
drew to a close, ‗but if they gave one for rotten sportsmanship it would go to North 
Korea‘.734 For a number of years the North Koreans had to live with the reputation of 
being the ‗bad boys‘ of Asian football and, when they resumed international matches 
after 1984, refurbishing their tarnished image was as important as achieving success on 
the field. This was still the situation in 1989, as the Straits Times indicated prior to the 
World Cup qualifying tournament held in Singapore.735  
 
North Korean terrorist acts in the 1980s reinforced this negative image originating from 
the football field. In 1983, during a state visit to Burma, seventeen high-ranking officials 
accompanying the South Korean President died when a bomb planted by North Korean 
army captains was detonated. 736  In 1987, in another shocking act of terrorism 
committed by North Korea, a bomb exploded on Korean Air Lines flight 858 claiming 
115 lives. It seems likely that these terrorist atrocities were the North Korean regime‘s 
way of responding to the enhanced economic and political status that South Korea was 
beginning to experience, especially after the decision in 1981 to award the 1988 
Olympic Games to Seoul. Oberdorfer has argued that the aim of bombing the South 
Korean airliner was to ‗dissuade the nations of the world from participating in the Seoul 
Olympics‘.737  
 
The violence at the New Delhi football stadium could not be disassociated from their 
intimidating social climate in which terror schemes targeting South Korea were 
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frequently laid out by the North Korean leadership. North Korean athletes must have 
come under pressure to win against their compatriots in the 1982 Asian Games. But the 
gap between the two Koreas in the medal race in 1982 was much wider in comparison 
with that in the previous Asian Games. In 1978, the gap had been only three gold 
medals; in 1982 it was eleven.738 It was for this reason that the head of North Korean 
contingent to the Asian Games expressed great disappointment at how poorly his 
athletes performed. ‗The sportsmen‘, he said, ‗had failed to come up to expectation in 
football, boxing, weightlifting and shooting‘. 739  Moreover, North Korea had been 
defeated by South Korea in all head-to-head clashes in the five team events at New 
Delhi.740 It seems possible that these humiliations heaped additional pressure on the 
North Korean footballers as they approached the semi-final. At home they were ‗treated 
as if they were senior party cadre‘, enjoying a relatively high standard of living with 
luxury cars and apartments They also enjoyed the privilege of frequent trips overseas. In 
these circumstances much rested on achieving success in football which could 
compensate for North Korean failures in other sports.741 Thus, when this face-saving 
mission was thwarted by a controversial refereeing decision, the North Korean team and 
their officials over-reacted.742  
 
Ironically, the two-year ban on North Korea playing any match under the jurisdiction of 
the AFC and FIFA immediately provided a great opportunity for South Korea, whose 
under-20 team was picked to take their place in the final round of the Asian youth 
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tournament in 1982. Although it had been defeated by the North in the Asian 
qualifying competition the South Korean side was thus given the unexpected 
opportunity to reach the final stages of the FIFA World Youth Championship in Mexico 
as a representative of Asia.743 The South Korean team seized their chance and reached 
the semi-finals in Mexico, the country‘s best achievement to date in any FIFA 
competition, a feat which generated enormous public interest back home. Almost 
eighty-four per cent of people in Seoul watched the South Korea-Brazil semi-final live 
on television; the usual morning rush-hour traffic was absent and pigeons were said to 
have basked in the sunshine on the abnormally quiet roads.744 On their return home 
the team was awarded the Medal of Sports by President Jeon Du Whan and the players 
were showered with gifts, such as colour television sets and refrigerators, by various 
South Korean conglomerates. 745  As far as the President was concerned the team‘s 
achievements in Mexico justified the government‘s policy of using sport to pursue the 
wider goal of modernization because it signaled that South Korea was capable of 
leaping the gap between the Third World and the First.746 Their success in reaching the 
semi-finals fully justified underwriting the additional expenditure that had been required 
to send the team to Mexico fifteen days early so that they would become acclimatized 
before the competition got under way.747 South Korea now designated itself a ‗sports 
republic‘ as the government obsessively pursued a policy of using sport to raise the 
national profile ahead of the 1988 Seoul Olympics. 748  
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After South Korea had lost to Scotland in their first game, Jeon – who had played as 
goalkeeper for the Korean Military Academy – advised that ‗more training and study‘ 
were required to achieve success against physically powerful and high skilled teams 
from the West.749 However, the team did not need his advice. It was in this competition 
that a distinctive, up-tempo South Korean style of play was clearly manifested to the 
world. As far as the Mexican press was concerned the South Koreans were the ‗Red 
Devils‘ – a less sensational and mysterious version of the North Korean ‗Red Mosquitos‘ 
of 1966; they played in a similar style and achieved similarly unexpected results.750 FIFA 
President Dr Joao Havelange was particularly delighted at the success of one of the 
lesser-known football nations, praising their swift attack relying on wing play. 751  It 
helped to promote his agenda that FIFA‘s international competitions should be 
characterized by a ‗genuine challenge from all corners of the earth‘; it had been hoped, 
when the World Youth Championship had been established that it would encourage 
genuine world competition.752  
 
It is worth noting that the performance of the ‗Red Devils‘ was basically based on 
building physical fitness through a concentrated preparatory training programme lasting 
forty-six days, in which the footballers wore masks for an hour per day so that they 
would be able to endure oxygen deficiency in the extreme altitude of Mexico.753 The 
South Koreans owed much to the charismatic leadership of the coach, Park Jong Whan, 
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whose preparations for the tournament were meticulous; he even arranged for them to 
train on artificial grass when most South Korean clubs and players had access only to 
clay surfaces.754 Park Jong Whan‘s tireless running game based on physical strength 
succeeded in getting the best out of some rather mediocre players, but it had its 
limitations. One editorial complained that South Korea played ‗uneconomical football‘ 
which meant that the team tended to become exhausted as the match went on. 
However, it was also accepted that the style adopted by the Red Devils may have been 
the only way in which South Korea could compete effectively against bigger and more 
skilful players from Europe and South America.755 Again this seemed to owe something 
to the approach adopted by North Korea in the 1966 World Cup.  
 
It may be significant that Park Jong Whan was less successful at senior level. Even 
though, at his request, many of the young players who had competed so well in Mexico 
were included in the senior international squad, South Korea failed to qualify for the 
1984 Olympics in Los Angeles.756 Five veteran footballers revolted against his Spartan 
training methods and left the training camp after complaining of the coach‘s favouritism 
towards the younger players.757 Most of them were recalled, but it was an unhappy 
omen and the attempt to combine old and new in the national team was a failure.758 It 
did not help that referees appeared to continue favouring teams from the Middle East. 
The Asian qualifying round in which nine nations competed saw three Middle East 
teams securing the Olympic spots, while four South and Far Eastern nations were 
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eliminated. 759  The footballers from the Middles East, particularly Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia were noted for their individual skills, rapidly developed under the guidance of 
Brazilian coaches. 760  However, this round was marked by controversies surrounding 
refereeing decisions, all of them in matches played by countries from the Middle East.761 
Saudi Arabia, in particular, was suspected of bribery allegations and, prior to the crucial 
Saudi Arabia-South Korea match the media in Seoul predicted that the referee would be 
the most important factor in deciding the outcome. 762  This proved correct. In a 
dramatic game, Saudi Arabia was awarded two controversial penalties and ran out 5-4 
winners. There were complaints that ‗South Korea had won the game, but lost to petrol 
money‘.763  
 
(4) The professionalization of South Korean football 
  
The most noteworthy change in South Korean football in the 1980s was the 
inauguration of a professional league in 1983. This shift, along with the 
professionalization of baseball a year earlier, was made possible by the Jeon military 
regime‘s intention to use sports entertainment as a medium of social control as it 
sought to alleviate political tensions simmering after the Gwangju Democratization 
Movement in 1980. 764 Thousands of protesters in the south-western city had been 
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angered when their charismatic local politician, Kim Dae Jung, was arrested after it had 
been alleged that he was connected with a pro-North Korean organization. They did 
not trust the regime, which was largely led by south-easterners, and in the ensuing 
clashes many people were brutally murdered by the armed forces.765 It was hoped that 
professional sport would help to distract the attention of the population from an 
unpopular government. 
 
It has to be said, however, that the KFA had its own reasons for promoting a 
professional league and these dovetailed with the regime‘s broad strategy. It was 
becoming imperative that the problem of footballers‘ pay, which had become an 
embarrassing source of discontent, should be addressed. Dissatisfaction had come to 
the fore after Cha Bum Keun was transferred to the West German professional league in 
1979 and his handsome salary became a much discussed   topic in the South Korean 
media.766 Many footballers in the South Korean national team became ambitious to go 
to abroad and one resigned in order to move to a club in the Hong Kong semi-
professional league where financial rewards were higher. Anxious about the prospect of 
a ‗brawn-drain‘ which would deplete the national team of its star players, Choi Soon 
Young, president of KFA, pledged to found a professional club in Korea within a year.767  
 
It was under these circumstances that Hallelujah, South Korea‘s first professional football 
club, came into being in 1980. The Hallelujah football team was largely made up of 
evangelical Christian footballers and enjoyed the financial backing of Choi, a devout 
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Christian and the head of a conglomerate. This religious football club provided its 
footballers with an exceptionally good salary, compared with that of bank teams, but 
preaching the gospel was as important to the Christian footballers as making money.768 
Some Hallelujah players who eagerly devoted themselves to the propagation of 
Christianity left the team when   its training programme began to interrupt their 
missionary work. 769   With other company-sponsored professional clubs joining the 
league one after another, Hallelujah transformed itself into an amateur club in 1985. 
Choi claimed that he anxious that it should focus on ‗its original object of missionary 
work‘.770 However, the real reason for this decision was that Choi‘s company had run 
into financial difficulties.771 Nevertheless, it is important to stress that Hallelujah paved 
the way for the birth of other professional football clubs backed by conglomerates.  
 
South Korean businesses played an important part in developing elite sport in the 
1980s, a decade that saw many Chaebols (owners of South Korean conglomerates) 
assume leading positions in various sports associations which had   hitherto been 
dominated by politicians and technocrats. Choi had set the trend   when he took over 
the management of the KFA in 1979.772 By 1983, no less than thirty out of a total of 
thirty-five sports associations were being run by Chaebols. Their financial contribution 
proved critical in helping South Korean athletes gain medals more than had been 
expected in the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics in Seoul.773 The regime 
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encouraged the Chaebols to become involved and they poured a vast amount of 
money into the development of elite sports in this period while also providing the 
necessary financial assistance for the staging of prestigious sporting mega events. In 
return the Chaebols were awarded building contracts for new stadia and associated 
infrastructure improvements.774  
 
The professionalization of South Korean football was also much dependent upon 
Chaebols, who founded new clubs such as Hallelujah, Daewoo, Yukong, LG, and Hyundai. 
These clubs and the publicity they attracted helped to raise public awareness of the 
enterprises with which they were associated but all of them were run at a loss, a 
problem which generated some concerns regarding the extravagance of the Chaebols 
as they poured their money into football.775 However, despite these losses, such was the 
commercial rivalry between the various Chaebols that they continued to invest money 
in professional football. The rivalry between Hyundai and Daewoo, the two front-runners 
of South Korean automobile industry, was particularly intense as they fought each other 
to recruit the most talented players, notably Kim Jong Bu, poached by Daewoo just as 
he was about to finalize a contract with Hyundai in November 1987. This incident 
prompted the Hyundai club to disband in protest, though this dramatic decision was 
reversed a month later.776  
 
Television was another important influence and helped to make professional sports a 
national spectacle in an age of rising consumerism. As living standards improved the 
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number of colour TV sets in use increased by three million between 1982 to 1986, 
allowing the Korean middle-classes to consume professional sports in the comfort of 
their own homes. Previously it had been customary to watch televised live sporting 
events at Dabang and other communal places.777 KBS, the South Korean broadcasting 
company, eagerly supported professional football; all televised professional football 
matches were broadcast exclusively on KBS in 1983 and 1984. 778 Its main rival, MBC, 
founded a professional baseball club and paid enormous fees for the rights to 
broadcast as many professional baseball games as possible. 779  The intense rivalry 
between broadcasters resulted in a deluge of sports programmes on television which 
was much criticized by intellectuals opposed to the Jeon regime who regarded it as a 
sinister development.780 Expanded television coverage was matched by newspapers. Not 
only did the space allocated to sport by the dailies increase but two new specialist 
sports newspapers were founded in the 1980s, making three in all.781 By virtue of this 
expansion, South Korean dailies were increasingly inundated with articles pertaining to 
professional sports and developed a particular interest in stories about players’ private 
lives not covered by television.782 It was the 1980s that the sports pages of the popular 
press in South Korea, to borrow a description a change which had occurred in English 
daily newspapers in the 1960s, were turned into a ‘kind of sports magazine’.783  
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After professional baseball was successfully launched in 1982, the South Korean football 
authorities hastily sought to set up a professional league to compete for the people’s 
attention. They needed to find a way of increasing   poor attendances; no domestic 
club match in 1982 attracted a crowd of more than 8,000. 784  The first year of 
professional football saw some success in this respect with attendances averaging 
10,000 per game, a significant increase in popularity which was partly attributable to 
keeping ticket prices low and providing fans with more free gifts than baseball.785 
However, in stark contrast to baseball which grew increasingly popular, it proved 
impossible to sustain this improvement in match attendances.786 The main reason for 
the failure to attract larger crowds was that the interests of the clubs were secondary to 
those of the national team. With three important international tournaments in the 1980s 
– the World Cup in Mexico and the Asian Games in Seoul in 1986 and the 1988 
Olympic tournament, also in Seoul – the needs of the national team were a priority. This 
meant that clubs in the professional league were often without their star players and 
consequently the competition failed to capture the public imagination.787  
 
When the national team had to play World Cup qualifying matches in 1985, it was 
decided to cut the number of league fixtures.788 With attendances falling, many club 
owners argued that the league should be abandoned until early November, the end of 
the qualifying matches. However, this change of schedule would bring its own problems 
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because it would be more difficult to attract fans during the cold winter months.789 
Normally the professional football season in South Korea ran from spring to autumn. 
These intractable problems were compounded in 1986 when star players joined the 
national squad for training in March, just after the start of the season, and were free to 
play only three games for their clubs before rejoining the national team in July for the 
Asian Games. Attendances in 1986 was no more than 1,000 per game and professional 
football clubs were turned into a ‘circus troupe’ entertaining small crowds in small 
towns as they were denied access to larger stadiums in big cities which had been 
designated as football venues for the Asian Games.790      
 
In these circumstances it was not surprising that the professional clubs did not take root 
and there are virtually no instances of football clubs being adopted by locals as ‘their 
team’. It did not help that there was a regional imbalance with no professional club 
established in the south-west; all six professional football clubs were based either in 
Seoul or in the large ports of the south-east.791 Moreover, the league did not help itself 
by failing to establish a regular programme of home and away fixtures until 1986.792 
Unlike professional baseball where most players were appearing for their local team, 
there were very few home-grown footballers with whom local fans could identify. In the 
absence of local patriotic support, the popularity of football clubs was far less than that 
enjoyed by baseball teams.793 In reality, by the 1980s, professional football had too 
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much ground to make up. From the 1970s onwards the popular enthusiasm for high 
school baseball was immense. Four high school baseball tournaments sponsored by 
major newspapers were well established and attracted large attendances and extensive 
media coverage, while high school football did not appeal to the public at all. 794 
Winning a major baseball tournament catapulted a school and its team into public 
prominence and enhanced local pride. High school baseball rather than football thus 
became the focal point for local communities. This local passion for baseball and its 
accompanying regional rivalry, particularly between the south-east and south-west, 
provided a framework in which professional baseball could flourish and establish itself 
as South Korea’s most popular sport.795  
 
(5) The 1986 World Cup and the making of ‘FC Korea’  
 
Qualifying for the World Cup finals was an elusive dream for South Korea during the 
1970s, although much effort was made to fulfill this ambition. However, the possibility 
to reach the finals grew in the 1980s as the result of the expansion of the finals from a 
sixteen to a twenty-four-team contest in which Asia/Oceania and Africa’s representation 
doubled to two countries apiece.796 This change had been proposed by Havelange 
partly to attract support from African and Asian countries in the FIFA Presidential 
Election of 1974.797 There was much apprehension in Europe when the new format was 
announced in 1979 and fears that it would dilute the quality of the competition. British 
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journalist Brian Glanville was especially outspoken and rebuked Havelange for selling 
World Cup finals places to the ‗Afro-Asians and their ilk‘.798 However, South Korea again 
failed to qualify for the 1982 World Cup in Spain, with Kuwait eventually advancing to 
the finals as the Asian representative along with New Zealand representing Oceania. 
For the first time World Cup matches were broadcast via color TV in South Korea, albeit 
recordings rather than live transmission, and this enhanced interest in the tournament, 
even though, as one newspaper editorial lamented, it was only possible to watch as 
neutrals. There was a vicarious satisfaction to be derived from watching Kuwait draw 
with Czechoslavakia, since it was believed that South Korea was probably as good as 
the team that had defeated them in such controversial circumstances.799 
 
As far as South Korea was concerned, the arrangements for the 1986 World Cup were 
much more favourable. Oceania was excluded from the Asia preliminaries and, more 
important, the two places allocated to Asia were geographically zoned with one 
allocated to the Middle East and one to South-East Asia. This meant that South Korea 
and its neighbours would no longer be confronted with the problems of playing 
qualifying matches against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.800 Despite unexpectedly losing 
away from home to Malaysia, the South Korean national team reached the final 
qualifying round where they faced Japan with whom they were now fairly evenly 
matched. Although, historically, South Korea had dominated in head-to-head 
confrontations with Japan to the extent that any defeat – such as that inflicted in the 
1982 Asian Games - was regarded as a shock, Japanese football was now on an upward 
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curve.801 In the early 1980s, the Japanese national side benefited from the arrival of a 
new generation footballers possessing highly-developed individual skills and therefore 
represented a serious threat to the South Koreans.802 The match generated enormous 
interest in both Japan and South Korea and the first leg at the Tokyo National Stadium 
sold out, the first time in a decade that this had happened. In the end, South Korea re-
asserted its ascendancy, qualifying for the finals in Mexico by winning 2-1 in Tokyo and 
1-0 in Seoul. Thus South Korea qualified for the final stages of the competition for the 
first time since 1954.803 Significantly, defeat prompted the Japanese to look to South 
Korea as a model and the first seeds of professional football in Japan, which finally 
arrived in 1993, were sown at this time.804  Whatever the limitations of South Korean 
professional football – and there were many – it seemed to have helped the national 
team to qualify for the final stages of FIFA’s most prestigious tournament.805  
 
In South Korea qualification raised the level of public interest and also the level of 
expectation; seventy-one per cent of South Koreans polled before the start of the finals 
predicted that their team would advance to the second round of 1986 World Cup.806 It 
certainly helped that the national side could call on the services of Cha Bum Keun, who 
had scored seventeen goals in the German Bundesliga during the 1985-86 season and 
was widely regarded as the best footballer South Korea had ever produced.807 The 
European media, however, was inclined to write the South Koreans off; The Times in 
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London observing that the South Koreans ‘will be hoping merely to restrict the goals 
they concede to tolerable respectability’.808 Drawn in a very tough group, South Korea 
managed to perform respectably, drawing with Bulgaria (1-1) but losing to the eventual 
champions Argentina (3-1) and Italy (3-2).809 Nevertheless South Korean football was 
still hard to evoke any positive response from Western critics and The Times was 
particularly scathing in reporting the match between Argentina and South Korea, 
arguing that it had proved that South Korea was a long way from becoming a major 
force in world football. 
 
South Korea should stick to karate [sic] ... South Korea gave 
substance to the argument that even as the legitimate 
representatives of Asia, they have no right to be in a world 
championship ... They were naïve, consistently misjudged the flight 
and pace of the ball in an amateurish way and compensated for this 
deficiency only with the vigour of their running and physical 
challenge.810 
 
Ironically, in the light of these comments, England also lost to Argentina by three goals 
to one in the quarter finals. 
 
Though the South Korean team returned home after the group stage the 1986 World 
Cup was a turning point in that it marked the beginning of the social phenomenon of 
supporting ‘FC Korea’ in international matches. During the qualifying rounds there was 
much evidence that public interest was at level that it had not reached previously 
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prompting the KFA to switch home matches to a larger stadium in order to cope with 
the demand for tickets.  Gate receipts for the game against Japan at Seoul were the 
largest in South Korean sports history. 811  Fans showed an unusually high level of 
engagement, some telephoning the KFA when it began to rain on the morning of the 
match against Malaysia to demand that the pitch be covered so as not to give South 
Korea’s opponents the advantage of playing in familiar wet conditions.812 The KFA’s 
decision to cover the pitch with plastic as an emergency measure was in part a 
response to this kind of pressure.813 The popularity of World Cup live coverage on 
television was also unprecedented. More than half the population of South Korea 
watched live matches of their team, even though they were generally televised at the 
break of day due to a time difference between Mexico and South Korea.814 Television 
advertising rates for the South Korean games were more expensive than for ‘News 
Desk’, the most popular prime-time programme of the day. 815  The Korea 
Telecommunication Authority made a handsome profit from a campaign urging people 
to sending encouraging telegram messages to the national team in Mexico.816  
 
Why did such World Cup fever grip the nation? The answer may lie in the fact that 
qualification for the World Cup finals after a gap of thirty-two years was seen by the 
South Korean people as a significant achievement in itself, but the timing was also an 
important factor. For the South Korean national team to represent the country at such 
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a high-profile international event tapped into a prevailing sense of enhanced national 
prestige following two decades of miraculous economic progress which was especially 
powerful during the build-up to the 1988 Seoul Olympics.817 The reason why seventy-
one per cent of South Koreans audaciously predicted that their team would make the 
second round could be seen as an expression of self-confidence in the growing 
strength of their nation state.818 Simply getting to Mexico helped to satisfy the South 
Korean people’s desire that its achievements since the Korean War – in particular the 
economic miracle it had experienced - should be more widely recognized. Thus it was 
important and satisfying to see South Korea taking its place as Asia’s representative 
alongside the major football powers of the world. We should also reflect here on the 
capacity of sport, especially football, to serve as a vehicle for expressions of national 
identity. ‘The imagined community of millions’, Eric Hobsbawm has famously observed, 
‘seems more real as a team of eleven named people’.819 This was what South Koreans 
seemed to discover for themselves as they followed their team in the 1986 World Cup.  
 
While South Korean football was making significant progress in the 1980s, the 
condition of North Korean football remained largely unchanged except that new criteria 
were used to guide the selection of players for the national team when its period of 
suspension from international competition ended. North Korea became increasingly 
obsessed with size - tall players with a large build were preferred - which made their 
national team more powerful but less skillful. 820  The results were generally 
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disappointing. Though the return of international matches was keenly anticipated, size 
and physical fitness were not enough and North Korea was defeated by Japan over two 
legs in the World Cup qualifying round in 1985.821 The power and energy of North 
Korean football did bring one victory in the 1986 King’s Cup in Thailand, thanks mainly 
to Kim Yong Nam, one of the new generation of tall North Korean players, who set up 
two goals in the final against Denmark’s August Gymnastic Football Club.822 Nodong 
Shinmun, ideologically faithful as ever, argued that this win could be attributed to the 
Party’s special treatment of elite North Korean footballers, who were rewarded for their 
efforts with apartments and colour TV sets; it also argued that a foundation for further 
success had been established.823 However, success never came for the footballers of 
North Korea’s increasingly isolated communist state. 
  
(6) Conclusion  
 
The fear of defeat provides the key to understanding the football relationship between 
North and South Korea in the period 1974-91. Firstly, during the 1970s, it was South 
Korea that felt anxiety over at the prospect of any defeat that might be inflicted by its 
ideological enemy. However, this apprehension rapidly waned over the course of the 
next ten years or so after the   South Korean national team defeated North Korea for 
the first time in 1980 and when the latter was suspended from international football for 
two years after the referee had been violently attacked at the end of a match at the 
1982 Asian Games.  
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When North Korea resumed international matches and played in the 1986 World Cup 
preliminaries, it was clear that it had been adversely affected by the two-year ban. A 
South Korean coach who watched their matches against Japan observed that the North 
Korean football team had deteriorated and now had a lower skill level than before the 
ban had been imposed in 1982.824 As South Korean confidence in its own football grew 
there was little to fear from North Korea. It was now the North Korean leadership that 
feared an embarrassing defeat by the South and this was underlined in January 1983 
when it was announced that North Korea would not participate in any sporting 
competition involving South Korea except for the Asian Games and the Olympics.825 
Though this did not happen, it indicates the high level of anxiety in the North Korean 
regime at the time. During the 1980s South Korea’s football ascendancy continued with 
North Korea achieving success only in the King’s Cup, effectively Asia’s second-tier 
football competition. But whereas North Korea sent its senior national team to this 
competition South Korea sent only club sides or the national youth team so, to some 
extent, this success should be discounted.826  
 
This reversal of the relative standing of North and South Korea as football powers, 
along with the simultaneous collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states and the 
termination of the Cold War, increasingly diluted the intensity and mutual animosity 
surrounding the Korean derby in the 1990s. At this time the South Koreans came to 
view the people of the North as their compatriots. Indeed, the South Korean football 
coach declared openly that South Korea should help the North to qualify for the 1990 
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World Cup finals by defeating UAE in the Asian qualifying round, even though the 
South had already secured their berth.827 Such statements signaled that the South 
Koreans no longer saw the North as their main enemy, particularly in the world of 
football. Under these new and friendlier circumstances South and North Korea played 
the Unification Football Championship matches in 1990, and a year later, unified North-
South team was sent to the FIFA World Youth Football Championship. But this mood of 
unprecedented amiability and co-operation did not last very long and relations 
between North and South Korea soon worsened as we shall see in the next chapter.  
 
It did not help that North Korea were regarded as ‘bad boys’ in international football 
circles after their unsportsmanlike conduct in 1982. However, in mitigation, it could be 
argued that the North Korean footballers were under extreme pressure at the 1982 
Asian Games, their compatriots in other sports having underperformed.  Given that 
football was considered to be the ‘King of sports’ in North Korea, and its potential 
value to the regime for propaganda purposes, it is not surprising that there was an 
explosion of anger and frustration, especially as it underlined the North Korean claim 
that the referee had been bribed by their opponents. The North Korean government 
was always aware of the propaganda value of football. This was something it had 
learned from 1966. While discussing the possibility of co-hosting the 1988 Olympics 
remained on the table they even suggested that the Olympic football tournament 
should be staged in North Korea.828  
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Around the same time, South Korean football represented their playing style to the 
world. The South Korean youth team that reached the semi-finals of the 1983 FIFA 
Youth Championships, owed its success largely to its reserves of stamina developed 
over a long period of intensive fitness training. This proved especially useful in the 
high-altitude conditions of Mexico; indeed, there was no option given the relentless 
running game that the South Korean ‘Red Devils’ played. The type of football played by 
the South Korean youth team in 1983 was very similar to that which had been played 
by the North Korean senior team at the 1966 World Cup; it was based on developing 
the endurance required to run at the same unrelenting pace from the kick-off to the 
end of the match. It seemed that a distinctive (North and South) Korean style of 
football with the accent on building physical strength so as to sustain fast and 
industrious movements on the pitch for the full ninety minutes was being crystallized in 
the international arena. There were, of course, discernible differences between the 
football styles of the North and South; North Korea relied totally on physical strength 
while there was some room in the South Korean team for individual flair. However, 
these differences were only apparent when the two teams played against each other, 
which did not happen very often in this period. Therefore, though it might be 
suggested that the political ideologies prevailing on either side of the North-South 
border from the early 1950s shaped the playing style of the two national teams, it 
could also be argued that it was what the two Koreas had in common that was more 
important and that there was a distinctive Korean approach to the game that could be 





Though this distinctively Korean approach to the game had its limitations it was 
sufficient to carry South Korea to the World Cup finals in Mexico in 1986. By this time, 
South Korean football at the highest level had been professionalized, a structural shift 
that was funded at club level largely by the Chaebols. Clubs financed by large 
corporations found it more difficult to establish roots in the communities where they 
played, certainly it was more difficult than for baseball clubs which grown organically 
through their strong connection with the school system. Thus, as far as most South 
Koreans were concerned it was the national team that captured their interest and 
imagination. It was often said ‘two faces of South Korean football’ – the domestic game, 
which attracted little interest, and   ‘FC Korea’, the senior representative team, that 
picked up support in 1985-86 ‘when the World Cup phenomenon swept across the 
nation.829 For South Koreans, reaching the 1986 World Cup finals was an important 
signifier of how far they had come and how much they had achieved since the Korean 
War and  of the relatively high place that their ‘sports republic’ now occupied in the 
world. It allowed them to project their national pride and distinctive identity onto a 
global screen. However, it is worth reflecting on the role of contingency here as this 
would not have been possible if the World Cup finals had not been expanded to 
accommodate twenty-four teams and if the Asian qualifying group had not been 
divided into two separate zones, allowing South Korea to avoid some powerful 
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‘Again 1966’: the two Koreas and the 2002 World Cup, 1992-2002 
 
The idea of Japan and South Korea co-hosting the 2002 World Cup finals emerged from 
the politics of the bidding race. Competition to stage the first World Cup finals to be 
held in Asia was so intense that it raised anxieties that it might severely damage 
relations between the two countries. Although Japanese football officials were generally 
opposed to the idea of co-hosting, some Japanese politicians were favourable. Initially, 
public opinion in South Korea, where Japan had been hitherto viewed as an arch-rival 
rather than as a potential partner, suggested that co-hosting was unacceptable, though 
once FIFA had made the decision, it was generally welcomed and viewed as a 
diplomatic victory for South Korea, whereas in Japan the outcome was seen as an 
embarrassment. At one time it had seemed certain that the 2002 tournament would be 
hosted by Japan alone but the internal politics of FIFA created a situation in which the 
Japanese were forced to compromise at the last minute.831  
 
The 2002 World Cup brought national euphoria for the people of South Korea and its 
significance had implications beyond football itself. Enthusiastic support for the national 
team in front of gigantic public screens turned the streets into football stadiums as 
South Korea progressed to the semi-final. This nationwide phenomenon was portrayed 
as providing evidence that South Korea had overcome the IMF(International Monetary 
Fund) crisis that had inflicted financial difficulties its people since 1997. The 
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achievements of the South Korean team was a legitimate source of national pride and 
its Dutch coach Guus Hiddink was widely praised for his democratic and meritocratic 
approach which involved breaking down the rigid hierarchical order in the national team 
and defying the old boy network in selection policy.832 Hiddink‘s methods were widely 
discussed in the South Korean media and it was often argued that he had set a global 
standard which South Korea should seek to emulate in other areas.833 Meanwhile it was 
especially important that the 2002 World Cup offered an opportunity for the younger 
generation of South Koreans to demonstrate that it was a significant cultural and social 
force. In some ways this anticipated the Presidential election of December 2002, the 
outcome of which was profoundly affected by the young and their internet culture.834  
 
The North Korean experience was quite different. Men‘s football had ceased to function 
as a key propaganda tool after the humiliation of the national team in   the 1994 
World Cup preliminaries and for many North Koreans was simply a happy reminder 
symbolizing the ‗good old days‘. With the support of the party, women‘s football and 
men‘s basketball now assumed the place that men‘s football had previously occupied. 
This new order in North Korean sport largely coincided with the emergence of a 
strategy of brinkmanship in foreign policy driven largely by the regime‘s dangerous but 
effective nuclear programme, one of the last options available for demonstrating that it 
remained a power to be taken seriously. In its own way North Korean women‘s football 
served the same purpose as it became the dominant force in Asia in the early twenty-
first century. The regime took every opportunity to use the achievements of its women‘s 
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team for wider propaganda purposes though it seems likely that only those not 
suffering from North Korea‘s food shortages would have been in a position to celebrate.   
 
This chapter begins with the 1994 World Cup preliminaries since it was a starting point 
of the bidding race between South Korea and Japan and also marked a watershed in 
North Korean football. An analysis of the winding road leading to the co-hosting the 
2002 World Cup follows; what this signified both south and north of the border is also 
considered. Attention will then be given to explaining as to how an ordinary South 
Korean team was able to achieve extraordinary results in 2002 and the wider 
significance of successfully co-hosting the tournament. Finally, developments in North 
Korea, where the emphasis shifted from men‘s to women‘s football as the new torch-
bearer of national pride, will be considered. 
 
(1) The Miracle in Doha 
 
The prospect of holding the World Cup finals in Asia was first glimpsed at the very 
beginning of the 1990s when it was announced that Japan would inaugurate a 
professional football league in 1993. The ‗J-League‘ was an immediate success and 
Japan was overtaken by a wave of enthusiasm for football; some fixtures were sold out 
four months in advance.835 Even before the start of the league, however, football‘s new 
popularity in Japan was evident when the Asian Cup was held in Hiroshima in 1992. 
Previously, there had been very little interest in the Asian Cup which took place in the 
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same year of Olympics.836 In 1988 Japan had been content to send a team of college 
footballers, media interest had been minimal and not a single journalist traveled with 
the team. However, in 1992, the situation had changed dramatically.  Football 
enthusiasts from all over Japan gathered at Hiroshima; they showed their support for 
the team by singing and   synchronized clapping in all stands and there were 
unprecedented celebrations after the victory over Saudi Arabia in the final.837 Football 
had not been so popular in Japan since the national team had won a bronze medal at 
the Mexico City Olympics in 1968.  
 
The idea that South Korea might stage the 2002 finals surfaced at about the same time. 
It was broached by Kim Young Sam during his successful presidential   election 
campaign in 1992, and was also taken up by Chung Mong Joon, the KFA‘s president, 
who was also a congressman with serious political ambitions of his own.838 Despite 
some press criticism that the idea of South Korea staging the tournament was 
unrealistic it was clear from the start that it had some political mileage, not least 
because it involved a strong element of rivalry with Japan.839  
 
In the mid 1990s, the South Korean media viewed the newly established and instantly 
popular J-league with both curiosity and envy.  There was surprise that professional 
football had succeeded in a country where baseball had long been regarded as its 
national sport.840 However, it was also recognized that this was linked to the strength of 
                                           
836 Goto, A History of Japanese Soccer, 272.  
837 Goto, Future Centuries of Japanese Soccer, 120-121; History of Japanese Soccer, 276. 
838 Kyunghyang Shinmun, 22 Dec 1992; 13 Jan 1993.  
839 Donga Ilbo, 2 Apr 1993.  
840 Donga Ilbo, 20 Jan 1994.  
223 
 
Japan‘s economy which generated the resources required to attract foreign football stars, 
such as Gary Lineker and Zico, to J-League clubs.841 When the preliminary round for the 
1994 World Cup began, curiosity and envy turned to alarm as South Korean football 
pundits noted that the J-League had led to a rapid improvement in the quality of 
Japan‘s national team. For many South Koreans it was especially important to maintain 
the dominance established over their former colonial oppressors on the football field.842  
 
The 1994 World Cup Asian final qualification round held at Doha in October 1993 
featured six teams: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, South and North Korea, and Japan. It 
attracted a good deal of media attention around the world, firstly because it brought 
together teams from so many nations that were hostile to each other, and secondly 
because three of the teams represented nation states that were fiercely anti-American, 
raising questions about the finals which were to be staged in the USA.  
 
Iran and Iraq are perpetual adversaries, North and South Korea share 
the world‘s most heavily-armed border and, in the absence of a 
peace treaty, are still technically at war. Saudi Arabia, from where the 
allied coalition struck at Iraq during the Gulf War is another 
contender … The top two teams will advance to next June‘s World 
Cup finals in the United States- a bitter foe of Iraq, Iran and North 
Korea and a staunch ally of Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia.843  
 
What made the tournament an even more interesting prospect was that the six teams 
were evenly matched with South Korea‘s coach predicting at the start that chances were 
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‗equal for all the teams‘.844  
 
South Korean-Japanese rivalry was another factor that had to be taken into account 
from the start as the KFA had resented the successful Japanese lobbying which had 
resulted in the previous qualifying round being held in Qatar.845 As the tournament 
reached its climax South Korea suffered a 1-0 defeat to Japan, the first Japanese success 
against what the New York Times called their ‗historically more powerful soccer 
neighbor‘ in a World Cup qualifying match since 1954.846 While an estimated 1,000 
Japanese fans celebrated at the stadium, live television coverage achieved highest 
viewing rates in Japanese football history, a further indication of the popularity that the 
game now enjoyed in Japan. Miura‘s winning goal ‗must live in national memory‘, a 
Japanese sports daily noted.847 For the South Koreans, this result was seen as a disaster; 
for one journalist it was ‗the second national humiliation day‘, the other having occurred 
in 1910 when Korea had lost its sovereignty to Japan.848 Although the South Korean 
press criticized the performance of its own team there was awareness that Japanese 
football had benefited from a concerted national drive which incorporated 
professionalization, the J-League, extending invitations to world-class national teams 
from Europe and South America and hiring a foreign coach for the national team. 
Japan‘s ambition to stage the 2002 World Cup was part of the same drive.849 
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With one round of the tournament remaining, the fortunes of South Korea were 
contingent on the results of other games.850 Goal difference was likely to decide the 
two slots, with five teams still having a chance to qualify. South Korea completed their 
mission by defeating North Korea in the final match but it seemed that they had not 
qualified. They were rescued, however, when Iraq equalized in the last minute in their 
match against Japan. Thus the qualifying tournament ended with South Korea‘s success, 
qualifying on goal difference over Japan.851 Such was the football rivalry between the 
two countries that while the South Koreans were delighted by the ‗Miracle in Doha‘, the 
Japanese saw it as a tragedy.852 After the match the flag flying in front of the Iraqi 
embassy in Tokyo was stolen by infuriated Japanese fans; meanwhile the Iraq embassy 
in Seoul was swamped by calls from South Koreans expressing gratitude and the KFA 
asked the government whether it would possible to invite the Iraqi national team to 
play in Seoul. As the South Korean government was anxious to avoid friction with the 
USA permission was not granted though a compromise was agreed which saw Jaffar, 
the scorer of the crucial Iraqi goal, invited to South Korea by a private sponsor and a 
football bearing his autograph exhibited at the KFA.853 
 
Jaffar‘s goal was vital not only because it allowed South Korea to qualify but also 
because qualification added momentum to its bid to stage the 2002 World Cup. Chung 
Mong Joon openly asserted that South Korea, who had reached the final stages four 
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times, was more eligible than Japan, who had never qualified before. 854  He also 
announced that he was considering standing against a Japanese candidate for the FIFA 
vice-presidency in an attempt to strengthen South Korea‘s position within world 
football‘s governing body and raised the possibility of hosting the event jointly with the 
North in the hope that this might influence the outcome.855 At this stage, however, 
Japan seemed to be well ahead of South Korea. Not only did Japan have the advantage 
of a superior infrastructure but Japanese companies, such as Canon and Fuji Film, 
accounted for a third of FIFA‘s official corporate sponsors.856 
 
Failure in the 1994 World Cup preliminary round dealt a huge blow to North Korean 
football. In March 1993, North Korea had announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty which quickly led to widespread anxieties regarding the 
prospect of it acquiring nuclear weapons.857 In these sensitive political circumstances 
football might have provided some useful propaganda opportunities but the national 
team – soundly defeated by both South Korea and Japan - never fulfilled the party‘s 
expectations.858  North Korea‘s matches were reported in Nodong Shinmun and Chosun 
Shinbo, newspapers published in Tokyo and widely read by pro-North Koreans residing 
in Japan. These two dailies printed some optimistic previews before the qualifying 
tournament and reported North Korea‘s 3-2 victory over Iraq in their first round. 859 
There were no further reports as the form of the North Koreans slumped and they lost 
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their remaining matches.  
 
North Korea did not send any reporters to Doha. The New York Times suggested that 
the plan was to wait and see. If the national team failed, there would be no reports and 
the North Korean public would remain in ignorance.860 However, it appears that this 
strategy may not have been entirely successful. A Laurel Wreath, a novel by a North 
Korean basketball player, published in 1999, sought to capture the mood of the nation, 
particularly Pyongyang, after the preliminaries, with passers-by looking depressed, a 
decrease in production at factories, and calls to the sports authorities from some 
citizens complaining the football‘s failure.861 An interview with the author in Chosun 
Shinbo in 2000 confirmed that this impression of the public mood in 1994 was based 
on eyewitness accounts.862  
 
The disappointing results of the North Korean national team in the qualifying 
tournament enraged the party at a time when it desperately needed to boost morale in 
a grave economic situation in which food and commodity shortages were rampant. 
Disappointment bred punishment. The national football coach and his assistants were 
interrogated for three days and criticized for lack of leadership and strategy. The coach, 
who would later defect to South Korea, was banished to a factory producing sporting 
goods and a number of players in the team that had played in the qualifiers would not 
be recalled to the North Korean squad.863 As it happened, there was little opportunity 
for them to wear the national team‘s jersey when a ban on international football 
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matches was imposed in 1994 when Kim Il Sung died and a period of mourning was 
declared. Although this came to an end in 1995 there were no full international matches 
for the North Korean men‘s team until 1998.864 
 
(2) The race between Japan and South Korea to stage the World Cup 
 
It became clear that South Korea and Japan were seriously engaged in a battle for the 
2002 World Cup when Chung Mong Joon and Murata Tadao became rival candidates 
for the AFC seat on FIFA‘s executive in 1994. When Chung won the election by virtue of 
his energetic campaign which involved visiting as many AFC member countries as 
possible, South Korea, for the first time, gained an important space to engage in 
football diplomacy within FIFA. It was also guaranteed one vote on the committee 
which would decide which country would host the World Cup finals.865  
 
Having achieved this Chung‘s football diplomacy then concentrated on building an 
alliance with the UEFA whose president, Lennart Johansson, needed help from non-
European members to challenge Havelange, FIFA‘s president.866  A Brazilian business 
tycoon, Havelange had filled FIFA‘s coffers by taking full advantage of advertisers‘ 
growing interest in football in an age of globalised and media-led mega sporting 
spectacles.867 However, by the mid 1990s, when he was in his eighties, his intransigent 
style of governance meant that he was increasingly unpopular, particularly amongst 
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European members, at a time when the days of his presidency were numbered.868 With 
Havelange openly supporting the Japanese bid during the World Under-18 
Championship held in Tokyo in 1993 by giving the impression to the Japanese that ‗they 
were the firm favorites‘, it was a natural corollary that Chung and the European 
representatives would collaborate to pursue their mutual interests.869  
 
Havelange began to intervene directly in the bidding race from 1995. He attempted to 
bring the World Cup decision date forward from June 1996 to the end of 1995 in order 
to place the South Koreans at a disadvantage; this move was blocked after Chung‘s 
protest supported by UEFA.870 Chung seized the opportunity to undermine Havelange 
after he visited Nigeria and talked with its military dictator in 1995 after the Under-20 
Championship had been cancelled due to an outbreak of cholera and meningitis.871  
Unfortunately, Havelange‘s visit coincided with the execution of dissidents by the 
Nigerian government. ‗The timing could not have been worse‘, observed Chung. ‗This 
visit has greatly damaged the image of FIFA‘.872 Chung, in association with UEFA, then 
attacked Havelange‘s ‗backroom politics‘ when awarding television rights for the World 
Cup and tried to block the decision to give the contract to International Sports & 
Leisure (ISL) with which Havelange was closely linked. He believed that the fact that 
forty-nine per cent of shares in ISL were owned by Dentsu, a Japanese advertising 
agency, had helped to ensure Havelange‘s support for the Japanese bid.873  
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Despite the South Korea-UEFA alliance, Havelange continued to strive for the success of 
the Japanese bid. It was revealed that he had pressed the officials who inspected 
facilities in 1996 to see that they complied with FIFA standards to present a report in 
favour of Japan.874 Havelange allocated four million dollars to the Confederation of 
North, Central and Caribbean Association Football Associations (CONCACAF) in order to 
secure the backing of its FIFA executive members for the Japanese bid. When he met 
eight members of the FIFA executive from Asia, South America and Africa weeks before 
the decision day, he urged them to thwart Europe by supporting Japan.875 The Japanese 
kept pace with Havelange by promising sponsored football schools and pledging to 
grant a loan to help football development Africa, since African votes could be crucial to 
determine the host of 2002 World Cup.876  
 
There were significant differences between the ways in which the rival Japanese and 
South Korean bids were organized. Influential and capable persons in every corner of 
South Korean society were brought in to support the bid. In Japan the campaign was 
dominated by football officials and businessmen.877 It was led by major figures from the 
corporate sector just as Japan‘s economic glory days were coming to an end. 
Confronted by economic stagnation, they clearly saw the staging of the World Cup as a 
launch pad for overcoming enduring recession.878 There was very little in the way of 
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direct support from the Japanese government. This was partly due to ongoing political 
instability from the late 1980s when the conservative Liberal Democratic Party‘s long 
hegemony ended and was followed by a succession of weak governments.879  
 
In South Korea the situation was quite different. The South Korean President, Kim Young 
Sam, wore T-shirts imprinted with ‗2002 World Cup‘ while jogging and lobbied various 
heads of state and FIFA executive members in support of his country‘s bid.880 His rival, 
Kim Dae Jung, leader of the opposition party, who became President in 1997, showed 
his support by sending letters to all twenty-one FIFA executive members. 881  Many 
foreign branches of Hyundai – Chung Mong Joon was one of the sons of the company‘s 
founder - actively engaged in the World Cup project, gathering information about the  
bidding race and arranging meetings with important foreign football figures. 882  In 
February 1996, Protestants, Catholics, Buddhists, and some leaders of local religions 
conducted a campaign in favour of staging the World Cup and four eminent religious 
figures would be enlisted by the Korea World Cup Organizing Committee. 883  Not 
surprisingly, given the differences between the two campaigns, public support for 
staging the World Cup was much stronger in South Korea than in Japan. Whereas 
ninety per cent of South Koreans polled in 1996 were enthusiastic about the prospect; 
only twenty-nine per cent of Japanese were fully supportive of their country‘s bid.884  
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As the bidding competition intensified, the co-hosting issue surfaced amongst South 
Korean and Japanese politicians in 1995. The idea had been cautiously put forward a 
year earlier by the Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Yohei who was ‗the dove‘ amongst 
Liberal Democratic Party members and wished to make good relationship with South 
Korea.885 When leading figures from South Korea‘s ruling party met with some leading 
Japanese politicians, including Kono, in Tokyo in July 1995, they formed a consensus 
over the co-hosting idea. An   influential Japanese daily, Asahi Shimbun, immediately 
gave its editorial support, expressing concern that that the intense contest to stage the 
World Cup could develop into a serious diplomatic conflict given the South Koreans‘ 
deep-seated antipathy towards Japan.886 At first, however, the idea of co-hosting drew a 
hostile response from Japanese football officials who thought that following this 
politically-driven strategy was unnecessary, considering Havelange‘s strong support and 
Japan‘s superior economic power.887  
 
There was also resistance to this idea in South Korea. Chung Mong Joon pointed out 
that it may well have been a Japanese ploy aimed at disrupting the South Korean 
bidding campaign. 888  Kyunghyang Shinmun accused a Korean politician who had 
discussed the co-hosting issue with some Japanese counterparts of defeatism, arguing 
that he had given the impression that the South Korean bid was weaker than the 
Japanese bid.889 There was no place for international goodwill in this debate, since it 
was widely believed in South Korea that the Japanese suggestion was neither serious 
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nor sincere. There was even concern that Japanese government could use the co-
hosting idea to bury the unhappy past between the two countries without any official 
apology for the suffering it had caused Korea.890 Not surprisingly, public opinion in 
South Korea was against the idea: eighty-one per cent of South Koreans opposed co-
hosting with Japan in an opinion poll undertaken in 1995. What a vast majority of the 
South Koreans wanted was co-hosting with the North, not Japan.891  
 
This prospect surfaced a few months later, in January 1996, with the surprising news 
that North Korea had suggested to FIFA that it should co-host the 2002 World Cup with 
the South, an unexpected offer that threatened to complicate the bidding contest. At 
first this development was welcomed in the South because it was consistent with the 
long-term aim of reunification and thus seemed to add value to the Korean bid. 
Havelange, salivating at the prospect of a Nobel Peace Prize, also gave some serious 
consideration to the idea.892 However, eventually the South Korean government took a 
more sceptical view, especially when the North broke off its talks with the South.893 
Former Prime Minister, Lee Hong Koo who was actively involved in the bidding 
campaign along with Chung Mong Joon, argued that the discussion with North Korea in 
relation to co-hosting should only take place if and when the South was awarded the 
finals. The bidding process was difficult enough for South Korea without an additional 
complication courtesy of Pyongyang. 894  It seems that this cautious approach was 
justified. Having floated the idea, no official proposal from North Korea was 
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forthcoming and the idea was quietly forgotten even before it was formally withdrawn 
via a fax to FIFA shortly before the decision day.895 
 
The rationale behind the North Korea‘s initiative remains unclear but there were good 
reasons for its government‘s interest in the 2002 World Cup. Faced with a major 
economic crisis, the North Korean leadership feared that its ability to control the people 
was weakening. From 1996 onwards, after the collapse of the rationing system and a 
devastating famine, many of those living in the north of North Korea made the journey 
across the poorly guarded border with China.896 As revealed by North Korean defectors 
who had lived in Chongjin, North Korea's third largest city and the place most severely 
hit by famine, confirmed in interviews with American journalist, Barbara Demick, the 
food crisis was the main reason for their departure.897 As state-enterprise coal mines 
and steel mills closed, there was a noticeable rise in small-scale commercial activity, 
such as market stalls, as the party lost its grip. Travel restrictions, for example, became 
difficult to enforce as the state bureaucracy became demoralized and open to bribery 
and corruption.898 For Kim Jong Il, struggling to establish himself as leader after his 
father‘s death in 1994, any distraction which would help to restore the people‘s loyalty 
to the regime – especially if it reminded them of the heady days of 1966 – was to be 
given serious consideration if the revolution was to be protected.899  
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Meanwhile, the bidding race between South Korea and Japan became more intense and 
more vicious with the rivals resorting to a smear campaign. When accused of bribing 
FIFA officials, South Korea countered by claiming that the J League was ‗just an 
elaborate lobbying device to win the World Cup‘.900 However, by this time diplomatic 
relations between South Korea and Japan had worsened considerably for other reasons 
after Japanese Foreign Minister Ikeda Ukihiko revived his country‘s claim to the disputed 
island of Dokdo (Korean)/Takeshima (Japan) in February 1996.901 Although it was a 
popular cause with the right wing in Japan the intervention seemed ill-timed and 
provocative; it could only make the football-related rivalry between the two countries 
more difficult.902 Not surprisingly, when Japan and South Korea clashed in the Olympic 
preliminaries in March 1996, the South Koreans in the stadium cried ‗Dokdo is our land!‘ 
and also ‗for the World Cup in Seoul‘.903  
 
In these difficult circumstances, co-hosting began to be seen as a compromise solution 
that would give something to both sides and it was brought seriously into play when 
the eight European members of FIFA‘s executive met in April 1996. They were anxious 
that the bidding race was degenerating rapidly with ‗cash in a plain brown envelope‘ 
the only missing element. At the same time, they were under pressure from the 
Japanese companies that now sponsored much of European football and needed to 
make concessions, despite Japan‘s alliance with Havelange, their mutual foe. The great 
attraction of co-hosting for European members of FIFA, therefore, was that offered a 
way of resolving the conflict between South Korea and Japan while enabling them to 
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undermine Havelange who remained openly committed to the original Japanese bid.904 
 
Having started behind Japan in the race for the 2002 tournament South Korea could 
afford to compromise. Chung Mong Joon was thus able to adopt a flexible stance: 
South Korea would accept joint-hosting with Japan if asked to do so by FIFA.905 In 
contrast Japanese football officials continued to pin their hopes on a decisive vote in 
which Havelange‘s influence would prevail in their favour. 906  As the decision day 
0approached, however, and it became clear that executive members from Europe, Africa 
and North and Central America favoured the co-hosting solution, Japan was in such a 
weak position that even Havelange was urging them to accept co-hosting or risk losing 
the tournament altogether and the details were agreed at a meeting between Miyazawa 
Kiichi (Japan) and Lee Hong Koo (South Korea) a day before the appointed decision 
day.907 While the Japanese media saw this outcome as a defeat for Japan, the South 
Korean media saw it as a victory over the old enemy and also as a triumph for 
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(3) The growth and development of women’s football in North Korea  
 
Meanwhile, North Korea had been focusing on a different game: women‘s football first 
established there in 1986. A statement issued by Kim Jong Il in 1989 set out the 
regime‘s intentions:  
 
Recently the level of our women‘s football may have risen a little .... 
Last year, our female footballers competed against Chinese female 
footballers in China and I think that we can win an international 
match soon if we perform better. We should send our team to 
international competitions even though they have no chance of 
winning. We must dispatch the female footballers to the Asian 
Women‘s Football Championship and to another international 
tournament to be held in Czechoslovakia. We need to establish a 
women‘s football team within the Abrok River Sports Club.909  
 
North Korea‘s growing interest in women‘s football may have been inspired by China, 
where it had expanded rapidly across the country in the 1980s.910 Moreover, the success 
of Yanbien women‘s football team in the Jilin province of China which was entirely 
composed of girls of Korean descent, may have also encouraged the North Korean 
leadership to view women‘s football as a promising sport. Yanbien had won the 
National Women‘s Football Invitation Competition in October 1983 and took the fourth 
place in the First International Women‘s Invitation Competition held in Guangzhou in 
November 1983 when eight teams (Japan, Singapore and six Chinese teams) had 
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competed against each other.911 The North Korean women‘s national team had drawn 
0-0 in a friendly game against Yanbien in 1988 and this performance against one of the 
strongest women‘s teams in China prompted Kim Jong Il‘s optimism.912  
 
Chinese women‘s football came to be a role model for the North Koreans to emulate 
and at the same time a rival which they would have to surpass in the near future. When 
the Chinese women‘s national team played an international in Pyongyang in 1990, 
North Korean spectators and football pundits were impressed by the great potential of 
their national team despite a 2-1 defeat. Football analysts noted that North Korea was 
not inferior to China in technique and physical ability and that the only disparity 
between the two teams came from the Chinese footballers‘ greater international 
experience. Over 30,000 Pyongyang fans who packed into Seosan stadium reveled in 
the first international women‘s football match ever played in North Korea. It was 
reported that they particularly admired the determination of their female footballers 
who were on average ten centimetres shorter than their Chinese rivals.913  
 
However, despite Kim Jong Il‘s rhetoric, it was not until 1993 that the North Korean 
leadership began to take the women‘s game seriously. According to Moon Ki Nam, then 
coach of the women‘s team, Chang Sung Taek, husband of Kim Jong il‘s sister, who 
oversaw North Korean football generally in the 1990s, took no interest in women‘s 
football. His attitude changed, presumably on the orders of Kim Jong Il, after the failure 
of the men‘s team in the World Cup preliminaries held in October 1993. When North 
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Korea participated in the Asian Women‘s Football Championship held in Malaysia in 
December 1993, Chang telephoned Moon every day to check on all matters pertaining 
to the North Korean team.914 It seems likely that the decision, announced in September 
1993, to include women‘s football in the Olympic Games from 1996, was also 
significant. 915  It was no coincidence that South Korean women‘s football was re-
launched at the same time on the initiative of Chung Mong Joon with the first women‘s 
championship, the formation of the first company team by Inchon Steelworks, a 
subsidiary of Hyundai, and the establishment of school and college teams with the 
support of the Hyundai foundation. 916  However, women‘s football was probably 
stronger in North Korea than in the South at this time.  When the national teams met 
in the 1993 Asian Women‘s Championship, North Korea defeated their Southern sisters 
by 3-0, finished runner-up in the tournament and thus qualified for the women‘s World 
Cup finals to be held in Sweden in 1995. In the end they did not play in Sweden after 
the sudden death of the ‗Great Leader‘.917  
 
Although this meant that North Korea excluded themselves from international 
competition for a brief period until 1996, the domestic league for women‘s football 
never idled and its talent pool continued to increase in years. The top-division of the 
women‘s football league, with eight teams participating, offered each team twenty-eight 
matches. Every sports club throughout the nation began to set up women‘s football 
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teams and there was a steep increase in the number of female footballers in schools.918 
Thus, on their return to international competition at the Asian Women‘s Football 
Championship in 1997, North Korea could still demonstrate exceptional ability at the 
highest levels of the game, allied   to strong domestic base and rising popularity. By 
finishing as runners-up to China, North Korea qualified for the 1999 World Cup as 
representatives of Asia.919 A year later it was clear that the gap between North Korea 
and China – Olympic silver medalists in 1996 - was narrowing. China – North Korea‘s 
role model as far as women‘s football was concerned – only just managed to beat them 
(1-0 after extra time) in the final of the tournament at the Bangkok Asian Games. Now 
the North Korean women‘s team could look to the future with confidence. As their      
goalkeeper said after the match, ‗We are much younger than them. We will win over 
China someday‘.920  
 
These remarks provide a way of understanding how the dominance of Chinese women‘s 
football was being eroded in the years around the millennium, despite their national 
team finishing as runners-up in the 1999 World Cup.  During the late 1990s, a lack of 
new players taking up the game contributed to the problem of an ageing national team; 
the average age of the Chinese team that won the Asian women‘s championship in 
1997 was twenty-seven.921 There was a strong prejudice in China against girls taking up 
football and often parents were not supportive. 922  Significant funding from the 
government or from a major sponsor was required if the women‘s game in China was 
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to remain healthy and the national team successful, but this was not forthcoming.923 
The primary focus in China was on men‘s football which enjoyed financial assistance 
from the authorities and popular attention from the media despite the disappointing 
record of the national team.924 Moreover, from the 1990s, as China developed a market 
economy, there was little chance of rescuing women‘s football which failed to draw 
large crowds and, consequently, failed to attract big commercial sponsors, thus denying 
the game the funding it needed to develop at all levels. These two factors contributed 
to a decrease in the number of both junior teams and senior clubs in Chinese women‘s 
football.925  
 
In contrast, women‘s football in North Korea enjoyed parity of status from 1993 and was 
better supported by the state than most other sports. While many athletes in North 
Korean sport clubs suffered on account of inadequate nutrition, its international 
footballers were provided with one-and-a-half kilogrammes of meat per day, a 
significant favour given the food shortages of the late 1990s.926 It was one of many 
privileges that encouraged girls to take up football. Moreover, when the performance of 
the men‘s team slumped in the 1990s, the North Korean women‘s game took its place 
as the team sport which had the greater potential for the party‘s propagandists as they 
sought to enhance the regime‘s image abroad while boosting the morale of their 
impoverished comrades at home. The Kim regime‘s support for women‘s football 
encouraged many girls to take it up and North Korea‘s finest young female athletes 
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were lured away from other sports, such as track and field. As a result the number of 
high school and college football teams increased which in turn led to an expansion of 
the top division of the women‘s national league from nine to twelve in the early years 
of the new century. Moreover, women‘s football teams in North Korea did not need to 
worry about attracting spectators and sponsors to keep them afloat. Under the still 
highly centralized socialist system, state and party support would be forthcoming as 
long as women‘s football could help the propaganda effort by performing successfully, 
especially at international level.927 
 
Youth combined with strength were instrumental in defeating China in the semi-finals of 
2001 Asian Women‘s Football Championship. North Korea‘s three goals were scored by 
Jin Byol Hee, a twenty-one-year-old striker with amazing agility.928 As the South Korean 
referee observed: ‗The North Korean players ran tirelessly for ninety minutes … They 
were more energetic than the Chinese side in which most players were in their late 
twenties‘. However, it was not simply a question of the youthful North Koreans beating 
the ageing Chinese. The victory owed much to systematic training routines designed to 
develop physical strength. One of their training programmes was to run up mountain 
called Baekdu, approximately 2,750 metres, and the highest peak in Korea.929 Thus they 
were following the example of the North Korean men‘s squad which had performed 
heroically and surprised the world in 1966. The result was that the North Korean 
women‘s team of the late 1990s/ early 2000s was a well-drilled unit noted for swift 
movement and tireless running, characteristics that earned them the nickname 
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Chollima.930 Such methods, of course, were also popular with coaches in South Korea.931 
It would be no exaggeration to say that running up and down mountains was a 
distinctive feature of Korean football.  
 
These methods brought success as the North Korean women‘s team won the 2001 
Asian Women‘s Football Championship, the 2002 Asian Games tournament held in 
Busan, South Korea and then the 2003 Asian Women‘s Championship for a second time 
in 2003. For propaganda purposes these phenomenal achievements were attributed to 
the ‗military first‘ policy pursued by Kim Jong Il since the mid 1990s; Nodong Shinmun, 
the party organ described the women footballers as ‗sports soldiers for General Kim‘. 
The military connection was not merely rhetorical. Several members of the North 
Korean women‘s national team - including the leading scorer at the 2003 tournament -
Lee Geum Sook, played for army club.932 Kim Jong Il‘s ‗army first‘ strategy meant that 
the military authorities were now closer to the top of North Korea‘s hierarchical pyramid 
than representatives of the Workers‘ Party.933 It also meant that the policy of further 
militarization (incorporating a nuclear programme) was given priority and this has been 
described as an ‗anomaly for a communist regime‘, and a ‗tragedy‘ for the poverty-
stricken people.934 To rally support for the regime at home Kim Jong Il stressed the 
importance of the ‗revolutionary military spirit‘ and, in this sense, North Korea‘s female 
footballers were important role models as the people struggled to cope with energy 
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and food shortages.935  
 
While women‘s football in North Korea became a source of national pride and was 
eulogized by the regime, men‘s football failed to recover from the slump which had 
begun when the team had been disqualified from the 1994. When the men‘s team 
participated in the 1998 Asian Games, their first international tournament in five years, 
they were eliminated at the group stage. They failed to qualify for the final stages of 
the Asian Cup in 2000, despite six months hard training.936 Underlying these repeated 
failures were severe internal problems which left North Korean men‘s football short of 
talent at the top level. As Kim‘s sports novel, A Laurel Wreath, shows, coaching in North 
Korean schools tended to concentrate on collective team practice at the expense of 
developing basic individual skills. The preference was for players who possessed 
physical strength; over-age players were frequently selected in order to win school 
matches.937 It was a short-sighted policy that meant that North Korean schools football 
in the 1990s rarely produced players with the necessary skills to progress to a higher 
level in the men‘s game and this hampered efforts to compete successfully at 
international level.  
 
Indeed, it could be argued that when the results of the North Korean men‘s team 
eventually began to improve it was because of the important contribution made by 
footballers who had learned the game in Japan rather than North Korea, such as Yang 
Gyu Sa, whose goal-scoring talent proved crucial in the Asian Cup preliminaries held in 
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2000.938 While some players from the expatriate community in Japan had been drafted 
into the national team since the 1970s they had played only a supporting role.939 From 
the late 1990s they were used more frequently to cover the gaps as the supply of 
home-produced talent began to dry up. By 2010, when North Korea qualified for the 
World Cup finals after a forty- four year hiatus, it was widely recognized that the two 
Korean-Japanese players Jong Tae Se and Ahn Young Hak were a central part of the 
North Korean team.940 This was a fragile basis on which to build a national team, not 
least because players travelling from Japan for international matches needed both an 
identity card issued by the North Korean government before they could play and a 
Japanese re-entry permit to return home.941  
 
Men‘s football in North Korea also had to contend with the emergence of basketball as 
a national sport in this period. As interest in men‘s football waned, basketball took off in 
1997 as the number of basketball teams in schools and factories leapt to 130; a 
basketball tournament for young workers, high school and college students was set up 
in the same year.942 Basketball flourished as both a popular and an elite sport.  One of 
North Korea‘s famous sports clubs, Abrok River, founded a top-quality senior team 
named Taepoong, (‗Typhoon‘) and other sports clubs followed suit.943 Basketball soon 
gave North Korean boys a new hero and role model, Lee Myung Hoon, the tallest 
basketball player in the world, who changed his name to Michael Lee in homage to 
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American NBA star Michael Jordan. 944  Though Lee‘s hope of playing NBA basketball 
were thwarted, this son of a coal miner became North Korea‘s most celebrated sports 
personality and was rewarded by the regime with a modern apartment in central 
Pyongyang and a spacious car especially designed for his 235-centimetre frame.945 It is 
not surprising that North Koreans began to see basketball as potentially more 
rewarding than football, especially for young men. 
 
The attitude of North Korea‘s political leadership was also important; from the mid 
1990s, ‗the Dear Leader‘, paid particular attention to basketball. According to a story 
attributed to a North Korean defector, Kim was advised by a former basketball player 
that the game enhanced one‘s brain-power and immediately ordered players in the 
national team to give lessons to his sons.946 Whether or not this is true, the party 
swung into line. Nodong Shinmun published a poster explaining that basketball was a 
game for everyone, not just members of sports club.947 A film entitled Family Basketball 
Club was produced in 1998 and a song, Basketball is a Nice Game, was popularized.948 
These efforts to promote basketball were linked to a government campaign to make 
North Korean schoolchildren grow taller at a time when their average height was 
decreasing, presumably due to malnutrition.949 Thus, in this period, conditions were 
difficult for men‘s football in North Korea which had to compete with women‘s football, 
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where the national team enjoyed greater success, and also with   basketball, which now 
enjoyed the support of the ‘Dear Leader‘. 
 
(4) The 2002 World Cup and the two Koreas: ‘Again 1966!’ 
 
As co-host of the 2002 World Cup finals, it was important that South Korea should 
deliver on the promises it had made during the bidding process. However, this was not 
achieved easily. In 1997, South Korea was confronted by a severe financial crisis and the 
government was forced to go to the IMF for an emergency loan. This led to doubts as 
to whether the construction of ten World Cup stadiums was feasible.950 It did not help 
that other countries were so keen to fill the gap should South Korea fail. An article in 
The Times in April 1998 headed ‗Korean crisis opens door for England‘ reported that the 
South Korean Prime Minister was about to recommend ‗that plans to build new 
stadiums for the 2002 World Cup finals, to be hosted jointly with Japan, should be 
abandoned‘. It went on to argue that ‗unless Japan … feels in a position to host the 
World Cup alone, then a continuation of the economic crisis could oblige Fifa [sic] to 
consider alternative venues‘.  Lennart Johansson of UEFA was said to favour England an 
alternative venue. 951  Having just secured Japanese financial assistance to build the 
World Cup stadium at Suwon, such reports could only cause dismay in South Korea and 
raise anxieties about whether the prospect of co-hosting the event was slipping away.952 
Eventually, after much debate at the highest political level, Chung persuaded President 
Kim Dae Jung that the planned construction of ten new stadiums should go ahead even 
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though this required the introduction of austerity measures elsewhere to make the 
funds available.953 
 
Meanwhile, there were other logistical problems to be resolved regarding the staging of 
the 2002 finals. Chung Mong Joon pointed out that timing posed significant problems. 
June and July were the rainy season in Japan and Korea; the weather in September was 
more suitable but there would be a clash with domestic and international club 
competitions in Europe and South America.954 The ensuing debate gave The Times a 
second opportunity to raise doubts about South Korea‘s capability to stage the 
tournament and to express again its doubts regarding the stadium construction 
programme. However, the English daily   overplayed its hand by suggesting that Chung 
was raising the issue of the weather ‗as an excuse to withdraw from co-hosting the 
tournament‘. This provoked a strong reaction in South Korea forcing the British 
government to make a formal apology. 955  The issue of exactly when to stage the 
tournament was not finalized until a FIFA executive meeting in September 1999. South 
Korea and Japan had by now accepted that the tournament would have to take place 
outside the football season for Europe and South America and proposed a 25 May start, 
whereas UEFA wanted to delay the start until early June. In the end it was agreed to 
begin the tournament on 1 June, ten days earlier than the start of the 1998 tournament 
in France.956 For many elite players with European clubs this was unfortunate as it gave 
them little time to prepare with their national squads after the end of their season. 
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With these issues finally resolved, the KFA turned its attention to selecting an 
experienced foreign coach for the South Korean national side. Its first preference was 
Aime Jacquet, who had steered France to victory in 1998 but he   turned down the 
offer. The KFA then looked to Guus Hiddink, coach of the Dutch national team in 1998 
and he took up the post with the South Korean team in 2000.957 While Jacquet had 
already fulfilled his dream with the talented French footballers, Hiddink needed a 
success to restore his reputation after recent failures in the Spanish football league.958  
 
It took some time for Hiddink to win over the South Korean public. There were sarcastic 
references to a typical ‗Hiddink score‘ after the national team lost 5-0 to both the Czech 
Republic and France.959 Donga Ilbo took a dim view of his leadership, comparing him 
unfavourably with Troussier, the esteemed Japanese coach, who did not take long 
holidays and was famed for his diligence. It feared the embarrassment of South Korea 
being eliminated at the group stages while co-hosts Japan seemed likely to qualify for 
the second round.960 In early 2002, a poor performance by Hiddink‘s team in the Gold 
Cup competition held in the USA caused criticism to intensify. The former national team 
coach, Park Jong Whan, whose intensive training methods had helped the South Korean 
youth team to reach the semi-final in the 1983 FIFA Youth World Cup, took the lead:  
 
He (Hiddink) does not know South Korean football. Given the 
low individual skill level of South Korean footballers, he should 
have focused on building teamwork and devising tactics but he 
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has not even selected his players for the national squad yet.961 
 
The fact that Hiddink's girlfriend came to stay with him during the Gold Cup was used 
to suggest that Hiddink was not the right man for South Korean football. As the coach 
of one of South Korea‘s professional clubs pointed out, Hiddink‘s liberal attitudes did 
not match the Korean preference for abstinence and total dedication.962 Even so, the 
dismissal of Hiddink, however, was never discussed seriously, since the remaining time 
to the World Cup was too short.  
 
Despite this hostile atmosphere, Hiddink carefully prepared the national team for the 
World Cup finals in his own way.  It took some time before improvements were 
reflected in results but Hiddink was addressing some deep-seated problems, notably 
the hierarchy within the national squad which favoured senior players and the 
preferential treatment given to players from Yonsai and Korea, the two predominant 
universities in South Korean football, when it came to team selection. Hiddink tried to 
break down barriers within the squad, urging his players to communicate with each 
other directly and without deference on the pitch, irrespective of their ages, in order to 
bring them together.963 He was also prepared to draft in relatively unknown footballers 
such as Park Ji Sung if it was in the interest of the team.964 He also made important 
changes at a technical level confidently unveiling his ‗Power Programme‘ in March 2002 
to be carried out under the guidance of a newly-acquired Dutch physical trainer. This 
was designed, not merely to enhance stamina but to minimize recovery time. It involved 
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applying a scientific approach to players‘ diet and jogging and stretching exercises as 
players warmed down after training or a competitive match.965 This programme was 
designed to facilitate the formidable pressing and running game that South Korea 
employed successfully in 2002.  
 
It was also important for Hiddink to address South Korea‘s inferiority complex in 
relation to teams from Europe as little had been done to improve this psychologically 
disadvantageous situation. When Hiddink requested a pre-tournament friendly match 
against World Cup holders France in 2000, the KFA resisted, fearing a crushing defeat.966 
For South Korea to improve, however, such matches were necessary and at Hiddink‘s 
insistence a match with France was staged just five days before the 2002 tournament 
opened. Prior to this match South Korea had already beaten Scotland and drawn with 
England, results which helped the players to overcome their fear of European 
opposition. 967  South Korean confidence received a further boost from the team‘s 
performance against France, rated by some as the best team in the world going into 
the finals, even though the match was lost 3-2. ‗Now we are able to compete with any 
team‘, observed Park Ji Sung afterwards.968 The South Korean public was also feeling 
more confident as doubts about Hiddink‘s approach were dispelled. A South Korean 
football-loving professor reflected this mood in a post-match newspaper column asking 
if ‗you [the French] have ever been astonished as much since the day of the French 
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When the tournament began, the positions of South Korea and France were reversed. 
While the defending champions (without Zidane who was injured) did not reach the 
second round, South Korea exceeded all expectations by progressing to the semi-finals. 
The co-hosted World Cup finals of 2002 were the first in which teams from five different 
continents including Asia, Africa, and North America reached the quarter-finals.970 This 
amounted to a serious and unprecedented challenge to football‘s traditional world 
order dominated by Europe and South America. Indeed, the early departures of France, 
Portugal and Argentina the surprising success of countries such as South Korea ‗led 
many to talk of a new world order ‘.971 However, although the world order was changing, 
it is important to keep a sense of perspective. Many elite players arrived in South Korea 
fatigued from the physical and mental demands of the European football season. The 
French mid-field warrior, Patrick Vieira, who limped through the World Cup, explained 
that ‗it is impossible to be fresh after 38 [Premier] League games and 17 Champions 
League games‘. This was also the view of Franz Beckenbauer and FIFA announced that it 
was to launch an investigation into the possibility of ‗burnout‘ among the game‘s big 
stars. 972 Soon after the World Cup, UEFA responded to these concerns by abandoning 
the second league stage of the European Champions Cup in a bid to lessen the physical 
burden on top players in Europe.973  
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In 2002, many technically-gifted footballers exhausted by a long season and tighter pre-
tournament schedule struggled to match less skilful but well-organized teams; and it 
certainly did not help that the tournament started just sixteen days after the Champions 
League final. Fitness levels thus became the most critical determinant of success and 
failure. South Korea was what one might call the best ‗running team‘ in the World Cup 
in this regard and had clearly benefitted from a long and intensive training camp. With 
fifteen of South Korea‘s twenty-three squad players attached to domestic clubs it was 
especially advantageous that the start of the K-League season was deferred until after 
the World Cup in the interests of the national team. 974 Unlike their European 
counterparts Hiddink‘s players were not subject to competing demands as the KFA, as 
always, put country before club.975  
 
The physical strength and superior fitness of the South Koreans, who had not won a 
single game in their previous five World Cup final stage appearances, carried them 
through to the knock-out rounds where they won astonishing victories over Italy and 
Spain, two of the great powers of European football. However, these two victories were 
controversial and the old world order did not give way without protest. After being 
defeated 2-1 the Italian team smashed up the changing room in anger and claimed that 
they had been unfairly disadvantaged when Totti was sent off by the Ecuadorean 
referee. Conspiracy theories began to circulate and it was claimed that South Korea was 
a corrupted country. 976  FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, also criticized the referee for 
dismissing Totti, arguing that the incident did not justify a red card, ‗bearing in mind 
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that the same player had already been booked‘. So bitter were the Italians after their 
defeat that the Perugia club president sacked Ahn Jung Whan, the South Korean, whose 
‗golden goal‘ had decided the match.977 However, there was more sympathy for the 
Spanish than for the Italians. Italy had played defensively after taking the lead and 
scapegoating the referee helped to take pressure off the coach and the players.978 
Spain, beaten by South Korea 5-3 on penalties, also complained about a crucial decision 
which went against them in extra time when a goal by Morientes was disallowed by the 
Egyptian referee after what video replays confirmed had been an incorrect call by a 
linesman.979 As The Times noted, ‗South Korea are in the World Cup semi-finals, but 
they do not deserve to be there …. The departure of Spain may force people to 
recognize that this is becoming the World Cup of historic mistakes‘.980  
 
Yet, despite these controversies, there was much to admire in South Korea‘s progress to 
the semi-final. It was the incredible fitness level of the team that initially attracted the 
attention of football pundits and journalists. This was so striking that ‗[It] would be 
subsequently suggested that their exceptional stamina might have had chemical origins, 
but none of their players failed a dope test‘.981 World Soccer claimed that the South 
Koreans played bold attacking football with an ‗unshakeable belief in their own destiny‘ 
from beginning to end.982 After the win over Italy, the Japanese novelist, Murakami Ryu, 
coined the term ‗Dokonikudansen football‘ to describe the way that South Korea played; 
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this roughly translated as a sporting version of the hand-to-hand combat fought by 
commandos.983 As far as the South Korean media was concerned it was ‗fusion football‘, 
a combination of European stamina and know-how with South Korean speed and 
fighting spirit.984  
      
However the most surprising element of the South Korean phenomenon was the extent 
to which it was embraced by the whole nation. The host nation‘s run to the semi-final 
generated a football frenzy which some claimed was unprecedented in the history of 
World Cup football. ‗Home fans always get the most support at a World Cup but Fifa 
[sic] officials … say they have seen nothing like the events in Korea‘, noted one foreign 
press report. 985  South Korea‘s matches were watched by an estimated audience of 
twenty-two million, many of them wearing the red shirts of the national team and 
gathered in front of giant screens or electronic bulletin boards set up by local 
authorities in the streets and other public spaces. 986  As the multitude of street 
supporters who watched South Korea versus Portugal swelled to reach approximately 
three million, numbers viewing on television at home actually fell.987 Large screens and 
electric bulletin boards were beginning to establish themselves as an alternative to 
television sets in broadcasting global mega events to the public.988 They did not merely 
represent new media forms but expanded the concept of sport as a commodity. FIFA 
extracted significant fees for the broadcasting rights for public viewing of this kind and, 
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as at the stadiums, only products made by official World Cup sponsors could be sold at 
public viewing venues.989  
 
This new cultural phenomenon of gathering in public spaces to cheer on the national 
team was evident even before the tournament started. South Korean fans took the 
initiative at Gwangwhamoon in Seoul and ‗Red Devils‘ fan culture spread to a wider 
public during the pre-tournament games against Scotland, England, and France.990 The 
Red Devils took their title from the nickname of the South Korean team that had been 
so successful at the U-20 World Cup in 1983. Most of them were in their twenties and 
had sufficient experience of the internet to turn a cyber community into a real 
gathering.991 The enthusiasm of these young fans combined with the success of the 
national team encouraged people to leave their homes and take part in what was, in 
effect, a street festival. Their enthusiasm and exuberance was largely tolerated by the 
authorities, even when they climbed on public transport vehicles to celebrate a victory, 
whereas public viewing in Japan was suspended for fear that it might lead to 
disturbances.992  
 
There were spontaneity and conviviality in these public gatherings of the South Korean 
‗red army‘. Although it was predominantly youthful it encompassed people of all 
generations, who just wished to join this once-in-a-lifetime carnival.993 Though it could 
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be seen as a manifestation of excessive nationalism in that ‗people tended to regard 
being quiet or supporting in one‘s own way as inappropriate in this particular setting‘, a 
consensus emerged as to why South Koreans were pouring onto the streets in such 
large numbers. 994  Football had provided an opportunity for South Koreans to join 
together as they emerged from the aftermath of the IMF crisis of the late 1990s when 
mass redundancies and harsh austerity measures had dampened national morale.995 
Moreover, lurking behind the frenzied support for Hiddink and his team was a desire for 
political and social reform and, in particular, a desire for meritocracy over cronyism. 
Hiddink‘s selection policy – based entirely on performance and without regard to age 
and social status – had struck a chord, both in South Korean business circles and more 
widely.996  
 
The World Cup phenomenon had a profound impact on the presidential election that 
followed a few months later. Chung Mong Joon‘s decision to run for president was 
much indebted to his soaring popularity after the World Cup success.997 Although he 
would lose to Roh Moo Hyun in an opinion poll to decide the sole candidate of the 
liberal and centre-right parties, much of youthful enthusiasm associated with South 
Korea‘s World Cup fever was converted into political capital which Roh put to good use 
in his campaign.998 The younger generation‘s growing confidence saw the use of the 
internet for social purposes which had been so evident during the World Cup extended 
into the political arena. A Candle Memorial Ceremony after two South Korean middle 
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school girls had been hit and killed by a US armoured car, was organised by young 
internet users in November 2002. Widespread anger in South Korea, when an American 
military court acquitted the soldiers involved in the accident, prompted many ordinary 
people to participate in a peaceful demonstration.999 In the presidential election held in 
December 2002, Roh Moo Hyan, the progressive liberal candidate, was carried to victory 
on a wave of youthful support boosted by support generated through posting on the 
web.1000  
 
The World Cup fever in the South could be sensed across the border. Since 1990, a 
North Korean regional sport and entertainment television channel, Mansudae TV, whose 
main audience was in and around Pyongyang, had broadcast some recorded World Cup 
highlights at the end of every tournament, but all matches involving South Korea had 
been banned.1001 Yet, in 2002, the Pyongyang Broadcasting System, the state radio 
station, supplied details of a South Korean footballer‘s goal celebration after scoring the 
equalizer in the 1-1 draw with the United States; however, the fact that this match was 
part of the 2002 World Cup was not mentioned. The North Korean commentary on the 
goal celebration suggested that it illustrated ‗anti-American sentiments‘ and the ‗grudge‘ 
still felt in South Korea after one of their speed skaters at the 2002 Winter Olympics 
had been disqualified and missed a gold medal after impeding an American 
opponent.1002 It seems that the fact that this incident could be framed within the 
general context of anti-Americanism persuaded the North Korean authorities to risk 
broadcasting the details. It should be remembered that President Bush had declared in 
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February 2002 that North Korea was part of the world‘s ‗Axis of Evil‘.  
 
A few days later there was another significant breakthrough after South Korea‘s 
stunning victory over Italy when North Korean state television, Chosun Joongang, aired 
an edited, hour-long recording of the match. Though coverage had been edited to 
remove any close-up shots of the crowd ‗that might show the affluence, individuality, 
and character of the South Koreans‘, it was explained that the 2002 World Cup finals 
were being held in South Korea and that the victory had raised the morale of the South 
Korean people. 1003  Perhaps surprisingly, the North Korean commentator supported 
South Korea after Totti was sent off.  He commented on the controversial ruling: 'The 
referee correctly dealt with his [Totti‘s] simulation to get a spot kick'.1004 Support from 
this unexpected source   resonated amongst the South Koreans who were unhappy 
with claims that they had only won because of biased refereeing.1005 As the Korean 
(and English) proverb says, ‗blood is thicker than water‘, and it seemed that this was 
true. The South Korean media began to focus on ethnic commonalities. One Seoul 
newspaper observed that North Korea‘s victory over Italy in 1966 and South Korea‘s in 
2002 had something in common: the distinctive features of both North and South 
Korean football were speed and stamina.1006  
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Chosun Joongang TV went on to broadcast three more of South Korea‘s matches and 
observed that the team‘s top-four finish was a sign that the domination of the World 
Cup by European and South American countries had been broken.1007 Why did the 
North Korean regime decide to broadcast South Korea‘s games? To a certain degree the 
decision reflected the improving diplomatic relationship between North and South after 
summit talks were held in 2000 and an increasing focus on ethnic ties. It should also be 
remembered that increasing contact with the outside world and advancing means of 
communication made it very difficult for North Korea to block all news of what was 
happening in the South. However, it seems most likely that Kim Jong Il‘s regime had 
seized an opportunity to remind the people of the high point of North Korean football 
history. A published letter from the president of the North Korean Football Association 
to Chung Mong Joon noted that South Korea‘s victories had allowed all Koreans to 
experience the kind of pleasure that Park Do Ik and his team-mates had generated in 
1966. The fact that South Korea had beaten Italy, as their Northern brothers had done 
thirty-six years earlier, meant that this was a very suitable occasion for arousing 
nostalgic feelings amongst North Koreans. 1008 The Red Devils lifted up cards with a 
special message for the Italians, spelling out a message that would have been 
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(5) Conclusion  
 
If it had not been for the machinations of FIFA‘s internal politics the 2002 World Cup 
would probably have been hosted solely by Japan. South Korea was fortunate in this 
regard. Events on the field of play were also important. If it had not been for the 
miracle at Doha which allowed South Korea to qualify at Japan‘s expense in 1993 their 
bid would have lacked credibility. As the 2002 tournament progressed South Korea 
continued to outmanoeuvre their traditional rivals and former colonial masters. Japan, 
playing a more sophisticated passing game, reached the second round before they were 
eliminated; South Korea demonstrating a tenacious will to win advanced to the semi-
finals in front of the most enthusiastic home fans in the World Cup history. As World 
Soccer observed, ‗While Japan held their World Cup, Korea hosted theirs‘.1009  
 
While some of football‘s traditional great powers underperformed in 2002, a failure that 
probably owed much to the extreme pressures of European club football, the 
unexpected success of a South Korean team comprising players of average ability re-
emphasized the importance of fitness level and rigorous organization.1010 Locally, South 
Korea‘s performance provided a people who had become dispirited as a result of the 
harsh economic climate after 1997 with an opportunity to celebrate in an exuberant 
fashion. Viewing South Korea‘s matches on large screens in the streets and other public 
spaces created a new culture of fandom and taught the ‗World Cup generation‘ how to 
bring crowds together via the internet. This had significant implications both socially 
and in terms of politics and was an important feature of the December 2002 
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Presidential election. (It might be added here that the football frenzy of 2002 was 
focused entirely on the national team and did not carry over into the K-League where 
attendances boomed immediately after the World Cup but quickly dropped to more 
modest levels, as indicated by an average match attendance of 5,640 by October.)1011  
The 2002 World Cup also offered the two Koreas a short space of time in which they 
could share their national euphoria and pride as one ethnic race, rather than as 
ideologically-divided rivals. The South‘s victory over Italy reawakened the unforgettable 
upset which Park Do Ik and his North Korean colleagues had inflicted on Italy 1966. 
Placards on display during the game reading ‗Again 1966‘ showed that ‗South Korea 
was willing to borrow from the greatest moment in North Korean sporting history‘ and 
a strong sense of deja vu was turned into a reality.1012 Primarily because they were able 
to use it to remind their own people of one North Korea‘s greatest sporting 
achievements, the authorities in Pyongyang took a positive view of South Korea‘s victory 
over Italy and permitted judiciously edited recordings of its remaining matches to be 
broadcast on the main state-controlled television channel.1013 This may, as the North 
Korean match commentator hoped, have generated a pleasant nostalgic effect.1014 At 
the same time, it may have reminded North Koreans of the relatively poor current state 
of their men‘s football team, now marginalized by the success of the women‘s team at 
international level and the emergence of basketball as a mass sport.  
 
An article in La Gazetta Dello Sport satirized Italy‘s recurring Korean nightmare, ‗[Twice] 
a Korean team has stolen the [World Cup] trophy from us. In that sense, Korea is a 
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single entity‘. 1015  Indeed, the two victories over Italy in 1966 and 2002 helped 
metaphorically to dissolve the border which had separated North and South Korea for 
so many years. However, the renewed sense of unity between North and South did not 
last long; it was rudely interrupted when Kim Jong Il‘s navy initiated a skirmish with its 
Southern counterpart in the Yellow Sea on the day of the third-place play-off between 
South Korea and Turkey. The consolation final began with a moment of silence for the 
South Korean who had lost their lives.1016 However strong their ethnic and cultural links 
the two Koreas remained trapped by the ideological conflict from which they had 
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Over the course of the twentieth century, from the Japanese colonial period via the 
Korean War to the end of Cold War, Korea has been completely transformed. Football 
has played its part in this process especially when social and political transition 
influenced by internal and external pressures took place. Its role and its social and 
political significance have varied over the years as times and circumstances have 
changed. At different times, the Korean people have either played or watched football 
for a number of reasons – because it offered a way of asserting independence, because 
it offered a vehicle for national or regional pride, because it offered economic 
advantages to employers and encouraged sociability in the workplace. However, it 
should not be neglected that many people in Korea have played or watched football for 
sheer pleasure and with great enthusiasm unmatched by any other sport, even baseball. 
Had the Koreans not taken to football in this way, it could not have functioned as an 
important cultural indicator of their experience, at first in a united but colonized 
country and later in an ideologically-divided country over the past one hundred years.  
 
(1) Nationalism and Regionalism 
 
Nationalism was a key factor in ensuring that football became the most historically 
important sport in Korea. Under Japanese rule a strong connection was made between 
the practice of sport and nationalist sentiment as the Koreans began to resent the rule 
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of their masters and, at the same time, to realize that they should foster their strength 
to break away from the colonial shackle. One early indication of the widespread 
diffusion of sporting nationalism among the Korean public was the large number of 
young men‘s clubs being set up across the nation in the 1920s. These clubs attempted 
to imbue young people‘s minds with patriotism by way of promoting various sporting 
activities. In this process, modern sports, until that time largely the preserve of elite 
students born from affluent families, became more widely embraced by the people. Of 
the modern sports, football was the most suitable form for the clubs to adopt as their 
main game in that it required relatively little expense. Moreover, as a team sport 
requiring eleven players, football nicely fitted with the aim of promoting comradeship 
amongst the club members. Soon inter-club games were actively practiced. With the 
help of newly developed railway system, many clubs went on tour to other regions to 
play friendly matches. This grass-roots football boom led to the foundation of national 
tournaments held at Gyungsung and Pyongyang from 1921 onwards. Tournaments of 
this kind required playing to a common set of rules which were adopted in the various 
regional events that mushroomed subsequently. 1017  In turn, these regional events 
allowed sophisticated football sides from the cities to compete against each other but 
also provided opportunities for country football teams drawn from the rural areas in the 
locality of the host venue and often organized very rapidly on a scratch basis. 
 
Football was a useful medium for Koreans to express themselves as a nation because it 
was one in which they enjoyed a dominant position over their Japanese rulers.  It is not 
surprising that any sport at which the colonized excelled tended to symbolize national 
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resistance to the colonial oppressors. In Korea, during the colonial period some 
individual sporting heroes, such as Son Kee Jung, the Berlin Olympics marathon winner, 
and Um Bok Dong, the ‗great king of cyclists‘, came to embody anti-Japanese 
sentiments through their sporting successes. 1018  However, it was football, with its 
immense following and large attendances, that provided Koreans collectively with a 
medium through which they could express their patriotic sentiment more effectively 
than through any other sport. It was crucial that there was no other sport in which 
Korean teams were able to compete as successfully against the Japanese particularly 
from the 1920s onwards.1019 The Koreans enjoyed exceptional results in the prestigious 
football tournaments held in Japan: Soongsil Middle School from Pyongyang won the 
All Japan Middle School Football Championship in 1928; the Gyungsung team won the 
All Japan Football Championship and the Meiji Shrine Games in 1935; and Hamheung 
team won the Meiji Shrine Games two years in a row, 1939-40.  
 
At the time, Japan‘s foremost national game was baseball. Japanese colonizers brought 
bats and gloves with them to Korea in the hope that baseball could be helpful in 
acculturating Koreans into the fabric of Japanese imperialism. A number of public 
schools under Japanese control in Korea adopted baseball as their main school game 
and state-owned companies such as the railway bureau and Siksan Bank founded 
baseball teams.1020 Though it was led by Japanese expatriates, baseball in Korea was not 
their exclusive preserve. Quite a few middle schools and colleges set up by Korean 
nationalists or Western missionaries also had their baseball teams. However, baseball, a 
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relatively more expensive sport than football to take up, had limited appeal as a 
sporting expression of nationalist sentiment. It prospered mainly in the south that on 
the basis of teams founded by the Japanese. The northern part of Korea, where 
Japanese cultural impact was rather weak, showed little interest in baseball.  
 
While baseball was concentrated in southern cities, Korean football enjoyed more 
widespread popularity in the early twentieth century. Fierce rivalry between schools 
developed even in some parts of northeastern China where many Koreans – at first 
mainly northern poverty-stricken peasants and later those who fleeing from the 
Japanese oppression - had migrated since the late ninetieth century. Football‘s relatively 
popularity might be explained by the fact that the development of baseball skills in 
Korea relied heavily on Japanese assistance and on the contribution of Korean students 
who had experienced baseball at schools in Japan. 1021  Also, many Korean baseball 
players were employed in Japanese-controlled public companies or government 
offices.1022 Thus baseball was a game that many Koreans associated with their colonial 
oppressors. This - along with baseball‘s economic handicap - prompted the Koreans to 
embrace football more eagerly as their national sport, especially as there were few 
Korean baseball successes to celebrate. In this respect the Korean experience differed 
markedly from that of another Japanese colony, Taiwan, where successes at baseball - 
notably the Kano team‘s runner-up finish in the 1931 Koshien Summer Middle School 
Baseball Tournament in Japan – had a symbolic significance and helped to build a sense 
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of patriotic confidence amongst the Taiwanese.1023  
 
In contrast to baseball in Taiwan, Korean football in the colonial period was inextricably 
interwoven not with nationalism but with regionalism. As was often the case in other 
footballing nations, matches between neighbouring villages or towns in Korea during 
the colonial era tended to generate local rivalries that sometimes led to violence. In 
1928, one match in the north-west led to a bloody brawl involving several hundred 
peasants from two rural villages.1024 This was an indication of the growing enthusiasm 
for football and the intense passion that it could cause. However, football played in 
villages and small towns could not attract the large crowds necessary to sustain quality 
clubs capable of retaining top-level footballers and it was in the cities that the game 
became most strongly rooted. It was primarily at inter-city matches that football 
enthusiasts could express their local patriotism while enjoying play that demonstrated a 
high degree of skills. Of the inter-city rivalries that developed in the period, the most 
significant in a wider social and political context, was between the two biggest cities, 
Gyungsung and Pyongyang.  
 
Gyungsung was the centre on which all the Korean cultural and economic forces 
converged. The people of Gyungsung who were relatively heterogeneous in terms of 
origin witnessed the rise of school and club football from the very early stage of the 
sport‘s development. School grounds and some other flat plots offered good places for 
the Gyungsung public to play football, and many important football games took place 
                                           
1023 C. Lin and P. Lee, ‗Sport as a Medium of National Resistance: Politics and Baseball in Taiwan during 
Japanese Colonialism, 1895-1945‘, The International Journal of the History of Sport, 24 (3), Mar 2007, 
331-333. 
1024 Donga Ilbo, 16 Feb 1928.  
269 
 
at the Gyungsung stadium built by the Japanese authorities in 1925. The first national 
football tournament was organized in the capital city by the Chosun Sports Association 
in 1921. Football culture in Gyungsung was thus supported by a well-equipped 
infrastructure which allowed it to develop as an elite sport in schools and academic 
institutions and while encouraging spectator interest in inter-city and national 
competitions. The two most prestigious private colleges in Gyungsung, Yeonhee and 
Bosung sucked in most of the country‘s best footballing prospects. At the same time, 
Gyungsung‘s economic affluence allowed the foundation of Chosun Football Club, which 
was said to be the best team in Korea in the late 1920s. 
 
Pyongyang was another place in which modern sports could flourish. It was the most 
highly Christianized city in colonial Korea with many mission schools and churches 
which encouraged a variety sporting activities, not least football. The people of 
Pyongyang were largely unified by their attachment to Christianity, a homogeneity that 
was reinforced by a relatively loose social hierarchy, factors that helped to develop a 
strong sense of local identity. In addition, Pyongyang‘s thriving coal, rubber and textile 
industries relied on a host of manual workers, who were likely to require amusing 
entertainment, such as watching or playing football on their days off. In addition, there 
was in Pyongyang a deep-seated resentment of Gyungsang-based centralism and this 
proved a powerful incentive to promote the rapid modernization of the community in 
order to keep abreast of developments in the southern capital. Football soon became 
the oxygen which kept Pyongyang‘s strong sense of rivalry with Gyungsung burning. 
The Pyongyang YMCA set up a national football tournament in 1921, just three months 
after the first national tournament at Gyungsung. Later, in 1926 the Pyongyang ACFC 
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began operating under the aegis of the Gwanseo Sports Association, an independent 
sports body outside the sphere of influence of the national sports organization which 
was mainly controlled by nationalists in Gyungsung, political rivals to the Pyongyang 
nationalists. Although fighting for the same cause of Korean independence, they were 
very envious of each other ‘s success.  
 
Any match between the two rival cities had the potential to develop into a mass brawl 
involving partisan fans on the pitch, the charged atmosphere rendering these matches 
highly popular and profitable. Under these circumstances the Gyung-Pyong Football 
Championship was first organized in 1929, a magnificent sports spectacle which 
attracted large crowds, many of whom came to see a Pyongyang footballer, Kim Young 
Geun whose good looks in conjunction with his marvelous skill made him a magnet, 
not only for men but also women, particularly Gisaengs. 1025   From 1929 to 1935, 
Pyongyang generally had an edge over Gyungsung in this championship with nine wins, 
five loses, and seven draws.1026 Local interest in the championship was also higher in 
Pyongyang and large numbers of their fans would make the three-hour journey by train 
to Gyungsung when the championship was held at Hwimoon or the Baejae school 
grounds and Gyungsung Stadium.1027 When the Pyongyang and Gyungsung clubs were 
organized in the 1930s, many old boys‘ and regional young men‘s clubs began to give 
way to city-based clubs. As a result, the Tri-city Football Championship between 
Gyungsung, Pyongyang and Hamheung and All Chosun Inter-City Football 
Championship were set up in 1938. The establishment of the Gyung-Pyong 
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Championship in particular seems to transform Korean football into a competitive game 
amongst cities. In this period, the Hamheung club in the north-east developed rapidly 
owing to enormous financial assistance from its patrons and began to challenge the 
Gyungsung-Pyongyang duopoly that had existed previously.  
 
As far as football in the colonial period was concerned, the north of Korea, with 
Pyongyang its centre, almost constituted a football nation in its own right. This intense 
football partisanship was based on a strong sense of regionalism and was encouraged 
to develop by the successes achieved by Pyongyang or Hamheung in matches against 
Gyungsung. A comparison might be made with Scotland where popular nationalism was 
channeled through football particularly through the relative success achieved by the 
Scottish national side in matches against England.1028 However, the overriding concern 
for people from Pyongyang, who had immense pride in their football, was undoubtedly 
to establish a sovereign state for all Koreans, rather than an independent state of their 
own. To them, the great victory of Soongsil at Tokyo in 1928, as well as being a  
demonstration of their own capabilities was also a vindication of the oppressed Korean 
people‘s ethnic superiority over the ruling Japanese. Northerners in general and people 
in Pyongyang in particular attempted to promote their local patriotism within the 
Korean independence movement while wishing to take a leading role in achieving this 
ultimate goal. Football was a definite indicator that they were able to outperform the 
southerners amid the struggle for independence.  
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This regional battle in football was turned into a zero-sum national contest between 
capitalists in the South and socialists in the North after the Korean War. The last Gyung-
Pyong Football Championship held in Seoul in 1946 was ominous.  At the time the 
north was effectively controlled by the Soviet army and Pyongyang team honed their 
skills through some matches against Soviet army sides. After the championship they 
were not permitted to stay in the south and the victorious Pyongyang team was 
welcomed by a Communist Party led by Kim Il Sung. In the years that followed there 
was a corresponding development of football nationalism in the south.  
 
The fires of South Korean football nationalism began to be stoked up in the immediate 
years following the civil war. This owed much to the contribution of footballers from the 
north, some of whom had crossed the border amid the chaotic distractions of the war 
and others who had been educated at colleges in Seoul during the Japanese period and 
later settled down in their adopted city after the liberation. Footballers hailing from 
what was now North Korea helped the South Korean national team to beat Japan in 
1954, a win that ensured a place in the final stages of the World Cup for the first time 
in Korean football history. The qualifying fixture against the Japanese was the first 
international football match between the two nations and victory provided the South 
Koreans with reassurance that in football they were still stronger than their former rulers 
as had been the case in the ‗domestic internationals‘ during the colonial era. It was also 
regarded as sweet revenge for being ruled by the Japanese, pervasive sentiments which 
were reflected in the nationwide warm welcome given to the team. Taking a firm stance 
on Japan, such as prohibiting Japanese footballers from entering into the country for 
the qualifying match, President Rhee was particularly happy with this sporting 
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achievement.1029 However, the national celebration would have been impossible without 
the influx of northern talent, notably Choi Jung Min. It was ironic that South Korean 
football nationalism owed so much to them given the intense rivalry between the two 
states that was to develop later. 
 
For a time football in South Korea looked set to prosper with the national team winning 
the Asian Cup in 1956 and 1960. The government even built a new football stadium to 
host the 1960 tournament, despite its financial difficulties at the time. Yet South Korean 
football was gradually entering a period of decline which was suggestive of its society 
handicapped by corrupt, weak governments and political instability. The regeneration of 
football from the late 1960s was instigated by the military regime headed by Park 
Chung Hee. In the wake of North Korea‘s stunning success in the 1966 World Cup, 
South Korea, where politics and society were steeped in anti-communism began to 
assign much more importance to their football. Indeed, it became something of a 
national obsession particularly after North Korea began to take part in the Asian Games 
and Asian Cup in the 1970s. With an annual international football tournament being set 
up to enhance the quality of the national side in 1971, The ‗FC Korea‘ phenomenon 
became embedded in South Korean popular culture. In the 1970s a tradition began to 
take root with many supporters gathering in tea rooms to support the national team 
while watching important international matches on television. This culminated in crowds 
in the streets cheering in front of giant screens, as South Koreans regained confidence 
through the success of the 2002 World Cup tournament. Public interest in any domestic 
competition was now completely dwarfed by concern for the national team in 
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international competitions, a trend that continued even after the launching of 
professional football in the 1983. The professional game in South Korea where 
attachment to local clubs is weak has been plagued by low attendances and little media 
exposure. Most of the stadiums purpose-built in South Korea for the 2002 World Cup 
became ‗white elephants‘.1030 As the BBC has aptly observed, football in South Korea 
‗begins and ends with the national team‘.1031  
 
North Korea has undergone a general transformation since the Communist Party took 
control. However, it was in the post-Korean War period that a centralized and planned 
system established a sturdy substructure conducive to developing elite sports along 
Soviet lines. Many multi-sports clubs and youth sports schools were set up to produce 
‗state amateurs‘ for the international stage in the late 1950s. All sporting talents flocked 
into the clubs in Pyongyang and footballers followed this trend. This centralization of 
football resources in North Korea was evident in the composition of the national team 
for the 1966 World Cup: the twenty-two strong national squad all played for clubs in 
Pyongyang.1032 The 1966 team, in this respect, might be the Asian equivalent of the 
Hungarian team in the early 1950s, albeit without the latter ‘s sophisticated skills.1033 The 
‗Magical Magyars‘ were the product of communist state‘s power focusing solely on 
making a good national team with all players on the national team being concentrated 
in a few clubs.1034 North Korean football witnessed its high water mark in 1966, when 
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reaching quarter-finals of the World Cup in England by beating Italy, a victory which 
was deeply imprinted on the minds of the people as evidence that North Korea‘s 
socialist economy and society were moving in the right direction. However, since 1966, 
football in the North has never regained the glory of their golden age, mainly due to 
political interference from the autarchic regime, purging many World Cup heroes from 
the football world and ordering the national team to boycott major international 
tournaments.  
 
Football, which has been referred to as ‗heavy industry of sports‘ in the military-centred 
Asian communist state, was a very useful propaganda tool for the Communist Party, 
since it was the most popular sport in the North and the success of the national team 
had a great impact on national consciousness.1035 Yet in the early 1990s the Party‘s 
support for North Korean men‘s football, which was seen as underperforming on the 
international stage, gave way to official support for women‘s football. The decision to 
switch the main sport of the Party appeared to pay off. However, the success of North 
Korean women‘s football in the 2000s, including victory in the FIFA Under-20 Women‘s 
tournament in 2006 did not seem to give the wider public as much hope or self-esteem 
their men‘s football had done in 1966. Setting aside the gap between men‘s and 
women‘s football in popularity, any propaganda campaign utilizing football was by this 
time unlikely to win the hearts and minds of North Koreans, who were in extreme 
poverty from the 1990s onwards and desperately needed ‗bread‘ not ‗circuses‘.  
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(2) Internationalism and Globalism  
 
The Cold War was rooted in fear of mutually-assured destruction with each of the 
superpowers committed to a strategic arms race where the aim was to counterbalance 
the nuclear weapons stockpiled by its ideological rival.1036 As the dangers of open 
military conflict were so great a huge importance was attached to ideological warfare 
conducted via diplomacy and also through various cultural and sporting competitions 
to which enormous importance was attached. For the two Koreas, which were on 
opposite sides of the divide, football fitted neatly into the practice of Cold War politics. 
While North Korean football was in the ascendant from the early 1960s through to its 
climax in 1966 and a little beyond, South Korea avoided football contact – as at the 
Asian Games of 1974 - fearing that its team would be defeated and thus hand a 
propaganda victory to its ideological enemy. However, at the same time, the South 
Korean military regime lent its enormous energy to the development of football in 
order to catch up with the North during the 1970s and eventually attain football 
superiority over its rival in the 1980s. While a two-year international ban was imposed 
on North Korean football due to violent conduct towards a referee in the 1982 Asian 
Games, South Korea qualified for the 1986 World Cup. Since then South Korea has 
always succeeded at the regional preliminary stages of the world‘s premier football 
tournament. Now that South Korean football had improved there was no reason to 
avoid contact with North Korea 
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During the 1970s and 1980s, Korean ‗derbies‘ at any level were keenly contested in a 
very strained atmosphere. A feeling of sporting rivalry between the North and South 
was very strong in this period.1037 The people of both nations followed such matches 
with great interest and some footballers on both sides became household names as a 
result of an excellent performance in North-South contests. The fierce Cold War 
intensity of these football matches might be compared to the experience of West and 
East Germans when their national teams confronted each other in the 1974 World 
Cup.1038 The difference is that the Korean Derby still takes place while the German 
Derby has never been held since 1974 due to East Germany‘s deliberate avoidance of a 
rematch against in order to preserve their historic victory of 1974 and, after 1990, to the 
reunification of Germany.1039  
 
Changes in the international situation following the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the East bloc from 1989 encouraged the two Koreas to arrange  football ‗friendlies‘ in 
1990 and to organize a Korean Unification Team for the Under-20 World Cup in 1991. 
However, this rapprochement did not mean the end of their intense North-South 
competition on the playing field, although the tension surrounding matches was 
somewhat alleviated, especially on the side of the South which could now approach 
such contests with confidence of a favourable result. Meanwhile, after a humiliating 3-0 
defeat by the South in 1993, North Korea actively drafted in some talented Korean-
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Japanese footballers into the national team and permitted some North Korean 
prospects to gain experience by playing abroad.1040 Their efforts to narrow the gap 
between themselves and South Korea partly bore fruit as shown by achieving one draw 
and a narrow defeat in the regional qualifying matches for the 2010 World Cup. Indeed, 
North Korea eventually reached the World Cup finals in South Africa.  
 
For football in both North and South Korea, a commitment to internationalism was 
important. There were political and diplomatic advantages to be gained from sporting 
contact with other countries; also such contacts strengthened football culture and 
improved the tactical awareness and skills of Korean players on both sides of the border. 
For North Korea, football contacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from the 
late 1950s onwards were crucial to the achievement of the ‗miracle‘ of 1966, since they 
provided lessons in how to cope with the superior physical strength of European teams. 
The victory of the Pyongyang team over Moscow Spartak during their Soviet tour in 
1961 was especially significant. It gave much confidence and pride to the North Korean 
footballers in that it was a win over one of the best clubs in the Soviet Union, the 
world‘s leading communist power.1041 
 
It was also important for North Korea to cultivate football contacts nearer home. 
Indonesia, led by the leftist Sukarno, was the first South East Asian nation with which 
North Korea sought to establish diplomatic relations from the late 1950s. Sukarno 
fancied himself as the leader of the Third World and organized the Bandung Conference 
in 1955 to bring together the newly-independent Asian and African states under the 
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political banner of ‗neither Moscow nor Washington‘.1042 When the Sino-Soviet dispute 
was deepening in the early 1960s, North Korea increasingly needed new allies so as to 
be independent of the two Communist rivals. This prompted Kim Il Sung to participate 
in a multi-sport event for Third World countries, the GANEFO in Indonesia in 1963. Two 
years later, North Korea staged the Asian Football GANEFO and won the tournament.  
 
During the years from its independence to the early 1970s, the scope of South Korea‘s 
football diplomacy was largely restricted to South-East Asia. South Korea participated in 
the Merdeka Cup in Malaysia and the King‘s Cup in Thailand in the late 1960s and 
invited many Asian nations to its own Park‘s Cup from 1971. The inauguration of the 
Park‘s Cup was partly influenced by the popularity of the tournaments in Malaysia and 
Thailand, where football was used for helping to strengthen nationalist sentiment. South 
Korea had already begun to take steps to develop the quality of its national football 
team by way of government-led schemes in response to North Korea‘s success at the 
1966 World Cup. Participation in these tournaments was crucial to foster not only 
football skills but to strengthen ties with other Asian states, many of whom shared same 
anti-communist values.   
 
Though the 1970s were a period of détente as far as the relationship between the two 
Koreas was concerned there was an element of competition in the way that each 
sought to establish good relations with as many countries as they could, capitalist or 
communist. Football played an important part in this competitive diplomacy. When 
North Korea established diplomatic relations with the five Scandinavia countries in 1973, 
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a team comprising some of its World Cup heroes played seven matches on a tour of 
Sweden and Norway.1043  This prompted the South Korean government to recall its 
ambassador in Stockholm in protest, since Sweden was the first Western nation to fully 
recognize North Korea. 1044  South Korea attempted to improve its relations with 
communist nations through football in this period but with little success though a youth 
team was sent in 1975 to compete in the Prince‘s Cup in Iran, where they played 
against East European sides such as Poland and Hungary in 1975, the first football 
contact between South Korea with those countries.1045  
 
It was however over the Middle East that the diplomatic warfare through football was 
most keenly waged. North Korea actively colluded with the Arab states to isolate their 
respective enemies, South Korea and Israel in the sports world. A North Korea ban on 
football contacts with Israel in the early 1970s helped to ensure the support of many 
Arab kingdoms supported North Korea. Support from Iran made it possible for North 
Korea to participate in the Teheran Asian Games for the first time in 1974. South Korea 
made its own overtures to Iran inviting the Iranian national team in 1971. With the rise 
in oil prices after 1973 and a construction boom in the Middle East leading to intense 
competition to win building contracts South Korea further reason to seek a closer 
relationship with the oil-producing countries in that region. The South Korean youth 
selects were sent to Iran in 1975 and the Iranian footballers paid a return visit to play in 
the Park‘s Cup in the same year. Lebanon also went to South Korea for this tournament 
despite the efforts of North Korean agents who worked in the Middle East to persuade 
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the Lebanese football officials not to stay away.1046 
 
The football diplomacy conducted by North and South Korea was, at times, ambiguous 
and inconsistent for many reasons. The competitive nature of the most globalised game 
on the international stage means that winning an international football match tends to 
be a primary concern for many countries regardless of diplomatic necessities. For North 
and South Korea, as for other countries, international fixtures have often been played 
with little friendship and sometimes downright antagonism as teams sought to assert 
their national strength by winning the games. The Middle East nations, as mentioned 
before, were strategically very important to South Korea but also provided difficult 
opposition in advancing to the World Cup finals and Olympics. Moreover there was 
widespread suspicion amongst South Koreans that the Arab nations frequently bought 
off referees before crucial matches and this led to much unpleasantness whenever 
controversial refereeing decisions led to a defeat by an oil-rich country, especially in the 
1980s. North Korea‘s relationship with China was far from comradely when it came to 
international football. When they played each other in 1979 in preparation for the 
regional qualifying round of the 1980 Olympics, it was pre-arranged at the North 
Koreans‘ suggestion, that the match should end in a 3-3 draw. Yet, when the match was 
played, the North Korean footballers made a determined effort to beat China, winning 
4-3, a result that embarrassed the Chinese.1047 
 
Memories of Japanese colonial rule tended to render any football match between either 
of the two Koreas and Japan fierce and bitter. Both North and South Koreans bore 
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grudges from the colonial era and in both countries much more attention was focused 
on winning over Japan than any other country. South Korea generally enjoyed 
dominance over Japan in international football to such an extent that its supporters 
came to expect victory on every occasion that the two teams met. If defeated by Japan 
the South Korean national team came under severe criticism. Even though Japan had 
performed well at the 1968 Olympics winning the bronze medal South Korea, its 
principal regional rival in football terms, held the upper hand in important matches 
between the two countries in the 1970s and 1980s. It was only after the J-league had 
been set up in 1993 that Japan began to match South Korea in international football. 
Although Japan defeated South Korea in a World Cup preliminary match in 1993, they 
failed to qualify for the final stage of the tournament, South Korea beating them on 
goal difference. However, a yet more embarrassing moment awaited Japanese football 
when it was decided that the 2002 World Cup would be jointly hosted by Japan and 
South Korea. This considerably disappointed the Japanese football authorities   who 
had been convinced that they would win the right to stage the tournament alone. 
Coming after the International Olympic Committee‘s decision in 1981 to award the 1988 
Games to Seoul rather than Nagoya this was regarded as a major setback for Japanese 
sports diplomacy.1048  
 
The honours have been evenly divided in international matches between North Korea 
and Japan since the Korean War. For example, in the World Cup preliminaries, North 
Korea gained victories in the 1982 and 1990 qualifying matches while Japan won in 
1986 and 1994. Outside these tournaments there were few football contacts though in 
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1974, during a period of détente, a North Korean club visited Japan and played a 
number of matches including one against the national representative team, winning 
them all. The purpose of this tour, however, was principally to advertise the 
achievements of the North Korean regime and to impress the many Korean exiles living 
in Japan and to foster a connection with them. At this stage, the North Korean football 
could still draw on the legacy of 1966, which remained a great source of national pride, 
and much effort went into the development of school and club football with a view to 
producing ‗another Park Do Ik‘.1049 The search extended to Japan and North Korea 
began to select Japanese-based Koreans for internationals from the 1970s. By the turn 
of the century they were making an increasingly important contribution to its football. 
 
The global diffusion had been a feature of modern football since the late ninetieth 
century. Thereafter interest in playing and watching the game spread to the populations 
of industrialized Europe, to countries in South America which formed part of Britain‘s 
informal empire of trade and commerce, and also to European colonies in Africa and 
Asia through the influence of missionaries and other cultural imperialists.1050 However, 
the extent to which football had become a global game did not become truly visible 
until after the Second World War when FIFA witnessed an unprecedented increase in 
the number of countries in membership as a plethora of new sovereign states emerged 
in the era of   decolonialization. FIFA‘s World Cup, like the Olympic Games, provided an 
arena in which newly independent nation states, such as North and South Korea, could 
reshape and revive their national identities in the emerging new world order while 
announcing their arrival to a global audience by virtue of the via new developments in 
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media communication, primarily television. However, there was a structural problem to 
be overcome in that it was extremely difficult for the   fledgling nation-states to reach 
the final stages of World Cup tournaments on account of the uneven distribution of 
places for the world‘s greatest football spectacle. Only in 1970 were Asia and Africa 
each allocated a place in the finals for the first time.1051 When the number of finalists 
was raised to twenty-four in 1982, Africa and Asia were each granted an additional 
place.1052 But it was not until 1998 that the most significant breakthrough occurred with 
five teams from Africa and four from Asia among the thirty-two finalists.1053  
 
This increase in the number of participating nations for the tournament resulted from 
the political and economic aspirations of former Brazilian FIFA president, Joao 
Havelange and it helped to improve in football in Africa and Asia. The World Cup in 
1966 had been the first tournament in which these signs of change were evidently 
detected. African countries had boycotted tournament the grounds that only one ticket 
to the finals was allowed for Asia and Africa. However, it was important that North 
Korea, an unknown outsider, made such a great impression, especially with their great 
games against Italy and Portugal and finished in the top-eight. The African boycott and 
North Korea‘s performance helped to make a case for reform and the dominance of 
European and South American countries within FIFA came under increasing pressure. It 
helped the African and Asian countries that a number of countries from South America 
who had performed poorly at the 1966 finals were also unhappy with the current 
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arrangements for the World Cup finals which they claimed favoured the Europeans.1054 
They expressed discontent over how the 1966 finals had been organized, believing that 
they had been disadvantaged by the selection of referees. Also, as Havelange, then 
president of the Brazilian Confederation of Sport made clear at the time, they were also 
angered by the controversial late decision to move England‘s semi-final match with 
Portugal to Wembley.1055 Sensing that a wind of change was about to blow through 
world football Havelange began to campaign against the incumbent FIFA president, 
England‘s Sir Stanley Rous, and finally succeeded in replacing him in 1974, an event of 
great symbolic significance in the history of the world game. Havelange had built a 
powerful anti-European coalition by promising African and Asian countries more places 
at future World Cup finals. Though Havelange was subsequently associated with the 
more intensive commercialization of the World Cup and other FIFA competitions, he 
kept his word as far as Third World countries were concerned by allocating more World 
Cup finals places to them while also backing football development programmes and 
new tournaments in Africa and Asia via lucrative and sometimes controversial deals with 
corporate sponsors such as Coca Cola and Adidas.1056  
 
As far as South Korean football was concerned, the two most important football 
tournaments were both connected with the Havelange‘s globalizing initiatives. The 
World Youth Football Championship set up in 1977 was used by FIFA to encourage the 
national associations in the football‘s under-developed regions by increasing the 
bidding opportunities for tournament hosting rights and offering them a showcase for 
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their football prowess. Indeed, South Korea‘s semi-final appearance in the 1983 Youth 
Championship provided the first meaningful opportunity to showcase its football to a 
worldwide audience. Though this was important the key factor was the fairer 
distribution of World Cup final places after 1982 without which South Korea would not 
have reached the final stages of the World Cup on four consecutive occasions between 
1986 and 1998.  
 
When it came to selecting the hosts for the 2002 World Cup, however, South Korea 
found itself in a new political situation within FIFA where Havelange‘s autocratic style 
had begun to create enemies, especially in UEFA. With Havelange openly backing a bid 
from Japan to stage the tournament, Chung Mong Joon was able to forge an alliance 
between South Korea and the European associations to work against the president. This 
is why the bidding battle between the two Asian nations was also viewed as a power 
struggle between Europe and Latin America. Thus the first co-hosted tournament was 
the product of global football politics. It also clearly showed that the contest to stage 
the finals was no longer simply a matter of deciding between bidding nations among 
the world‘s established football powers. The tournament that followed underlined this 
point when traditional world football powers fared relatively badly in the first World Cup 
held in Asia. With South Korea reaching the semi-finals and Africa, Asia and North 
America respectively providing three of the eight quarter-finalists – along with a number 
of unexpected results – it appeared that World Cup success was no longer the preserve 
of the big European and South American associations. In demonstrating that a new 
competitive balance between the different confederations had emerged the 2002 finals 





Unlike many football-loving African nations, Korean football in the early stages was little 
influenced by its colonizing power, Japan. It was missionaries who were more significant 
in establishing and sustaining disseminate Korean football culture through organizing 
school football teams and the activities of YMCA. Buddhism and some Korean local 
religions followed suit, but their efforts to foster football was rather insignificant 
compared with the role of Christianity. Korean nationalists also contributed by 
encouraging young men across the country to play football, seeing the game as a way 
of demonstrating independence from the Japanese. Football was widely reported in 
Korean newspapers often in terms invoking patriotic ardour. In addition, newspapers 
sponsored a variety of football matches and tournaments, exploiting football for 
commercial as well as patriotic reasons, even though they may not always have 
benefited directly from these initiatives. Meanwhile some wealthy Koreans with an 
interest in modernizing Korean culture, including sport, more generally, gave financial 
support to football clubs. Sometimes this had wider strategic significance as when Baik 
Myung Gon, the son of major landowner, bankrolled Chosun Football Club‘s Japanese 
tour in 1926 and good results were achieved against top-class Japanese teams.1057  
 
Football in Pyongyang, where the most enthusiastic fans in Korea were to be found 
during the Japanese period, provides some useful evidence concerning the relationship 
between patrons and football. A broad spectrum of football patrons in Pyongyang 
including Gisaengs, mill owners, missionaries and local churchgoers helped to create the 
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Korea‘s foremost football city. It was a marked feature of Pyongyang football that so 
many teams based on churches and workplaces sprang up, reflecting the culture of this 
totally Christianized city with its growing industrial base centred on the rubber and 
hosiery. In the late 1930s the dominance of Pyongyang and Gyungsung in Korean 
football was seriously challenged by the rise of Hamheung. The principal financial 
supporters of Hamheung Football Club were a local entrepreneur, civil servant and 
surgeon, all of them well-connected with Japanese high-ranking officials. They were able 
to offer talented footballers jobs with a steady income. This gave them an advantage 
and was a major reason for Hamheung‘s success.  
 
Since the Korean War, the development of North and South Korean football has been 
enormously indebted to the support from their respective governments. The fluctuating 
fortunes of North Korean football have been particularly dependent on the Communist 
Party‘s policy. The Party fully understood football‘s potential propaganda value and 
intervened to organize North Korean football systematically from the late 1950s with 
immense support from the military and police. Support from the state along with the 
experience gained by North Korea‘s footballers in their encounters with East European 
teams built confidence and were fundamental to what was achieved in England at the 
succeeding 1966 World Cup. When Kim Jong Il consolidated his power in order to be 
designated as the successor of his father in the 1970s, he took advantage of the 
popularity of football, one of his two main propaganda tools along with films. This 
entailed the foundation of the April 25 club, also known as the ‗Cinema Football Club‘ 
which  made successful football tours to South Eastern Asia and Japan in 1973 and 
1974 respectively and reconfirmed the relatively high standard of North Korean football 
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compared with other Asian countries.  
 
However power struggles within the party leading to political interference in football 
have marred further development of football in the North since 1966. Sometimes 
footballers were sent to labour camps or factories in the hinterland or border area and 
on occasions the national team was barred from participating in international 
competition on the order of Kim‘s family. As a result, men‘s football was weakened 
leading Kim‘s regime to switch its support to women‘s support in the 1990s where there 
seemed to be a greater opportunity for North Korea to make a mark in international 
competition. In a very short period, thanks to mainly traditional socialist forms of 
sponsorship, North Korean women‘s football reached Asia‘s top level. For the North 
Korean government this seemed the most effective way of promoting women‘s football 
and enhancing the skill of its players and in this sense it differed from China where 
development of the women‘s game was hindered to some extent by financial 
constraints. Indeed, North Korea stuck to the traditional socialist state-sponsorship 
model in striking contrast to Eastern Europe where commercial sponsors became 
involved from the end of the 1980s as clubs began to operate autonomously without 
intervention from the state.1058  
 
In South Korea the popularity of football and the passions aroused by the national team 
encouraged political leaders to take the game very seriously. After the Korean War, the 
Rhee administration was looking for ways to bind the people together and football 
provided one obvious way of achieving this outcome especially after South Korea 
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football defeated Japan in a 1954 World Cup qualifying match and won the Asian Cup 
in 1956. Inspired by this success, the government constructed a football stadium for the 
1960 Asian Cup at Hyochang Park in Seoul. This proved highly controversial, however, as 
many independence fighters, including Kim Ku, a Rhee‘s political rival, had been buried 
at the park.  And the construction plan originally involved the relocation of their 
graves.1059 Under the Rhee government, domestic football was entirely controlled by 
the military and became a cause of intense competition between rival commanders 
seeking to have the best team. Thus, in the 1950s and early 1960s, many talented 
players in search of recognition at international level career played their football and 
developed their skills while serving in the armed forces.  
 
During the early 1960s, however, military football began to be edged out by company 
football. By this time, South Korea was experiencing a period of political instability after 
Rhee‘s presidency ended in 1960 and the coup staged by Park Chung Hee in 1961. The 
switch from military to corporate sponsorship was in line with the Physical Education 
and Sports Promotion Law enacted by Park‘s regime in 1962, which encouraged 
companies to develop at least one sports team. 1060  There were some state-owned 
companies‘ and government departments‘ football clubs, but the two most successful 
club sides that emerged, each producing many South Korean internationals, were run by 
private companies. Cheil Mojik was noted for attracting excellent footballers from other 
clubs run by companies with worse wages and conditions and Geumsung Bangjik had 
the finest pitch in South Korea.1061  
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After North Korea‘s sensational success in 1966, the government in the South 
accelerated its football promotion strategy. KCIA, an appendage of the regime 
organized a team, presumably on the orders of the leadership, and a relative of Park 
was given responsibility for the development of football as president of KFA. His main 
achievement was the establishment of a new league in which teams sponsored by 
various banks featured prominently. Bank football clubs could provide footballers with a 
more stable income even after their retirement by allowing them to become a bank 
employee. He also masterminded the inauguration of the Park‘s Cup in 1971 inviting the 
national teams of many other Asian countries to South Korea. With South Korea‘s Park‘s 
Cup and other Asian international football tournaments booming in the 1970s, the radio 
and television became critical in purveying international football matches to the South 
Koreans. This led to intensified competition between rival television companies for the 
broadcasting rights to international football fixtures. Major newspapers, which had been 
deeply involved in sponsoring football tournaments in Korea since the Japanese period, 
increasingly lost their influence on the football industry from this period onwards and 
focused instead on promoting the popular domestic high school baseball tournaments. 
 
The Jeon government in the 1980s took full advantage to build on the economic 
development dating from the previous decade and football‘s ascending popularity. The 
professionalization of South Korean football in 1983 would have been impossible 
without a cluster of affluent Chaebols (conglomerates) along with Jeon‘s strategy of 
investing in sport which he saw as a useful medium of social control. Increasing 
international football contacts as South Korea tried unsuccessfully to reach World Cup 
finals in the 1970s eventually paid off in the 1980s when the South Korean youth team 
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reached the semi-finals of the World Youth Football Championship in 1983 and when 
the national team advanced to   the World Cup finals in 1986, the first time in thirty-
two years that a South Korean team had competed at this level. While these successes 
helped to underpin the regime live broadcasting generated huge advertising revenues 
for the media companies as football established itself as the most profitable sports 
content in an age of colour television. During the 2002 World Cup bidding campaign, 
South Koreans fully understood that losing the hosting rights to their arch-rival, Japan, 
would be a national disaster. It was for this reason that all available national resources 
were exploited to win the bidding contest. The battle against Japan for the 2002 World 
Cup unified the people across the political and religious spectrum. Broadcasting 
companies competed keenly with each other in inviting famous foreign clubs, such as 
Juventus and AC Milan, to play in Korea. Many Chabeols donated funds and supported 
the work of the South Korean bidding committee. Chung Mong Joon's Hyundai 
conglomerate, in particular, became very actively involved and was later rewarded when 
it was nominated as an official partner for FIFA‘s World Cup tournament. Like the South 
Korean government the corporations believed that they would benefit from South 
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(4) The Korean style of play 
 
In football, an awareness of variations in the way that different nations played the game 
developed with the emergence of international competitions from the early the 
twentieth century onwards.1063 Competing styles were first recognized in Korea after the 
first Gyung-Pyong Championship in 1929. As discussed before, Gyungsung players were 
noted for their highly developed individual technique, while Pyongyang played a high-
energy game based on physical strength. However, whenever Korean teams were pitted 
against Japanese sides during the colonial period it was as if players from the north and 
south of the country played collectively with an emphasis on ‗stamina and speed‘, as 
was observed in Japanese football circles after the tournament to select a national team 
for the 1936 Berlin Olympics had exposed them to Korean opponents.1064 Fighting spirit 
and physical endurance were also seen as the other essential ingredients of Korean 
football. When Soongsil Middle School team won the All-Japan Middle School Football 
Championship in 1928, its robust fighting spirit was praised in the Korean daily press 
and singled out as the main reason for their success.1065 A Chinese newspaper saw 
similar qualities in Korean football praising a star forward playing for a Chinese club for 
his tireless play after a tour of South-East Asia in 1930.1066 This Korean football style 
further developed on account of the successful Hamheung club‘s intensive physical 
training methods in the late 1930s which included including mountain climbing, though 
the emphasis on stamina and physical fitness seemed to preclude sophisticated ball 
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control and thoughtful passing.  
 
For the South Koreans, this kind of discourse on their football style became 
commonplace in the 1970s when international football tournaments held in Asia 
increased and more international football matches, mainly between South Korea and 
teams from other Asian countries, were televised. Television viewers were able to see for 
themselves that while South Korea‘s teams were often superior in terms of stamina they 
were inferior in terms of skill. Superior stamina was usually sufficient to bring success 
against teams from South-East Asia but not against taller and physically stronger teams 
such as Australia who twice thwarted South Korea‘s World Cup qualifying ambitions in 
the 1970s. It was sometimes suggested that the Burmese football style based on an up-
tempo passing game provided a model that South Korean football could emulate.  
 
However, it was North Korean approach to the game, notably demonstrated in 1966, 
that South Korean footballers were able to copy more easily than any other football 
style. This had first been developed in response to the difficulties experienced when 
competing against taller sides in the late 1950s. The popularity of North Korean football 
particularly amongst the English fans in 1966 was closely related to their high work-rate 
on the field. Their courageous but sometimes naïve attacking football with chasing the 
ball all the time was made possible by their formidable speed and stamina. This had 
appealed because it provided a refreshing contrast with the cautious tactics employed 
by most of other teams at the World Cup. The creation of this North Korean style was 
much indebted to a long period of preparation designed to increase their footballers‘ 
endurance through intensive physical training, long-distance running and mountain 
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climbing. Speed was an important element of North Korean football style. It was an   
attribute which North Koreans were said to have in abundance and it was the injection 
of pace supplied by footballers originating from the north that had helped South Korea 
to beat Japan in the 1954 World Cup preliminaries.  
 
It is notable that this football style was being fully developed during a period in which 
North Korea promoted its self-sustaining economy very eagerly under the slogan of the 
‗Chollima Movement‘. This movement compelled the North Koreans to finish their 
allotted work as soon as they could. One of the symbols pertaining to this movement 
was the Chollima tractor. It had been originally imported from the Soviet Union but had 
been remodeled to demonstrate that North Korea depended on no other country in the 
economic sphere. 1067  Similarly, when their distinctive football style began to draw 
attention from a wider audience, the North Korean media was keen to exploit the 
situation for propaganda purposes with the Pyongyang Times explaining that the 
national team‘s great achievements in the 1966 World Cup were ‗attributable to the 
tactical system best suited to the constitution of the Koreans‘.1068  
 
Over time, South Korea‘s approach to the game grew very similar to that of the North 
with much emphasis on building physical strength and endurance through long training 
where the regime, inevitably, included mountain climbing.1069 It seems likely that the 
Hamheung team‘s obsession with climbing in the 1930s was especially influential in 
shaping a distinctively Korean style of play based on speed and endurance which was 
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taken up in both North and South Korea. Certainly, whenever South Korean footballers 
perform well in international tournaments, these two characteristics have been 
especially noticeable. It was the South Koreans‘ tireless and vibrant up-tempo tactics 
through all their games that led them to the 2002 World Cup semi-finals. South Korea, 
as an authoritative foreign observer pointed out after the match against Italy, exhibited 
‗extraordinary stamina and energy as they hassled and harried Italy at every turn‘.1070  
 
It is not an exaggeration to say that these qualities of ‗speed, stamina and spirit‘ have 
featured heavily in the discourse offered by the South Korean media and that they have 
become deeply entrenched in the minds of the people as the distinctive characteristics 
of Korean football. In addition, a consensus has developed in South Korean football 
circles regarding the value of training programmes which are designed to develop the 
stamina required to achieve good results.1071 This emphasis on indefatigable stamina 
was in line with the story that South Koreans liked to tell about themselves as they 
reflected on the progress made by their nation state which ‗without raw materials and 
devastated by civil war had transformed itself from amongst the poorest and most 
ravaged in the world into one of the richest by dint of social organization, centralization 
and phenomenal hard work‘. 1072  The military regimes which ruled from the 1960s 
through to the early 1990s were able to point to rapid development achieved by virtue 
of a labour force that possessed skill, initiative and stamina, just like former Manchester 
United‘s Park Ji Sung who was ‗comfortable in possession, quick to the ball and plenty 
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of indefatigable running‘.1073 The latter quality in particular echoed the perceived virtues 
of the Chollima Movement in the North. 
 
Despite the tendency of football style in North and South Korea to converge, some 
important differences remained at least in the way that the game was perceived in the 
two countries. In particular, ideological perceptions of football styles were accentuated 
by Cold War politics and subsequent North-South antagonism in the period since the 
early 1950s. Thus, for the two Koreas, football style was often seen as being 
characterized by collectivism in the North and individualism in the South. For the North 
Korean media the collective, teamwork-based approach of their national side was a key 
factor when victory was achieved over their neighbours to the south.1074 In contrast, the 
South Korean media was inclined to write off North Korean football for being 
monotonous and played by lifeless robots1075  In reality – and setting ideology aside - 
North Korean teams were relatively superior in terms of strength and stamina whereas 
Southern footballers probably had superior ball skills. 1076  This became clear in the 
‗friendlies‘ between the two national teams in 1990 and the warm-up matches between 
the two national youth teams in 1991. 
 
It has to be recognized that the erosion of unique national playing styles has been 
gathering pace since the 1980s, with greater freedom of movement for players and 
many footballers playing in foreign leagues being included the World Cup national 
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squads.1077 In addition, many expatriate footballers have been included in the national 
teams of their adopted countries, another factor contributing to the homogenization of 
national playing styles. It has also been argued that national styles increasingly have 
converged as a result of a ‗search for more efficiency‘.1078 Thus the ‗universal quest for 
results‘ may explain, for example, the cautious approach of the well-organized Brazilian 
side in the 1994 World Cup, which rejected spontaneity making it difficult to distinguish 
between a South American and European way of playing.1079  
 
It could be argued that football in North and South Korea was relatively unaffected by 
these developments. There have been no expatriate players in the North and South 
Korean national team, with the exception of some Korean-Japanese footballers who 
played for the former. Moreover, with only a small number of North and South Korean 
footballers playing in foreign leagues, their respective national football styles developed 
in a way that owed more to each other than to influences from abroad. In this respect it 
is interesting to compare the recent development of Korean football with football in 
African nations which supply so many players to professional leagues in Europe. 
However, it could also be argued that the worldwide shift from entertaining to 
pragmatically effective   tactics that rely heavily on ‗pressing‘ and a very high work-rate 
are now aligned neatly with the way in which football has been played in both North 
and South Korea.  
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Football in North Korea may have provided an extreme example of how a communist 
regime could exploit and at times abuse the game over the years in order to make 
propaganda and underpin the absolute dictatorship of the party and the Kim dynasty 
that dominated it. In view of this, there was very little space for North Korean football 
to act autonomously as a form of a cultural expression. However, despite the heavy-
handed intervention of the regime, football has continued to be still played widely in 
North Korea and followed by the North Koreans with great enthusiasm. Arguably, 
however, the enduring popularity of football in North Korea suggests some degree of 
autonomy in that it has persisted in the face of somewhat inconsistent support from the 
regime.  It could be also argued that the main effect of the successes enjoyed by 
North Korean football from time to time was to enhance the morale of the people and 
their pride in the nation rather than to generate loyalty to the regime, though this 
might have occurred incidentally.  
 
In the context of enduring Cold War politics, it is unsurprising that the fortunes of 
South Korean football have been considerably influenced by the intervention of the 
state acting through various agencies. This was first evident when South Korea was 
under the control of a military regime from 1961 to 1979. Under the Park administration 
sport began to be regarded as very important as ‗physical strength is national power‘ 
indicated. It was in this period that a ‗super club‘, Yangji run by KCIA, was established, 
and an international football tournament, the Park‘s Cup was set up. Until the early 
1980s, when entrepreneurs began to emerge as patrons of fully-fledged professional 
clubs, the South Korean state was directly involved in nurturing ‗state amateurs‘ whom 
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they hoped would match the football successes enjoyed by North Korea.1080 Even after 
the 1980s, it could be argued, the government remained active in support of the 
national football team, assisting indirectly to ensure that it is in a position to fly the 
South Korean flag world-wide in international tournaments. Under this dispensation, the 
interests of South Korean football clubs have been regarded as subservient to those of 
‗FC Korea‘. Despite many contrasting features, it is an indisputable resemblance between 
North and South Korean football in terms of state intervention, although the former 
offered a more extreme case.  
 
If there has been another enduring similarity between North Korean and South Korean 
football it has been in the style of play. For both North and South Korean footballers, 
chasing a ball for ninety minutes with speed and stamina has been far more important 
than passing, possession or individual skills. In the first half of the twentieth century 
superior speed and stamina had been important in defeating the Japanese rulers in 
many crucial football matches and the Korean approach to the game had been quite 
different from the more technically- oriented Japanese football style. This tradition was 
further accentuated after partition when both North and South Korea had no alternative 
but to rely heavily on the efforts of their respective workforces as they set about the 
task of the post-war reconstruction and prepared for ideological battle. In this 
competitive climate, a high value was placed on the virtues of hard work in both 
countries. What was seen as a distinctively Korean football style, with much emphasis 
on building strength so that opponents would eventually be out-run, thus reflected and 
epitomized the two Korean societies, both north and south of the border that divided 
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them from 1953 onwards. This tendency was accentuated because both North and 
South Korea were confronted with the problem of finding a way of competing 
effectively against teams from the established elite of world football, whose players 
tended to be well-built and more skilful in comparison with Korean footballers. In order 
to close the gap and achieve creditable results in international matches Koreans focused 
on arduous training systems designed to enhance the endurance of their players. When 
success was achieved, for example by the North Korean World Cup squad in 1966, the 
tendency to rely on these methods was reinforced. Thus it could be argued that the 
Korean way of playing was not merely the manifestation of an ethnic character but also 
a realistic way to gain international recognition via football.  
 
Over recent years, and especially since the 1990s, there has been a gradual erosion of 
the Korean style, especially in South Korea. Greater exposure to European and South 
American football led to more awareness of the advantages of a passing game. In 
addition, the increasing number of South Korean footballers playing for European clubs, 
especially after the 2002 World Cup, meant that it became impractical to subject them 
to harsh training camps for lengthy periods. However, the idea of a distinctive Korean 
approach which has enabled highly- motivated, well-organized teams to develop the 
necessary endurance to overcome natural disadvantages and compete effectively 
against teams with more resources and superior technique still has its attractions. It is 
part of a shared cultural heritage embodying ethnic sameness which has survived in the 
two Korean nation-states, despite their troubled history and continuing uneasy 






A. Primary Sources 
 
<Official References and Archival Sources> 
 
(Korean) 
Baejae Middle and High School, The History of Baejae, Seoul, 1955.  
Japanese Government-General at Gyungsung, The Biographical Dictionary of Members 
of Parliament in Chosun, Gyungsung, 1931. 
Korea Baseball Organization (KBO), The 1983 Korean Professional Baseball Yearbook, 
Seoul, 1983. 
Korean Basketball Association, 100 Years of Korean Basketball: 1907-2007, Seoul, 2008. 
Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), The Present Condition of North Korea‘s Sports 
Activities in Foreign Countries, Seoul, 1973.  
Korea Football Association (KFA), A 100-year History of Korean Football, Seoul, 1986.   
——, A 100-year History of Korean Football, Seoul, 2003. 
Korean Sports Association (KSA), The History of the Korean Sports Association, Seoul, 
1965. 
——, A 70-Year History of the Korea Sports Association, Seoul, 1990.  
Ministry of Sports and Youth, The North-South Unification Football Championship, 
Seoul, 1991. 
Osan Academic Institution, A Hundred Year History of Osan, Seoul, 2007. 
The Publication Committee for the History of Chosun Ilbo, A 50-Year History of Chosun 
Ilbo, Seoul, 1970. 
The Graduates‘ Association of Joongang, A Hundred Year History of Joongang, Seoul, 
2008. 
The Graduates‘ Association of Sunrin Middle and High School, A Hundred Year History 
of Sunrin, Seoul, 2000.  
303 
 
The Gyungshin History Publication Committee, The History of Gyungshin (1885-1991), 
Seoul, 1991. 
The Publication Committee for the History of Donga Ilbo, The History of Donga Ilbo 
(1920-45), vol. 1, Seoul, 1975. 
The Publication Committee of Korea University, The 60-Year Journal, Seoul, 1962. 
The Sports Association of Korean Residents in Japan, The History of the Sports 
Association of Korean Residents in Japan, Tokyo, 1992, (in Japanese language) 
‗With regard to Popularising Sports and quickly developing Sports Skills: Kim Jong Il‘s 
statement to the Central Committee of the Chosun Worker‘s Party, 19, May, 1986‘, in 
A Selection from the Statements of Kim Jong Il, vol. 8, Pyongyang, 1998, 400-23 
‗With regard to developing Sports: Kim Jong Il‘s statement to the Leaders of North 
Korean Sports, 2, June, 1989‘, in A Selection from the Statements of Kim Jong Il, vol. 9, 
Pyongyang, 1997, 333-41. 
Yonsei Football Old Boys Association (YOBA), 70 Years of Yonsei Football, Seoul, 1989. 
Yun Chi-ho, The Diary of Yun Chi Ho, vol. 8, 9, 10, Seoul, 1921-33.  
 
(English) 
FIFA, FIFA/Coca-Cola Cup-World Youth Championship-Mexico 1983 Technical Report, 
Zurich, 1983.  











Chugan Sports (Weekly Sports) 




Mal (The Language) 
Samchuli 
Tongil Hanguk (Unification Korea) 
Wolgan Joongang (Monthly Joongang) 
Wolgan Chukgu (Monthly Football) 
 
(English) 
Charles Buchan‘s Football Monthly 
London Review of Books  
FIFA World 
When Saturday Comes  













Chosun Shinbo (Tokyo) 















Maeil Gyungjae Shinmun 
Maeil Shinbo 
Munwha Ilbo 












Corriere Della Serra (Rome) 
Daily Express 
Daily Mail (Northern Edition) 
Daily Sketch 
Daily Telegraph 
Evening Gazette (Middlesbrough) 
Guardian 
Los Angeles Times 
Liverpool Echo and Evening Express  








New York Times 
Northern Echo 
South China Morning Post(Hong Kong) 
South China Sunday Post Herald 
Sunday Mirror 
Sunday Times 
The Scotsman (Edinburgh) 
The Straits Times (Singapore) 
The Times 





Ham Yong-gil, Comets, vol. 1, Pyongyang, 2003.  




Interview with Chang Heng Hoon, Seoul, 6 March 2008. 
Interview with Choi Jong Duk, Seosan City, 17 Mar, 2009. 
Interview with Jung Yong Whan, Uijeongbu City, 25 Mar 2008. 
Interview with Kim Ho Gon, Seoul, 12 March 2008.  











Ariyama T., Koshien Baseball and the Japanese, Tokyo, 1997. 
Goto T., The Future Centuries of Japanese Soccer, Tokyo, 1997.  
——, A History of Japanese Soccer: the Ninety years of the Japanese National Team 
(1917-2006), Tokyo, 2007. 
Kawabuchi S., Grabbing the Rainbow, Tokyo, 2006. 
Ohshima H., The Legend of Kick-off between Japan and Korea, Tokyo, 1996. 
Shin Mu-gan, Jainichi, Soccer, and Identity, Tokyo, 2010. 
Takeuchi J. (ed.), Unofficial History of Japanese Football, Komae, 1991. 
Whang Sung-bin, ‗The World Cup and Japanese Portrait, and Korea as the other ‘, in 
Arimoto T. and Ogasawara H. (eds.), Soccer‘s Poetics and Politics, Tokyo, 2005, 175-210. 
 
(Korean) 
Ahn Min-seok, ‗North Korean People‘s Leisure Pursuits and Sports Activities‘, in Korean 
Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (ed), North Korean People‘s Daily Life and 
Popular Culture, Seoul, 2003, 45-87.  
Baik Hak-soon, A History of North Korean Power, Seoul, 2010. 
Ban Byung-ryul, ‗The Impeachment of Rhee Syng Man and Leaders of the Korean 
Provisional Government at Shanghai‘, in Young-ik Yu, Rhee Syng Man and the Korean 
Provisional Government, The Scholarly Series of Modern Korean Study, vol.13, Seoul, 
2009. 100-18. 
Chang Eun-ju, ‗The Mutual Understanding of Korea and Japan in the years following 
1945‘, in Publication Committee of the Collection of Dissertations on the History of 
Korea-Japan relations, Issues and Views of Korea-Japan relations in the Post-Liberation 
period, Seoul, 2005. 43-92.  
Chang Gyu-sik, Korean Christian Nationalism under Japanese Rule, Seoul, 2001. 




Cho Dong-pyo and Kwon Young-chae, A Dunk-Shot in 96 years: A 100-Year History of 
Korean Women‘s Basketball, Seoul, 2006. 
Choi Han-su, Does TV Benefit from Sports?, Seoul, 1998. 
Cho Hee-yeon, Park Jung Hee and an Era of Developmental Dictatorship, Seoul, 2007 
Cho Yong-man, Night Tales at Gyungsung, Seoul, 1992. 
Choi Dong-sub et al, A Football History of Ethnic Koreans Living in Yanbien, Yanbien, 
1992. 
Choi Joon, A History of Korean Newspapers, Seoul, 1990. 
Choi Young-jin, The Politics of Korean Regionalism and Identity, Seoul, 1999. 
Chosun Ilbo Research Centre for its Historical Materials, The People of Chosun Ilbo: 
Japanese Colonial Period, Seoul, 2004. 
Chung Dong-gil, North Korean Sporting Hero, Seoul, 2001.  
Chun Jung-whan, A Syndrome Still Lingers On, Seoul, 2005. 
Guk Heung-joo, The Fateful Bottom of the Ninth Inning, Seoul, 1975. 
Han Geun-jo, Godang Cho Man Sik, Seoul, 1973. 
Huh Jin-seok, The Birth of Sports Republic: Sports policy of the Third Republic and 
President of KSA, Min Gwan Sik, Seoul, 2010. 
Joo Ik-jong, Scout of a Large Army: the Gyungsung Textile Company under Japanese 
Rule and Kim Sung Soo and Kim Yeon Soo, Seoul, 2008. 
Joongang Ilbo, Ah! Korea, Seoul, 2005. 
Ju Dong-jin and Ko Hong-ryul, Mongyang Yeo Woon Hyung‘s Sports and Cultural 
Activities, in Sports Society Philosophy Studies, A history of Korean Sport Figures, Seoul, 
2004. 123-42. 
Ju Sung-ha, A Pyongyang Story Written in Seoul, Seoul, 2010. 
Jung Hee-jun, Sports, Korea Fantasy: A Korean Social and Cultural History, Seoul, 2009. 
Jung Jin-seok, The History of Korean Newspapers, Seoul, 1990. 
Kang Chol-whan and Rigoulot P., The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North 
Korean Gulag, New York, 2005.  
Kang Jun-man, Football is Korea: A 124-year History of Korean football (1882-2006), 
Seoul, 2006. 
——, The Exploration of Modern Korean History 1940s (2), Seoul, 2004. 
——, The Exploration of Modern Korean history 1950s (3), Seoul, 2004. 
309 
 
——, The Exploration of Modern Korean History, 1970s (1), Seoul, 2002. 
——, The Exploration of Contemporary Korean History in the 1980s (1), Seoul, 2003 
——, The Exploration of Contemporary Korean History 1980s (2), Seoul, 2003. 
Kang Jun-man and Kim Whan-pyo, Scapegoats and a Sense of Guilt: A History of Anti-
Communism in Korea, Seoul, 2004. 
Korea Football Association, Korea Football Hall of Fame, Seoul, 2005.  
Kim Byung-ha et al., Football of Our Nation, Pyongyang, 1963.  
Kim Gwi-ok, The Identity and Experience of the Brethren who Came from the North: 
Research on North Korean Refugees, Seoul, 1999. 
Kim Hye-jin, ‗Kim Chang Ryong: From Japanese Military Police to the Head of CIC, in 
Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities, A History that has not been 
eradicated: Pro-Japanese Faction who Controlled Modern Korean History, vol. 1, Seoul, 
1994, 180-96. 
Kim Hwa-sung, Korea is Football, Seoul, 2002. 
Kim Jae-woo, A Hundred-Year Sports History of Seoul YMCA, Seoul, 2009. 
Kim Jung-san, ‗Chung Mong Joon‘, in KFA, Korean Football Hall of Fame, Seoul, 2005, 
299-346.  
Kim Kyung-ju, ‗Hiddink‘, in KFA, Korean Football Hall of Fame, Seoul, 2005, 255-89.  
Kim Sae-joong, ‗The Development and Consequence of a Nexus between Civilians and 
the Military in the 1950s: A Change in the Military, 4.19 and 5.16 Revolutions‘, in 
Jung-in Moon and Sae-joong Kim (eds.), The Interpretation of Modern Korean History 
in the 1950s, Seoul, 2004, 39-94. 
Kim Sang-tae, ‗What did the Regional Antagonism emerge?‘, in The Research 
Association of Korean History, How We Lived For The Past One Hundred Years, vol.2, 
Seoul, 1988, 257-73. 
Kim Soon-gyo, The Present Situation of North Korean Sports with its Sports Activities at 
Home and Abroad as the Central Theme, Seoul, 1982. 
Kim Sung-won, A History of the Development of Korean Football, Seoul, 2004. 
Kim Yeon-Chul, The Remembrance of Cold War, Seoul, 2009. 
The Korean Journalists Association, A History of Korean Journalists: the Pre Liberation 
Era, vol. 2, Seoul, 1992. 
Korean Newspaper Research Institution, A Journal of Korean Journalists, Seoul, 1981. 
310 
 
Lee Eui-jae, People‘s History of Korean Football, vol. 1, Seoul, 2009.  
——, People‘s History of Korean Football, vol. 2, Seoul, 2009.  
Lee Dong-gyu et al., Football: Past and Present, Pyongyang, 2001. 
Lee Dong-yeon, ‗The Birth of Sports Events in the Periphery and the Nation‘s Narcissism: 
a Football Tournaments as a Symbol of Modernization in Asia during the 1970s‘, in 
East Asia Research Centre of Sungkonghoe University (ed.), The Cultural Landscape of 
Cold War Asia: 1960s-70s, Seoul, 2009, 473-95. 
Lee Hak-rae, A Contemporary History of Korean Sports, Yongin, 2008. 
——, A 100-year History of Korean sports, Seoul, 2001. 
——, A Sports History of Modern Korea, Seoul, 1990. 
Lee Hak-rae and Kim Dong-sun, The Sports of North Korea, Paju, 2004.  
Lee Han-young, Kim Jong Il and the Royal Family: A Memoir of Kim Il Sung‘s Wife‘s 
Nephew, Seoul, 2004 
Lee Jong-seok, A History of North Korea, vol 2: The Juche Ideology and Solipsism in 
North Korean System 1960-1994, Seoul, 2011. 
——, Research into the North Korean Worker ‘s Party, Seoul, 1995. 
Lee Jung-sik, Yeo Woon Hyung, Seoul, 2008.  
Lee Myung-ja, North Korean Movies and their Modernity, Seoul, 2005.  
Lee Seung-heon, ‗The Reshuffling of the North Korean Party and Rise of Solipsism: From 
Restrictive Pluralism to Solipsistic System‘, in The North Korean Graduate School of 
Gyungnam University (ed.), A History of Modern North Korea, vol 1, Seoul, 2004, 343-
68. 
Lee Young-man, Hundreds of Thousands of Stories Intertwined with a Ball, Seoul, 1998. 
Min Gyung-bae, A 100-year History of the YMCA Movement in Seoul (1903-2003), Seoul, 
2004. 
Oh Mi-il, The First Industrial Capitalists in Modern Korea, Seoul, 2002. 
Park Dal, A New Light, Part 2, Pyongyang, 1961. 
Park Gyung-ho and Kim Duk-gi, A Secret History of Korean Football, Seoul, 2000. 
Park Myung-lim, Park Jung Hee and Kim Il Sung, in the Editorial Board of Review on 
History, The Rivals Shaping North and South Korea: A Modern History of the Key 
Figures in North and South Korea, Seoul, 2008, 21-49. 
Park No-ja, Making Courageous Men, Seoul, 2009. 
311 
 
Ra Hyun-sung, Sports History of Korea, Seoul, 1958.  
Ryu Song-a, Hong Duk Young in KFA, Korea Football Hall of Fame, Seoul, 2005, 67-99. 
Shin Duk-sang and Kim Duk-gi, A National Pastime: Football and its Brilliant Traces: A 
Story of Korean Sports History, vol. 10, Seoul, 1999. 
Shin Hyun-gyu, A Tale of Giseang: the Pop Star in the Colonial Period, Paju, 2007. 
So Young-hyun, The Heyday of Young Tramps: a Cultural Perspective of Modern Boys, 
Seoul, 2008. 
Son In-su, A History of Modern Education in Korea, Seoul, 1971. 
Suh Ki-won, A Certain Life: Biography of the Legend of South Korean Football, Kim Yong 
Sik, Seoul, 2000. 
Sung Hye-rang, A Wisteria Vine-Roofed House, Seoul, 2001. 
Yu Hong-rak, Chun Il-pyong, and Lee Jong-nam, A History of Korean Baseball, Seoul, 
1999. 
Yu Hong-rak and Lee Jong-nam, From Gillete to Lee Young Min, Seoul, 1997. 
Yun Gyung-heon and Choi Chang-shin, A National Pastime: Football and its Bright 
Morning : A Story of Korean Sports History, vol. 3, Seoul, 1997. 
 
(English) 
Aja T., ‗Spanish Sports Policy in Republican and Fascist Spain‘, in Arnauld P. and Riordan 
J. (eds.), Sport and International Politics: the Impact of Fascism and Communism on 
Sport, London and New York, 1998, 97-113. 
Alaway R., Football all Round the World: Islington Corinthians, London, 1948.  
Alegi P., African Soccerscapes: How a Continent Changed the World‘s Game, Athens, 
2010. 
Bishop I., Korea and Her Neighbors, Seoul, 1970.  
Butler O., ‗Getting the Games: Japan, South Korean and the Co-hosted World Cup‘, in J. 
Horne and W. Manzenreiter (eds.), Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup, London and 
New York, 2002, 43-55. 
Charlton B., Sir Bobby Charlton: The Autobiography: My England Years, London, 2008. 
Chung Hong-ik, ‗Government Involvement in Football in Korea‘, in Manzenreiter W. and 
Horne J. (eds.), Football Goes East: Business, Culture and The People‘s Game in China, 
Japan and South Korea, Abingdon, 2004, 117-30.  
312 
 
Crolley L. and Hand D., Football, Europe and the Press, London, 2002. 
Cumings B., Korea‘s Place in the Sun: a Modern History, New York, 2005. 
——, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. II, The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950, 
Princeton, 1990. 
Darby P., Africa, Football and FIFA: Politics, Colonialism and Resistance, London, 2002. 
Demick B., Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea, New York, 2010.  
Duke V. and Crolley L., Football, Nationality and the State, Harlow, 1996, 94-5. 
Edelman R., Serious Fun: A History of Spectator Sports in the USSR, Oxford and New 
York, 1993. 
——, Spartak Moscow: A History of the People‘s Team in the Workers‘ State, Ithaca, 
2009. 
Foot J., Calcio: A History of Italian Football, London, 2007.  
Ford G. and Kwon So-Young, North Korea on the Brink: Struggle for Survival, London, 
2008. 
Gaddis J., The Cold War: a New History, New York, 2005. 
Galeano E., (trans.) Fried M., Soccer in Sun and Shadow, London and New York, 1999. 
Ginsborg P., A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, London, 
1990. 
——, Italy and its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State, London, 2003. 
Giulianotti R., Football: a Sociology of the Global Game, Cambridge, 2000. 
Glanville B., The Story of the World Cup, London, 2010 
Goldblatt D., The Ball Is Round: A Global History of Football, London, 2006.  
Gordon A., A Modern History of Japan: from the Tokugawa Era to the Present, New York 
and Oxford, 2003. 
Guoqi X., Olympic Dreams: China and Sports 1895-2008, Cambridge and London, 2008 
Guttmann A., Games and Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism, New York, 
1994. 
——, The Olympics: a History of the Modern Games, (2nd ed.), Urbana and Chicago, 
2002. 
Guttmann A. and Thompson L., Japanese Sports: A History, Honolulu, 2001.  
Ha Nam-gil and Mangan J., ‗Ideology, Politics, Power: Korean Sport-Transformation, 
1945-92‘, in Hong F. and Mangan J. (eds.), Sport in Asian Society: Past and Present, 
313 
 
London, 2002, 213-42. 
Hampton J., The Austerity Olympics: When the Games Came to London in 1948, London, 
2008. 
Handler A., From Goals to Guns: The Golden Age of Soccer in Hungary 1950-1956, New 
York, 1994 
Henderson G., Korea: the Politics of Vortex, Cambridge, 1968. 
Hesselmann M. and Ide R., ‗A Tale of Two Germanys: Football Culture and National 
Identity in the German Democratic Republic‘, in Tomlinson, A. and Young, C. (eds.), 
German Football: History, Culture, Society, Abingdon, 2006, 36-51.  
Hobsbawm E., The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991, New York, 1996. 
——, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge, 1990. 
Holt R., Sport and Society in Modern France, Basingstoke, 1981. 
——, Sport and the British: A Modern History, Oxford, 1989.  
Holt R. and Mason T., Sport in Britain 1945-2000, London, 2000 
Hong F. and Mangan J., ‗Will the ‗Iron Roses‘ Bloom Forever? Women‘s Football in China: 
Changes and Challenges‘, in Hong F. and Mangan J. (eds.), Soccer, Women, Sexual 
Liberation: Kicking-off a New Era, London and Portland, 2004. 47-66. 
Hulbert H., The Passing of Korea, Seoul, 2000. 
Johnes M., Soccer and Society: South Wales 1900-1939, Cardiff, 2002. 
Kissinger H., On China, New York, 2011. 
Koh Eun-Ha, Andrews D. and White R., ‗Beyond the Stadium, and into the Street: Sport 
and Anti-Americanism in South Korea‘, in Wagg S. and Andrews D. (eds.), East Plays 
West: Sport and The Cold War, Abingdon and New York, 2007, 314-29. 
Kowalski R. and Porter D., ‗Cold War Football: British-European Encounters in the 1940s 
and 1950s‘, in Wagg S. and Andrews D. (eds.), East Plays West: Sport And The Cold 
War, Abingdon, 2007, 64-81. 
Lanfranchi P. et al., 100 Years of Football: The FIFA Centennial Book, London, 2004. 
Lanfranchi P. and Taylor M., Moving with the Ball, Oxford and New York, 2001. 
Lankov A., From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960, New 
Brunswick, 2002.  
——, ‗The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism‘, Asia Policy (1), Jan 2006, 95-121.  
Lee Hyang-jin, ‗Images of Otherness and ―Sleeping with the Enemy‖ in North Korean 
314 
 
Cinema‘, in  Portal J. and McKillop B. (eds.), North Korean Culture and Society: Papers 
from the British Museum and BAKS Study Days 2001 and 2002, London, 2004, 33-8.  
Lee Ki-baik, A New History of Korea, Cambridge and London, 1984 
Lichtenberger U., Tor ! The Story of German Football, London, 2002.  
Marks J., ‗The French National Team and National Identity: ‗Cette France d‘un ―bleu 
métis‘‘‘, in  Dauncey H. and Hare G.(eds.), France and the 1998 World Cup: The 
National Impact of a World Sporting Event, London, 1999, 41-57. 
Martin S., Sport Italia: the Italian Love Affair with Sport, London, 2011 
McIlvanney H., (ed.), World Cup ‘66, London, 1966.  
Morris A., Marrow of the Nation: a History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican 
China, Berkeley and London, 2004. 
Moseley P. and Murray B., ‗Soccer‘, in W. Vamplew and B. Stoddart (eds.), Sport in 
Australia: A Social History, Cambridge, 1994, 213-30. 
Murray B., Football: A History of the World Game, Basingstoke, 1994. 
——, Cultural Revolution? Football in the Societies of Asia and the Pacific, in S. Wagg 
(ed.), Giving the Game Away: Football, Politics and Culture on Five Continents, London, 
1995, 138-62. 
Oliver G., The Guinness Book of World Soccer, The History of the Game in over 150 
Countries (2nd ed.), London, 1995. 
Oberdorfer D., The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (New ed.), New York, 2001. 
Porter D., ‗Entrepreneurship‘, in Pope S. and Nauright J. (eds), Routledge Companion to 
Sports History, Abingdon, 2010, 197-215. 
——, ‗The Reverend K.R.G. Hunt: Muscular Christian and Famous Footballer‘, in Day D. 
(ed.), Sporting Lives, Crewe, 2011,40-54. 
Roelfs J., A Tale in June: Be the Reds, (trans.) Hee-seung Yang, Seoul, 2003. 
Sandbrook D., White Heat: a History of Britain in the Swinging Sixties, London, 2007. 
Schmid A., Korea between Empires 1895-1919, New York, 2002. 
Shin Gi-wook, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, And Legacy, Stanford, 
2006.  
Sir Rous S., Football Worlds: a Lifetime in Sport, London, 1978. 
Smith D., and Williams G., Fields of Praise: The Official History of The Welsh Rugby 
Union, Cardiff, 1980.  
315 
 
Spurling J., Death or Glory: the Dark History of the World Cup, London, 2010. 
Sugden J. and Tomlinson A., ‗International Power Struggles in the Governance of World 
Football: the 2002 and 2006 World Cup Bidding Wars‘, in Horne J. and Manzenreiter 
W. (eds.), Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup, London and New York, 2002, 56-70. 
Suh Dae-sook, Kim Il Sung: the North Korean Leader, New York, 1988. 
The Game of their Lives: the Greatest Shock in World Cup History: the Book of the Film, 
London, 2002. 
Tomlinson A. and Young C., ‗Culture, Politics and Spectacle in the Global Sports Event: 
an Introduction‘, in Tomlinson A. and Young C. (eds.), National Identity and Global 
Sports Events: Culture, Politics, and spectacle in the Olympics and the Football World 
Cup, London and New York, 2006, 1-14. 
Whang Soon-hee, ‗Football, Fashion and Fandom: Sociological Reflections on the 2002 
World Cup and Collective Memories in Korea‘, in J. Horne and W. Manzanreiter (eds.), 
Football Goes East: Business, Culture, and the People‘s Game in China, Japan, and 
South Korea, London, 2004, 148-64. 
Williams J., A Beautiful Game: International Perspectives on Women‘s Football, Oxford, 
2007. 
Wilson J., Inverting the Pyramid : A History of Football Tactics, London, 2008. 





Kim Sang-tae, ‗Pyongan Province‘s Christian Forces and the Formation of Pro-American 
Elites‘, Criticism on History, 45, Winter 1998, 171-207. 
——, ‗Dongwoohoe and Heungup Gurakbu in the period 1920-1930‘, Comment on 
Korean History, 28, Dec 1992, 209-62. 
Son Hwan, ‗Sport Activities of Hakwoohoe in Japan, Korean Journal for History of 
Physical Education, Sport and Dance, vol. 13, 2004, 45-60.  
Choi Wan-soo, ‗Kan Song Jeon Hyeong Pil‘, in Centre for the Study of Korean Arts, Kan 
Song Mun Hwa, 70, Seoul, 2006, 107-57. 
Oh Mi-il, ‗The Business Methods of Korean Businessmen with Political Affiliation during 
316 
 
the Japanese Colonial Period: the Capital Accumulation and Political-Social Activities 
of Baik Nam-Shin amd Baik In-Ki,‘ History and the Boundaries, 57, Dec 2005, 121-57. 
 
(English) 
Adams I., ‗Pancasila: Sport and the Building of Indonesia: Ambitions and Obstacles‘, 
International Journal of the History of Sport, 19 (2), Jun-Sep, 2002, 295-318.  
Bridges B., ‗Reluctant Mediator: Hong Kong, the Two Koreas and the Tokyo Olympics‘, 
International Journal of the History of Sport, 24 (3), 2007, 375-91.  
Ha Nam-gil and Mangan J., ‗A Curious Conjunction – Sport, Religion and Nationalism: 
Christianity and the Modern History of Korea‘, International Journal of the History of 
Sport, 11(3), 1994, 329-54. 
——, ‗The Knights of Korea: the Hwarangdo, Militarism and Nationalism‘, International 
Journal of the History of Sport, 15 (2), 1998, 77-102. 
Light R. and Watanabe Y., ‗J League Football and the Rethinking of Regional Identity in 
Japan‘, Sporting Traditions, 18 (2), May 2002. 
Lin C. and Lee P., ‗Sport as a Medium of National Resistance: Politics and Baseball in 
Taiwan during Japanese Colonialism, 1895-1945‘, International Journal of the History 
of Sport, 24 (3), Mar 2007, 319-37. 
Merkel U., ‗Sport, Politics and Reunification – A Comparative Analysis of Korea and 
Germany‘, International Journal of the History of Sport, 26 (3), Mar, 2009, 406-28. 
Moffet S. and Lee C., ‗Political Football: old wounds are reopened as Japan and South 
Korea battle for the 2002 World Cup‘, Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 May 1996, 43-
4.  
Ok Gwang, ‗The Political Significance of Sport: An Asian Case Study – Sport, Japanese 
Colonial Policy and Korean National Resistance, 1910-45‘, International Journal of the 
History of Sport, 22 (4), 2005, 649-70.  
Podoler G., ‗Nation, State and Football: The Korean Case‘, International Journal of the 
History of Sport, 25 (1), 2008, 1-17.  
Polley M., ‗The Diplomatic Background to the 1966 Football World Cup‘, The Sports 
Historian, 18 (2), 1998, 1-18.  
Riordan J., ‗The Strange Story of Nikolai Starostin, Football and Lavrentii Beria‘, Europe-





Lee Jong-sung, ‗The Peculiar Relationship between Regional Antagonism and Korean 
Baseball: 1970s-1980s‘, MA dissertation, De Montfort University, 2008.  
Mason T., ‗When Was The First Real World Cup?‘, Proceedings of the Conference on 
Globalization and Sport in Historical Context, University of California, San Diego, 
March 2005. 1-11. 
 
<Electronic and Audiovisual References> 
 
BBC, South Korea‘s hard to follow, 24 May 2006. Available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/in_ depth/49 85368.stm [Accessed 31 Nov 2011].  
Extract of the minutes of the 55th session of the International Olympic Committee in 
Munich (Haus des Sportes), May 25th to May 28th 1959, 75. Available from: 
http://www.la84foundation.org/OlympicInformationCenter/OlympicReview/1959/BDCE6
7/BDCE67zb.pdf [Accessed 23, Apr, 2011]. 
South Korea versus Italy, broadcast by Chosun Joongang TV, Pyongyang. 23 Jun 2002. 
[Accessed at Information Centre on North Korea in Seoul]. 















(1) Some key dates of Korean history 
 
1910 The Japanese annexation of Korea 
1919 The First of March Movement (An independence demonstration) 
1945 Liberation from Japanese colonial rule 
1948 The establishment of the two individual governments led by Rhee Syng Man 
and Kim Il Sung at Seoul and Pyongyang accordingly 
1950 The Korean War  
1958 The start of Chollima Movement in the North 
1961 The May 16 Military Revolution led by Park Chung Hee 
1967 The purge of the Gabsan faction within the Worker ‘s Party in the North 
1974 The assassination of the first lady by Pro-North Korean man living in Japan 
Kim Jong Il was appointed as the successor of his father, Kim Il Sung 
1979 The assassination of President Park Chung Hee 
1980 The Gwangju Democratization Movement 
1981 The inauguration of President Jeon Du Whan  
1983 17 South Korean officials were killed by North Korean agents in Burma 
1987 The bombing of a Korean air flight made by North Korean agents 
1988 The inauguration of President Roh Tae Woo 
1990 South Korea established diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union 
1991 North and South Korea joined the United Nations 
1992 South Korea established diplomatic ties with China 
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1993 The inauguration of President Kim Young Sam 
North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
1994 The death of Kim Il Sung 
1997 The IMF(International Monetary Fund) Crisis shook the foundation of South 
Korean economy 
1998 The inauguration of President Kim Dae Joong 
2000 The first summit talks between the two Koreas were held 
2002 President Bush declared that North Korea was part of the world‘s ‗Axis of Evil‘ 
Roh Moo Hyun was elected as President of South Korea with the overwhelming 

















(2) Some key dates of Korean football history 
 
1906 The first official football match was played 
(Hwangsung YMCA vs The Korean Sports Club) 
1921 The two All Chosun Football Championships were founded at Gyungsung and 
Pyongyang respectively 
1925 The Chosun Football Club was set up 
1929 The Gyungsung-Pyongyang Football Championship started 
1928 The Soongsil Middle School from Pyongyang won the All Japan Middle School 
Football Championship 
1935 The interruption of the Gyungsung-Pyongyang Football Championship 
1936 A Korean footballer played for Japanese national football team at the Berlin 
Olympics 
1946 The last Gyungsung-Pyongyang Football Championship was held 
1948 South Korean national football team participated in the London Olympics 
1954 The first official international football match between South Korea and Japan 
was held 
South Korea qualified for the Swiss World Cup for the first time 
1961 North Korean football team won Moscow Spartak by a score of 2-1  
1963 North Korean national football team reached the final of GANEFO 
1966 North Korea reached the quarter-finals of the England World Cup 
1967 Yangji Football Club was founded in South Korea 
1971 The foundation of President Park Chung Hee‘s Cup Asia Football Tournament 
April 25 Football Club was set up at Pyongyang 
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1978 The first Korean derby at senior level was played at Bangkok Asian Games 
1982 The FIFA imposed two-year international ban on North Korea 
1983 The professionalization of South Korean football 
The South Korean Youth team reached semi-finals of the FIFA Youth World Cup 
1986 South Korea qualified for the Mexico World Cup in 32 years 
1990 Unification Football Championship between North and South Korea was held 
1991 A unified team played in the FIFA Youth Championship in Portugal 
1996 The FIFA made a decision: Korea/Japan co-hosting 2002 World Cup 
2001 North Korean women‘s team won the Asian Women‘s Football Championship 
2002 South Korea reached semi-finals of the 2002 World Cup 
North Korean women‘s team won the Asian Games 
  
  
 
